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1 - 10 of 35 (0.31 seconds)Article 309 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Dina Nath Pandey vs State Of U.P. And Ors. on 4 January, 1990
18. To similar effect, the learned Counsel cited 1990(5) SLR 229=1990(2) SLJ 20 (All.). Dina Nath Pandey v. State of Uttar Pradesh; 1989(6) SLR 18, S.R. Farishta v. Union of India and AIR 1964 SC 364, Union of India v. H.C. Goel. We have carefully perused the said judgments. In the case of Dina Nath Pandey, a charge sheet was issued containing five articles of charge and in the first article of charge it was alleged that the petitioner therein had used improper words during conversation with the Kenungo. Neither the words which alleged to had been used by the petitioner, were spelt out nor did the charge sheet contain any description or detail as to in what manner the said incident took place. In such circumstances, the High Court had held that the charge was vague as the petitioner could not have met the charge or pleaded his defence to the said charge. In the case of S.R. Farishta, the petitioner, who was working in CRPF as Sub-Inspector, was issued the charge sheet containing two articles of charge. The first article of charge alleged that the petitioner had committed remissness in the discharge of his duty. The facts and circumstances on the basis of which the said charge was based had not been spelt out in clear terms.
Union Of India vs H. C. Goel on 30 August, 1963
24. We have perused the said judgment and find that the said observation is based on the law so laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in various judgments including Union of India v. H.C. Goel (supra) wherein it was held that mere suspicion should not be allowed to take the place of proof even in domestic enquiries. We have read and reread the charge levelled and find that the present contention is devoid of any merits. We have not been able to comprehend as to how the allegations made in the said charge memo could be said to be based on suspicion. It is an admitted fact that there was no permission from the Competent Authority to leave the Headquarters. It is also an admitted fact that the applicant was placed under suspension on 11.2.1992 with a specific condition that he shall not leave the headquarters without obtaining prior permission of the Competent Authority. It is also an admitted fact that the applicant never reported for duty on or after 11.2.1992 and neither applied nor obtained any permission to be away from the Headquarters. Though the applicant had submitted a letter dated 12.2.1992 praying for grant of leave on the ground that since he was hospitalised in a Nursing Home, Lakeside Medical Centre and Hospital, Bangalore and would submit the necessary leave application thereafter, but he neither reported to Headquarter nor submitted any leave application any time thereafter. The applicant's contention that he was not served with the suspension order dated 11.2.1992 till June, 1994 is also unsubstantiated. Even if it is presumed that the said suspension order was not served upon him till the year 1994, it is the applicant's own case that in May 1992 he had filed a petition before the Civil Court, Ghaziabad for removal of the wall raised at the entrance of his residential accommodation. Neither the copy of the said petition filed before the Civil Court, Ghaziabad nor the order passed thereon was produced before us. As stated by the applicant in his letter dated 12.2.1992 that he would submit the leave application thereafter, what prevented the applicant from approaching the respondents to obtain permission for leaving the Headquarters in April-May, 1992 especially when he had gone to Ghaziabad to file the said petition, has not been explained at all. The allegations contained in the memo, in our considered view; thus, is not based on suspicion but on hard facts of the case and therefore the judgment of Paresh Chandra so relied is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Accordingly the said contention is misplaced and rejected.
Meenglas Tea Estate vs Its Workmen on 22 February, 1963
32. The learned Counsel for the applicant has raised further contention that the Inquiry Officer acted as a Presenting Officer too and had put a leading question to the witnesses, which vitiated the enquiry. It is urged that the burden of proving the charge was on the Management/Department and not upon the delinquent official. Shri Subba Rao, learned Senior Counsel drew our attention to the deposition made by the witnesses as well as Inquiry report and strenuously urged that the Inquiry Officer had cross examined the witnesses, which conduct of the Inquiry Officer vitiated the Disciplinary Enquiry. The learned Counsel has drawn our attention to AIR 1963 SC 1719, Meenglas Tea Estate v. The Workmen, particularly para 4, wherein it was observed that:
Radhakrishna Setty vs Deputy General Manager (Disciplinary ... on 24 October, 1997
33. The learned Counsel has also relied upon ILR 1998 Kar. 897, Sri Radhakrishna Shetty v. Deputy General Manager, 1992 Labour & Industrial Cases 1832 (Madras) T.N. Govindaraju v. Indian Overseas and the order passed by this Tribunal dated 10.12.2002 in O.A. No. 1478/2001 K. Nandagopal v. Provest Marshal and Anr. In the case of K. Nandagopal's case, in para-16 it was held in the facts and circumstances of the said case that the enquiry officer himself had questioned the applicant which was treated as Examination in Chief as well as the Cross-examination of the applicant by the Inquiry Officer, which was held to be in not confirmity with the law i.e., the Inquiry Officer cannot assume the role of Presenting Officer as well as a prosecutor. In the case of Shri T.N. Govindarajan, the Inquiry Officer had found the petitioner therein guilty of charge No. 9 without considering the entire evidence adduced by the witnesses. In that context the Madras High Court had held that it was the duty of the Inquiry Officer to consider the evidence as a whole and then come to a conclusion. Since the Inquiry Authority had not considered the entire evidence on record before recording his findings, the penalty order of compulsory retirement was held to be not sustainable. In the case of Radhakrishna Shetty, on examination of the facts of the said case, it was found that the management did not appoint a Presenting Officer and the Inquiry Officer had put questions to the witnesses and got marked the documents from the management witnesses. In that context, it was held that while revealing the truth the Inquiry Officer cannot go beyond his limit and play the role of prosecutor given an indication that he was not fair and that he was biased. It was also found in the said case that while cross-examination, the Inquiry Officer told the witnesses that their statement were not only unbelievable but also tried to impute motives to them. Under such circumstances, the High Court had held that the conducting enquiry in the absence of the Presenting Officer by the Inquiry Office as if he was the Presenting Officer was clearly opposed to the principle of fairness and also violated the principles of natural justice.
K. Nandagopal vs The Provost Marshal Ag/Pm And Anr. on 10 December, 2002
33. The learned Counsel has also relied upon ILR 1998 Kar. 897, Sri Radhakrishna Shetty v. Deputy General Manager, 1992 Labour & Industrial Cases 1832 (Madras) T.N. Govindaraju v. Indian Overseas and the order passed by this Tribunal dated 10.12.2002 in O.A. No. 1478/2001 K. Nandagopal v. Provest Marshal and Anr. In the case of K. Nandagopal's case, in para-16 it was held in the facts and circumstances of the said case that the enquiry officer himself had questioned the applicant which was treated as Examination in Chief as well as the Cross-examination of the applicant by the Inquiry Officer, which was held to be in not confirmity with the law i.e., the Inquiry Officer cannot assume the role of Presenting Officer as well as a prosecutor. In the case of Shri T.N. Govindarajan, the Inquiry Officer had found the petitioner therein guilty of charge No. 9 without considering the entire evidence adduced by the witnesses. In that context the Madras High Court had held that it was the duty of the Inquiry Officer to consider the evidence as a whole and then come to a conclusion. Since the Inquiry Authority had not considered the entire evidence on record before recording his findings, the penalty order of compulsory retirement was held to be not sustainable. In the case of Radhakrishna Shetty, on examination of the facts of the said case, it was found that the management did not appoint a Presenting Officer and the Inquiry Officer had put questions to the witnesses and got marked the documents from the management witnesses. In that context, it was held that while revealing the truth the Inquiry Officer cannot go beyond his limit and play the role of prosecutor given an indication that he was not fair and that he was biased. It was also found in the said case that while cross-examination, the Inquiry Officer told the witnesses that their statement were not only unbelievable but also tried to impute motives to them. Under such circumstances, the High Court had held that the conducting enquiry in the absence of the Presenting Officer by the Inquiry Office as if he was the Presenting Officer was clearly opposed to the principle of fairness and also violated the principles of natural justice.
Laxmi Devi Sugar Mills vs Nand Kishore Singh on 4 October, 1956
36. Further reliance has been placed on AIR 1957 SC 70, Laxmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Nand Kishore Singh, particularly para 18. It was held in that case that the charge sheet which was furnished by the appellant to the respondent formed the basis of the enquiry which was held by the General Manager and the appellant could not be allowed to justify its action on any other grounds than those contained in the charge sheet. It was held that: "the respondent not having been charged with acts of insubordination which would have really justified the appellant and dismissing him from its employment (sic) the appellant could not take advantage of the same even though these acts could be brought home to him."
Deokinandan Sharma vs Union Of India & Ors on 11 April, 2001
39. Refuting the contentions of bias and role of Ld. Counsel for respondents also stated that at no stage, applicant made any allegations of bias etc. Any contentions not raised before the authorities can't be allowed to be raised later, before the Court/Tribunal. Reference is made to Deokinandan Sharma v. Union of India, 2001(5) SCC 340, para 6. In the said case, it was contended that the conducting officer "did not afford reasonable opportunity of hearing to the appellant to adduce defence evidence." After perusal of the appeal, it was found that "there was no whisper of the aforesaid ground therein." Therefore it was observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that "it is not possible to allow the appellant to raise this point....".
Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd vs Girja Shankar Pant & Ors on 18 October, 2000
In the Girja Shankar Pant case, (supra) the respondent was charged sheeted for 13 different charges, his request for supply of documents went unheeded despite an order for inspection of records was passed by the Inquiry Officer, he was not allowed to cross examine any of the officers despite specific request. In the said context, the High Court set aside the order of dismissal imposed upon the respondent therein on the ground that it was prejudicial and passed in contravention of principles of natural justice, which resulted in miscarriage of justice. The said findings of High Court were ultimately upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court by dismissing the appeal on the ground that the Managing Director of the appellant was not well disposed towards the respondent and the proceedings suffered because of bias, malice and violation of principles of natural justice.