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Govt Of National Capital Territory Of ... vs All India Confederation Of The Blind on 22 December, 2005

In GNCTD v. All India Confederation of the Blind (supra), a Division Bench of this court observed, with reference to the said Act, that it was a welfare legislation and, therefore, if two views were possible, the WP(C) Nos.997/11 & 3251/10 Page 17 of 39 interpretation which was in favour of the handicapped persons, ought to be adopted. From the above decisions, which have been relied upon by Mr Datar, it becomes clear that social welfare legislations ought to be given a beneficial and purposive construction which advances the object of the legislation. Of course, such an interpretation would only be possible where the provision is open to more than one meaning and is in keeping with the legislative intent.
Delhi High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 5 - M Katju - Full Document

Hukam Chand Shyam Lal vs Union Of India And Ors on 17 December, 1975

8. She also submitted that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, that thing must be done in that way or not at all and that other methods of performance are forbidden. She placed reliance for this proposition on the Supreme Court decision in Hukam Chand Shyam Lal v. Union of India & Others: 1976 (2) SCC 128. In this context, she submitted that the said Act provides for a reservation based on a percentage of the vacancies and it also provides for carrying forward of such vacancies. But, the carry forward permitted by the said Act must be done in the manner specified in the said Act and, in particular, under Section 36 thereof or not at all. According, to her, Section 36 of the said Act does not confer any power on the employer to carry forward the posts beyond the first year and on the contrary, the said provision envisages that the posts so reserved shall be filled in the second year itself either by a physically handicapped person of a different category and, if no such suitable person is available, then by any other person. She submitted that even the O.M. dated 29.12.2005 imposed a time-cap on the carrying forward of reservations for persons with disabilities. She submitted that if the WP(C) Nos.997/11 & 3251/10 Page 10 of 39 provisions of Section 36 of the said Act and of the O.M. dated 29.12.2005 are read together, the following position would emerge:-
Supreme Court of India Cites 4 - Cited by 242 - R S Sarkaria - Full Document

Shankarsan Dash vs Union Of India on 30 April, 1991

9. In view of the aforesaid submissions, the learned counsel further submitted that the two posts reserved initially for the physically handicapped in the years 2006 and 2008 respectively could not be carried forwarded as reserved vacancies beyond 2008 and 2009 respectively as they were not filled by the General candidates in the meantime. This is so because, according to the learned counsel, neither Section 36 of the said Act nor the said O.M. dated 29.12.2005 permits the carry-forward beyond the second year. It was also contended that the respondent No.1 is forcing the carry over quota for the physically handicapped to lapse and that the interest of the physically disabled persons can be better protected by appointing persons from the General category, so that the reservation can be carried over from year to year and kept alive in terms of the O.M. dated 29.12.2005. It was further contended that the two vacancies reserved in the year 2009 for persons with disabilities must also be filled in 2010 by those in the General category because, first of all, both Section 36 of the said Act and the said O.M. dated 29.12.2005 contemplate such an appointment; secondly, the interests of administration of justice require this to be done; WP(C) Nos.997/11 & 3251/10 Page 12 of 39 thirdly, the term "shall" in Section 36 of the said Act as well as the term "may" in the said O.M. can only be interpreted in consonance with the established ratio of cases that there must be a good and sufficient reason for not complying with the requirements of administration and that the State cannot be whimsical in denying appointment to successful candidates. Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision in Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India: 1991 (3) SCC 47 and Vice-Chancellor, University of Allahabad and Ors. v. Dr Anand Prakash Mishra and Ors.: 1997 (10) SCC 264. Consequently, Ms Ramakrishnan submitted that a mandamus would lie to direct that the posts advertised for the fifth and third time be treated as general vacancies and be filled as such. She also submitted that the mandamus would also lie in filling up the two vacancies reserved in 2009 for physically handicapped persons in 2010 in the interest of fair administration and justice. For, such a course would not take away anything from the entitlements of physically handicapped, but would ensure that there is a valid carry over of seats for 2011 and 2012.
Supreme Court of India Cites 3 - Cited by 1160 - L M Sharma - Full Document

The Vice Chancellor, University Of ... vs Dr. Anand Prakash Mishra & Ors on 16 December, 1996

9. In view of the aforesaid submissions, the learned counsel further submitted that the two posts reserved initially for the physically handicapped in the years 2006 and 2008 respectively could not be carried forwarded as reserved vacancies beyond 2008 and 2009 respectively as they were not filled by the General candidates in the meantime. This is so because, according to the learned counsel, neither Section 36 of the said Act nor the said O.M. dated 29.12.2005 permits the carry-forward beyond the second year. It was also contended that the respondent No.1 is forcing the carry over quota for the physically handicapped to lapse and that the interest of the physically disabled persons can be better protected by appointing persons from the General category, so that the reservation can be carried over from year to year and kept alive in terms of the O.M. dated 29.12.2005. It was further contended that the two vacancies reserved in the year 2009 for persons with disabilities must also be filled in 2010 by those in the General category because, first of all, both Section 36 of the said Act and the said O.M. dated 29.12.2005 contemplate such an appointment; secondly, the interests of administration of justice require this to be done; WP(C) Nos.997/11 & 3251/10 Page 12 of 39 thirdly, the term "shall" in Section 36 of the said Act as well as the term "may" in the said O.M. can only be interpreted in consonance with the established ratio of cases that there must be a good and sufficient reason for not complying with the requirements of administration and that the State cannot be whimsical in denying appointment to successful candidates. Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision in Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India: 1991 (3) SCC 47 and Vice-Chancellor, University of Allahabad and Ors. v. Dr Anand Prakash Mishra and Ors.: 1997 (10) SCC 264. Consequently, Ms Ramakrishnan submitted that a mandamus would lie to direct that the posts advertised for the fifth and third time be treated as general vacancies and be filled as such. She also submitted that the mandamus would also lie in filling up the two vacancies reserved in 2009 for physically handicapped persons in 2010 in the interest of fair administration and justice. For, such a course would not take away anything from the entitlements of physically handicapped, but would ensure that there is a valid carry over of seats for 2011 and 2012.
Supreme Court of India Cites 20 - Cited by 109 - Full Document

Jitendra Kumar Singh & Anr vs State Of U.P.& Ors on 8 January, 2010

10. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the other petitioner adopted the arguments of Ms Nitya Ramakrishnan. The learned counsel also submitted that a literal and strict interpretation has to be given to WP(C) Nos.997/11 & 3251/10 Page 13 of 39 Section 36 of the said Act. This is so because the concept of carry forward, according to the learned counsel, is not applicable in case of horizontal reservation. Reliance was placed for this proposition on the Supreme Court decision in Jitendra Kumar Singh and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others: 2010 (3) SCC 119. Consequently, it was urged that Section 36 was an exception to this rule and, therefore, required to be construed strictly. As such, it was contended that the word "shall" appearing in Section 36 ought to be read as "shall" and not as "may" and, therefore, the vacancies reserved for physically disabled persons could not be carried forward beyond the second year, meaning thereby that 4 vacancies would be available for being filled up by the candidates of General category which would include the petitioners.
Supreme Court of India Cites 24 - Cited by 368 - S S Nijjar - Full Document
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