The above two decisions have been quoted with approval in Newspapers Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal [195711 L.L.J. 1] wherein the following passage appears:
It is clear beyond any doubt from the above provision that the only condition for making a reference is the existence or the apprehension of an industrial dispute in the opinion of the Government at the time of making the reference. Admittedly, a dispute would be an industrial dispute, though it may concern only one workman, if his cause is sponsored by a substantial section of the workmen in his establishment, or by a trade union of which he is a member. So the only question, in a case where the dispute is not espoused by a substantial section of the workmen, but by a trade union, would be whether the union has espoused the cause of the aggrieved workmen before the date of reference. If that is so, the dispute would become an industrial dispute; and the reference would be valid. It is well-established by the decision of the Madras High Court in Working Journalists of The Hindu v. The Hindu 19611 L.L.J. 288, which has been approved by the Supreme Court in Bombay Union of Journalists v. The Hindu 196111 L.L.J. 436 that a reference once validly made does not become incompetent by virtue of the fact that the workers or a substantial section of them who had originally sponsored the cause, had later resiled or withdrawn from it. This was precisely the question before the Division Bench.
It is clear beyond any doubt from the above provision that the only condition for making a reference is the existence or the apprehension of an industrial dispute in the opinion of the Government at the time of making the reference. Admittedly, a dispute would be an industrial dispute, though it may concern only one workman, if his cause is sponsored by a substantial section of the workmen in his establishment, or by a trade union of which he is a member. So the only question, in a case where the dispute is not espoused by a substantial section of the workmen, but by a trade union, would be whether the union has espoused the cause of the aggrieved workmen before the date of reference. If that is so, the dispute would become an industrial dispute; and the reference would be valid. It is well-established by the decision of the Madras High Court in Working Journalists of The Hindu v. The Hindu 19611 L.L.J. 288, which has been approved by the Supreme Court in Bombay Union of Journalists v. The Hindu 196111 L.L.J. 436 that a reference once validly made does not become incompetent by virtue of the fact that the workers or a substantial section of them who had originally sponsored the cause, had later resiled or withdrawn from it. This was precisely the question before the Division Bench.
In support of that contention, counsel for the petitioner relied on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Shamsuddin v. State of Kerala 1961 1 L.L.J. 77. In that case three workers of an establishment were dismissed from service which gave rise to a dispute. Subsequently these employees got themselves enrolled as members of a trade union who took up their cause; and the Government referred the dispute for adjudication. Before the Tribunal, these workmen filed an application stating that they had resigned from the said trade union and joined another trade union, and praying that the second trade union may be allowed to represent their cause in the adjudication proceeding. The first trade union then filed another application stating that it did not desire to prosecute the matter and praying that the proceeding may be dropped. The Tribunal allowed the first application, permitting the second union to represent the workers, and dismissed the other application. The award passed by the Tribunal was questioned on the ground that a trade union, whose membership was accepted by the aggrieved workmen subsequent to the origin of the dispute was not competent to represent them and sponsor their cause. A learned single Judge of this Court rejected the above contention; but the Division Bench reversed his decision.
The Division Bench agreed with the opinion of a learned single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Padarthy Ratnam & Co. v. Industrial Tribunal and Ors. [195811 L.L.J. 290], wherein the learned Judge stated that the primary requirement of an industrial dispute was that the cause of the workmen must be sponsored by a trade union of which they are members on the date on which disciplinary action was taken against them, or by a substantial section of the workmen in the establishment. In other words, membership of the union must be anterior to the date of the origin of the dispute and not subsequent to it. Counsel for the petitioner also relied on the following passage appearing at page 80 of the report in the decision of the Division Bench
That apart, we feel in any fair determination of whether a dispute be trade or individual, some date will have to be fixed. It is equally cleat that such a date must be approximate to the time the act complained against has happened. The approximate date must further not be such as to allow the plea that the dispute originally concerned individuals. It follows that any hiatus between the end of the act and arising of interest must be avoided and that we think can only be by insisting on the community of interest not arising at a later date. Therefore, in determining whether the dispute be trade dispute or otherwise, the material time is when the act complained against has happened and not when the dispute is referred.
The above decision has been followed by a learned single Judge of the Punjab High Court in Khadi Gramodyog Bhavan Workers'1 Union v. Krishna Muni . The statements contained in the Division Bench decision of this Court are wide enough to support the contention of the petitioner's counsel. Speaking with the greatest respect, I have considerable doubt on the correctness of the above decision, in the light of the clear provision contained in Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and some of the statements contained in the decisions of the Supreme Court relied on by the Division Bench itself. But I do not feel obliged to refer this case to a larger Bench, since it can be fairly distinguished from the case before the Division Bench. In the case before me, the dispute related to the non-employment of twelve workmen out of the total employment strength of eighteen. Therefore, they form a substantial section of the workmen, and the dispute raised by them would admittedly be an industrial dispute. Further, in the instant case, the cause of the workmen was sponsored by a trade union of which they were members before the reference was made, unlike the case before the Division Bench, in which the workmen concerned joined the membership of the trade union only when the reference was pending.