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1 - 10 of 14 (0.22 seconds)Section 309 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
K. Sukhendar Reddy vs State Of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. on 5 April, 1999
Our attention has also been drawn to K. Sukhendar Reddy v.
State of A.P. 1999 (6) SCC 257, which is topical in that it castigates selective
suspension perpetuated indefinitely in circumstances where other involved
persons had not been subjected to any scrutiny. Reliance on this decision is in
the backdrop of the admitted facts that all the persons who have been privy to
the making of the Office-notes have not been proceeded against
departmentally.
State Of Andhra Pradesh vs N. Radhakishan on 7 April, 1998
So far as the question of prejudicial treatment accorded to an
employee is concerned, this Court in State of A.P. v. N. Radhakishan 1998 (4)
SCC 154, has observed that it would be fair to make this assumption of
prejudice if there is an unexplained delay in the conclusion of proceedings.
Union Of India & Ors vs Dipak Mali on 15 December, 2009
However, the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Dipak Mali 2010 (2)
SCC 222 does not come to the succour of the Appellant since our inspection of
the records produced in original have established that firstly, the decision to
continue the suspension was carried out within the then prevailing period and
6 OA.NO.170/00857 /2019 CAT, Bangalore
secondly, that it was duly supported by elaborate reasoning.
Kartar Singh vs State Of Punjab on 11 March, 1994
In Kartar Singh vs. State of Punjab (1994) 3 SCC 569 the Constitution Bench of
this Court unequivocally construed the right of speedy trial as a fundamental
right, and we can do no better the extract these paragraphs from that
celebrated decision -
Hussainara Khatoon & Ors vs Home Secretary, State Of Bihar, Govt. Of ... on 12 February, 1979
87.This Court in Hussainara Khatoon (I) v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar
while dealing with Article 21 of the Constitution of India has observed thus:
Abdul Rehman Antulay & Ors vs R.S. Nayak & Anr on 10 December, 1991
11. The legal expectation of expedition and diligence being present at every
stage of a criminal trial and a fortiori in departmental inquiries has been
emphasised by this Court on numerous occasions. The Constitution Bench in
Abdul Rehman Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak, 1992 (1) SCC 225, underscored that
this right to speedy trial is implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution and is also
reflected in Section 309 of the Cr.P.C., 1973; that it encompasses all stages,
viz., investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and re-trial; that the burden lies
on the prosecution to justify and explain the delay; that the Court must engage
in a balancing test to determine whether this right had been denied in the
particular case before it. Keeping these factors in mind the CAT had in the case
in hand directed that the Appellant's suspension would not be extended beyond
90 days from 19.3.2013. The High Court had set aside this direction, viewing it
as a substitution of a judicial determination to the authority possessing that
power, i.e., the Government. This conclusion of the High Court cannot be
sustained in view of the following pronouncement of the Constitution Bench in
Antulay:
Sate Of Punjab And Ors vs Chaman Lal Goyal on 31 January, 1995
12. State of Punjab v. Chaman Lal Goyal (1995) 2 SCC 570 deserves
mention, inter alia, because action was initiated on 25.3.1992 and a
Memorandum of Charges was issued on 9.7.1992 in relation to an incident
which had occurred on 1.1.1987. In the factual matrix obtaining in that case,
this Court reserved and set aside the High Court decision to quash the Inquiry
because of delay, but directed that the concerned officer should be immediately
considered for promotion without taking the pendency of the Inquiry into
perspective.
Raghubir Singh & Others Etc vs State Of Bihar on 19 September, 1986
13. It will be useful to recall that prior to 1973 an accused could be detained
for continuous and consecutive periods of 15 days, albeit, after judicial scrutiny
and supervision. The Cr.P.C. of 1973 contains a new proviso which has the
effect of circumscribing the power of the Magistrate to authorise detention of an
accused person beyond period of 90 days where the investigation relates to an
offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term
of not less than 10 years, and beyond a period of 60 days where the
investigation relates to any other offence. Drawing support from the
observations contained of the Division Bench in Raghubir Singh vs. State of
Bihar, 1986 (4) SCC 481, and more so of the Constitution Bench in Antulay, we
are spurred to extrapolate the quintessence of the proviso of Section 167(2) of
the Cr.P.C. 1973 to moderate Suspension Orders in cases of
departmental/disciplinary inquiries also. It seems to us that if Parliament
considered it necessary that a person be released from incarceration after the
expiry of 90 days even though accused of commission of the most heinous
crimes, a fortiori suspension should not be continued after the expiry of the
similar period especially when a Memorandum of Charges/Chargesheet has
not been served on the suspended person. It is true that the proviso to Section
167(2) Cr.P.C. postulates personal freedom, but respect and preservation of
human dignity as well as the right to a speedy trial should also be placed on the
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same pedestal.