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1 - 10 of 15 (0.30 seconds)Section 4 in The Contempt Of Courts Act, 1971 [Entire Act]
The Contempt Of Courts Act, 1971
Article 215 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Article 21 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Section 15 in The Contempt Of Courts Act, 1971 [Entire Act]
Section 7 in The Contempt Of Courts Act, 1971 [Entire Act]
State Of Maharashtra vs Sindhi @ Raman on 19 February, 1975
In this view we are supported by the observations made in State of Maharashtra v. Sindhi alias Raman . The Supreme Court in this case held :- 166 "So far as an accused person sentenced to death is concerned, his trial does not conclude with the termination of the proceedings in the court of Session. The reason is that the death sentence passed by the court of Sessions is subject to confirmation by the High Court. A trial cannot be deemed to have concluded till an executable sentence is passed by the competent court. Viewed from that stand-point, the confirmation proceedings under Sections 374, 375 and 376, Chapter xxvii of the Code of 1898, are in substance a continuation of the trial."
Section 368 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
S.N. Nagaraja Rao vs Chikkachennappa And Ors. on 2 January, 1981
(20) Next we may turn to the argument of Mr. Sodhi Teja Singh, counsel for the State. His objection to these proceedings is based on his construction of Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act whereby unless the Court proceedings on its own motion or on a motion made by the Advocate General, any contempt proceedings initiated by any other person can only be moved by such person with the consent in writing of Advocate General or the Law Officer duly appointed by the Union Territory, we however, do not agree with his contention and in this regard we are supported by the view taken by a Full Bench of Karnataka High Court in S.N.Nagaraja Rao v. Chikkachennappa and others (1981 Cri. Law Journal P. 43) wherein it has been held :- "Article 215 of the Constitution confers on every High Court the Power to Punish for contempt of itself. This power is wide enough to cover cases of act or omission which amounts to contempt of High Court. Therefore whether contempt of High Court alleged to have been committed by any one is of the description referred to in Section 14 or Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, it is competent for the High Court to punish the alleged contemner in exercise of its power under that Article. Such an action could be taken by the High Court under Art. 215 either on its own motion or securing information in whatever manner or on a motion made by the Advocate General or by any other person. Consent of the Advocate General is not contemplated by the Article for a motion made by any other person. 1971 Cri. L.J. 844 (SC) Ref. to. Even after the enactment of the Contempt of Courts Act, the Power of the High Court to punish for contempt of itself, continues to be derived from and traceable only to Art. 215, and therefore a provision in an enactment made by the Legislature to regulate contempt actions cannot be so construed as to affect the Content of the Power given to the High Court under the Constitution. Therefore, Section 15(1) providing for the consent of the Advocate General cannot be construed as mandatory as the power of the High Court to punish for criminal contempt of itself is conferred on it by Art. 215 without any such restriction, 1972 Crl. L.J. 643 (SC) and , Rel. on. Further, Section 15(1) is not couched in negative language stating that no motion by a person (other than the AdvocateGeneral) shall be entertained by the High Court without the consent of the Advocate General. The Legislative intent or its reason 173 also does not justify the construction that it is mandatory. The purpose of the provision is only to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court by unscrupulous persons by filing frivolous petitions. There might be cases where having regard to the facts and circumstances, the High Court is satisfied that there is a prima-facie case for initiating action through consent of the Advocate General has not been obtained and that the presentation of the petition is by a person, who has locus standi and bona fide, and there might also be cases, the circumstances of which indicate that the petitioner had good reasons for not approaching the Advocate-General seeking his consent or that the consent has been wrongly refused. Further there might be cases where acts of criminal contempt committed by an alleged contemner is not by way of Public speeches, or writings published in newspaper or books or pamphlets but as in the present case, are within the personal knowledge of an individual, and consequently an action is practicable and also convenient to be allowed to be taken at the instance of the aggrieved person, instead of a suo motu action by the Court. Section 15(1) is certainly not intended to preclude the High Court from entertaining such a petition and compel the High Court to take action suo motu only. Ref. to. By construing Sec. 15(1)(b) as directory does not mean that the provision should be ignored or that the consent of the Advocate General provided for in Section 15(1) is of no importance at all. A directory provision also must be given due weight and should not be rendered useless. The Court may reject a petition presented without consent of Advocate General or where consent has been refused, in liming. However, if in a given case, the court finds that the petition is bona fide by a person who has locus standi and there are sufficient grounds to take action the Court is not precluded by Section 15(1)(b) to entertain the mation as Section 15(1)(b) of the Act is only directory".