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1 - 9 of 9 (0.20 seconds)Section 292BB in The Income Tax Act, 1961 [Entire Act]
The Income Tax Act, 1961
The Disaster Management Act, 2005
Commissioner Of Income Tax-Iii vs Dimension Apparels Pvt. Ltd. on 20 March, 2015
12. In the case of Emerald Company Ltd., ITAT Kolkatta Bench has also dealt
with similar situation as we are confronted with. ITAT, Kolkatta Bench has also
made reference to the above judgment of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the
case of CIT Vs. Dimension Apparels P.Ltd., 370 ITR 288 (Del) as well as decision
of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of Spice Entertainment Ltd .. The ITAT
has also made reference to the decision of Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in the case
of CIT Vs. Intel Technology Ltd. P.Ltd., 380 ITR 272 (Kar.). The Tribunal has
held that action under section 263 is a jurisdictional action against an assessee . In the
case of a company, the ld.Commissioner was required to issue a show cause notice
against a juridical person contemplated in section 2(31) of the Income Tax Act and
if a juridical person ceases to exist then it would not be construed as a person within
the meaning of section 2(31) against whom any action can be taken. The Commissioner
would not assume proper jurisdiction and such type of defect would not be cured with
help of section 292BB of the Act, because it is not a procedural irregularity
which could be cured.
Section 394 in The Companies Act, 1956 [Entire Act]
Commissioner Of Income Tax vs M/S Intel Technology India Pvt. Ltd. on 10 September, 2018
12. In the case of Emerald Company Ltd., ITAT Kolkatta Bench has also dealt
with similar situation as we are confronted with. ITAT, Kolkatta Bench has also
made reference to the above judgment of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the
case of CIT Vs. Dimension Apparels P.Ltd., 370 ITR 288 (Del) as well as decision
of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of Spice Entertainment Ltd .. The ITAT
has also made reference to the decision of Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in the case
of CIT Vs. Intel Technology Ltd. P.Ltd., 380 ITR 272 (Kar.). The Tribunal has
held that action under section 263 is a jurisdictional action against an assessee . In the
case of a company, the ld.Commissioner was required to issue a show cause notice
against a juridical person contemplated in section 2(31) of the Income Tax Act and
if a juridical person ceases to exist then it would not be construed as a person within
the meaning of section 2(31) against whom any action can be taken. The Commissioner
would not assume proper jurisdiction and such type of defect would not be cured with
help of section 292BB of the Act, because it is not a procedural irregularity
which could be cured.
Otters Club, Mumbai vs Dit (E), Mumbai on 15 June, 2018
14. In the light of the above discussions, we are of the considered view that rather than
taking a pedantic view of the rule requiring pronouncement of orders within 90 days,
disregarding the important fact that the entire country was in lockdown, we should compute
the period of 90 days by excluding at least the period during which the lockdown was in force.
We must factor ground realities in mind while interpreting the time limit for the pronouncement
of the order. Law is not brooding omnipotence in the sky. It is a pragmatic tool of the social
ITA No. 7292/Mum/2019
Assessment year: 2015-16
Page 9 of 9
order. The tenets of law being enacted on the basis of pragmatism, and that is how the law is
required to interpreted. The interpretation so assigned by us is not only in consonance with the
letter and spirit of rule 34(5) but is also a pragmatic approach at a time when a disaster, notified
under the Disaster Management Act 2005, is causing unprecedented disruption in the
functioning of our justice delivery system. Undoubtedly, in the case of Otters Club Vs DIT
[(2017) 392 ITR 244 (Bom)], Hon'ble Bombay High Court did not approve an order being
passed by the Tribunal beyond a period of 90 days, but then in the present situation Hon'ble
Bombay High Court itself has, vide judgment dated 15th April 2020, held that directed "while
calculating the time for disposal of matters made time-bound by this Court, the period for which
the order dated 26th March 2020 continues to operate shall be added and time shall stand
extended accordingly". The extraordinary steps taken suo motu by Hon'ble jurisdictional High
Court and Hon'ble Supreme Court also indicate that this period of lockdown cannot be treated
as an ordinary period during which the normal time limits are to remain in force. In our
considered view, even without the words "ordinarily", in the light of the above analysis of the
legal position, the period during which lockout was in force is to excluded for the purpose of
time limits set out in rule 34(5) of the Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1963. Viewed thus, the
exception, to 90-day time-limit for pronouncement of orders, inherent in rule 34(5)(c), with
respect to the pronouncement of orders within ninety days, clearly comes into play in the
present case. Of course, there is no, and there cannot be any, bar on the discretion of the benches
to refix the matters for clarifications because of considerable time lag between the point of time
when the hearing is concluded and the point of time when the order thereon is being finalized,
but then, in our considered view, no such exercise was required to be carried out on the facts
of this case.
Section 263 in The Income Tax Act, 1961 [Entire Act]
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