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1 - 10 of 14 (0.19 seconds)Section 25 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Section 26 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872
Section 150 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
Section 24 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Queen-Empress vs Babu Lal on 22 August, 1898
In coming to this conclusion reliance was placed on the case of Queen-Empress v. Babu Lal reported in ILR 6 ALL 509 which is a Full Bench case. The question referred to the Full Bench was whether or not Section 27 was a qualification to both Sections 25 and 26 or only to Section 26. It appears there was some difference of opinion in the case decided in that Court; in one of the case Mr. Justice Mahmood had held that Section 27 was merely a proviso or a qualification to Section 26 and had no bearing on Section 25; which resulted in making every statement made to a police officer inadmissible in evidence even it satisfied the condition laid down in Section 27. The other view was that it was a proviso to both section 25 and 26. The majority of the Judges constituting the Full Bench held that Section 27 was applicable as a proviso to both Sections 25 and 26. Mr. Justice Oldfield does not construe the section in this manner, nor does Mr. Justice Brodhurst. It would appear that the learned Judge state at page 519, after giving an illustration of a person immediately after committing a murder going to the Police station and giving himself upto the Police office and making a statement before that officer and his subordinates of all the facts and pointing out the body of the victim and giving up the weapon with which he had committed the murder, that Section 27 would still be applicable to a case like that. The learned officiating Chief Justice held that Section 27 is applicable as a proviso to both Sections 25 and 26, and Mr. Justice Duthoit expressed a general opinion without expressing any opinion as to the construction of Section 27 itself. It is only Mr. Justice Mahmood who construed Section 27 in the manner suggested while dealing with the argument as to whether it is a qualification to Section 26 or to Section 25 as well. That case therefore cannot be regarded as an authority four the suggested construction.
Emperor vs Cunna on 21 March, 1920
3. In Section 24 of the Evidence Act, words precisely similar to those used in Section 27 are used; it refers to a confession made by an accused person and if the contention that is now made is accepted, it might introduce a great deal of injustice to persons accused of an offence because all confessions made by a person before he became an accused, would be admissible even if they were obtained by inducement, threat or promise. Section 24 in considered in the case of Emperor v. Cunna, 22 Bom LR 1247; (AIR 1920 Bom 270) (FB). Sir Lallubhai Shah at p. 1261 (of Bom LR): (at page 273 of AIR) says that section will be applicable to a confession made by a person, who becomes subsequently accused on an offence. The other Judges in effect accept this, but they differed from the learned Chief Justice on the question of fact as to whether the confessions were made by inducement, threat or promise. The phrase has been used in both sections and it must be interpreted in the same manner in both sections. No possible reason can be suggested why it should have a different meaning. We are therefore of opinion that the words information received from "a person accused of any offence" in Section 27 cannot be rad to man that he must be an accused when he gives the information but would include a person if he became subsequently an accused person, at the time when that statement is sought to be received in evidence against him.