Search Results Page
Search Results
1 - 10 of 12 (0.20 seconds)Kalu Ram vs Babu Lal And Ors. on 22 April, 1932
5. On the other hand, there is no doubt that so far as the suits relating to the cancellation of instruments are concerned, the Full Bench in Kalu Ram v. Babu Lal AIR 193 All 485, on p. 689 of 1932 A.L.J. clearly held that a relief to have a registered instrument adjudged void or voidable with the possible result of its being delivered up and cancelled and a copy of the decree being sent to the registration office for a note to be made by the registering officer in his books, is much more than a mere declaratory relief. It is undoubtedly a substantial relief of a nature differing from a declaratory one. It was. clearly pointed out that it was not incumbent on a plaintiff to ask in express terms a relief for the instrument to be delivered up and cancelled and that he might merely ask for its being adjudged void or voidable. Nevertheless a suit which falls under Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act, was held to be not a suit for obtaining a mere declaratory decree, but one for obtaining a substantive relief not otherwise provided for. The case of a decree stands on a different footing, because a suit to avoid it does not strictly fall under Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act. Strictly speaking, it would not even fall within the scope of Section 42, Specific Relief Act. Where the plaintiff chooses to ask for a definite relief for the cancellation of a decree or for the setting aside of that decree in addition to a declaration that the decree is not binding upon him, he is professedly asking for something more than a mere declaratory decree. At the stage at which the question of Court fee arises, it is immaterial to consider whether such relief is superfluous, redundant or useless or even impossible to be granted. Obviously, he has asked for more and so long as he does not amend his plaint and abandon this relief he can be called upon to pay Court fee for the relief asked for.
The Court-fees Act, 1870
Section 39 in The Specific Relief Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
B. Brij Gopal vs B. Suraj Karan And Ors. on 12 January, 1932
8. The view taken in some cases of the other High Courts is that in such a suit the plaintiff is trying to get rid of a decree which stands in his way and which is capable of being executed against him and that without having that decree set aside or cancelled the plaintiff would have no right to resist its execution, and accordingly such a relief is not one merely for obtaining a declaratory decree but is for obtaining a mere substantive relief, which is not specifically provided for in the Court-fees Act and would accordingly fall under Article 1, of the Schedule 1. It cannot be denied that there is something to be said for such a view because in substance the object of the plaintiff is to frustrate a decree which has been passed against him and to nullify it and to get it out of his way. On the other hand, the court-fees Act is a fiscal measure and is to be construed strictly and in favour of the subject There is also no' doubt that there is a long course of decisions in this Court in which it has been laid down consistently, and over and over again, that where nothing more than a mere declaration is sought for, the suit is one for obtaining a declaratory decree and no ad valorem court-fee for such a relief can be charged. We may in this connection refer only to the recent cases of this Court in Radha Krishna v. Ram Narain AIR 1931 All 369; Brij Gopal v. Suraj Karan AIR 1932 All 560, Lakshmi Narain Rai v. Dip Narain Rai AIR 1933 All 350 and Muhammad Ismail v. Liyaqat Hussain AIR 1932 All 310.
Lakshmi Narain Rai vs Dip Narain Rai on 21 December, 1932
8. The view taken in some cases of the other High Courts is that in such a suit the plaintiff is trying to get rid of a decree which stands in his way and which is capable of being executed against him and that without having that decree set aside or cancelled the plaintiff would have no right to resist its execution, and accordingly such a relief is not one merely for obtaining a declaratory decree but is for obtaining a mere substantive relief, which is not specifically provided for in the Court-fees Act and would accordingly fall under Article 1, of the Schedule 1. It cannot be denied that there is something to be said for such a view because in substance the object of the plaintiff is to frustrate a decree which has been passed against him and to nullify it and to get it out of his way. On the other hand, the court-fees Act is a fiscal measure and is to be construed strictly and in favour of the subject There is also no' doubt that there is a long course of decisions in this Court in which it has been laid down consistently, and over and over again, that where nothing more than a mere declaration is sought for, the suit is one for obtaining a declaratory decree and no ad valorem court-fee for such a relief can be charged. We may in this connection refer only to the recent cases of this Court in Radha Krishna v. Ram Narain AIR 1931 All 369; Brij Gopal v. Suraj Karan AIR 1932 All 560, Lakshmi Narain Rai v. Dip Narain Rai AIR 1933 All 350 and Muhammad Ismail v. Liyaqat Hussain AIR 1932 All 310.
Mohammad Ismail vs Liyaqat Husain on 2 December, 1931
8. The view taken in some cases of the other High Courts is that in such a suit the plaintiff is trying to get rid of a decree which stands in his way and which is capable of being executed against him and that without having that decree set aside or cancelled the plaintiff would have no right to resist its execution, and accordingly such a relief is not one merely for obtaining a declaratory decree but is for obtaining a mere substantive relief, which is not specifically provided for in the Court-fees Act and would accordingly fall under Article 1, of the Schedule 1. It cannot be denied that there is something to be said for such a view because in substance the object of the plaintiff is to frustrate a decree which has been passed against him and to nullify it and to get it out of his way. On the other hand, the court-fees Act is a fiscal measure and is to be construed strictly and in favour of the subject There is also no' doubt that there is a long course of decisions in this Court in which it has been laid down consistently, and over and over again, that where nothing more than a mere declaration is sought for, the suit is one for obtaining a declaratory decree and no ad valorem court-fee for such a relief can be charged. We may in this connection refer only to the recent cases of this Court in Radha Krishna v. Ram Narain AIR 1931 All 369; Brij Gopal v. Suraj Karan AIR 1932 All 560, Lakshmi Narain Rai v. Dip Narain Rai AIR 1933 All 350 and Muhammad Ismail v. Liyaqat Hussain AIR 1932 All 310.
Article 1 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Article 17 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Robert Fischer And Ors. vs The Secretary Of State For India In ... on 23 November, 1908
7. The origin and purpose of Section 42, of the Specific Relief Act and the history how declaratory decrees came to be granted have been set out in the judgment of their Lordships in Robert Fischer's case (1899) 22 Mad 270. No doubt there has "been some laxity in allowing plaintiffs to frame their plaints by asking for declarations of all sorts. But where a plaintiff expressly asks for something more than a mere declaration, for example, cancellation or the setting aside of a decree, it is difficult to hold that the claim is one merely for obtaining a declaratory decree. The difficulty arises only where he simply asks that it be declared that a certain decree which has been passed against him previously is null and void and is not binding upon him.