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Shrenik Kasturbhai (Huf) vs Gift-Tax Officer on 21 August, 1986 cites

Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Gujarat Ii vs Vimlaben Bhagwandas Patel And Kamlaben ... on 25 January, 1979

10. The learned counsel for the assessee further stated that Rule 11 was introduced by Notification No. GSR 491, dated 16-3-1963. Since at that time the rate of interest prevalent was 4 per cent discounting rate of 4 per cent per annum was quite in order. However, in 1982, the rate of interest of advance tax under the 1961 Act, was raised from 4 per cent to 12 per cent and in 1984, it was further raised to 15 per cent. Similarly, the bank rate which was 4 per cent in 1963 was raised to 10 per cent in 1982 and further raised to 11 per cent in 1984. However, in the said rule, the discounting rate remained at 4 per cent per annum all through even till today. He, therefore, urged that keeping in mind this position under the 1961 Act, and the bank rate, the assessee's contention of discounting rate between 12 per cent to 15 per cent per annum should have been accepted by the gift-tax authorities. Relying on the decision in the case of CIT v. Smt. Vimlaben Bhagwandas Patel [1979] 118 ITR 134 (Guj.), it was urged that in capitalising the income of a revocable trust, the rate of discounting should be the commercial rate of return ruling in the market, say between 15 per cent to 20 per cent per annum. He, therefore, urged that the GTO should be directed to accept the value of the shares gifted by the assessee at Rs. 1,15,084 as declared in its return.
Gujarat High Court Cites 108 - Cited by 99 - Full Document

The Commissioner Of Income Tax, ... vs Sri J.H. Gotla, Yadagiri on 29 August, 1985

12. The learned counsel for the assessee, in his reply, replying on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. G.H. Gotla [1985] 156 ITR 323, submitted that if a strict literal construction leads to an absurd result, i.e., a result not intended to be subserved by the object of the legislation ascertained from the scheme of the legislation, then, if another construction is possible apart from the strict literal construction, then that construction should be preferred to the strict literal construction. He, further submitted that where the plain literal interpretation of a statutory provision produces a manifestly unjust result which could never have been intended by the Legislature, the Court might modify the language used by the Legislature so as to achieve the intention of the Legislature and produce a rational result. According to him, since the strict interpretation of the provisions of Section 6, read with Rule 11 would hit the taxpayers, like the assessee in the instant case, which was never intended by the Parliament, we can substitute the rate of discounting to a higher percentage than that mentioned in the said rule.
Supreme Court of India Cites 42 - Cited by 488 - S Mukharji - Full Document

Tarulata Shyam And Ors. vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax on 19 February, 1971

13. We have carefully considered the rival submissions of the parties and we can appreciate the hardship of the assessee. However, it is a trite law that where the provisions of a statute are clear and unambiguous, there is no scope for importing into the statute words which are not there, for such importation would amount to amending the statute and not construing it. Even if there be a casus omissus the defect can be remedied only by the Parliament and not by judicial interpretation. Further, once it is shown that the case of the assessee comes within the letter of the law, he must be taxed, however great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind -Smt. Tarulata Shyam v. CIT [1977] 108 ITR 345 (SC). In the instant case, we have to apply the provisions of Section 6(2) read with Rule 11. The facts mentioned above are not in dispute. It would appear from the stand taken by the assessee, right from the assessment stage, that it is not in dispute that the provisions of Section 6(2) are clearly attracted in its case. Again, it cannot be disputed that one cannot totally ignore the provisions of Rule 11 even though the learned counsel for the assessee, in the course of his argument, has stated that the provisions of the said rule are redundant. We make this observation as the learned representative for the department had very forcefully contended that in order to decide the point at issue in view of the provisions of Section 46(1) and 46(2)(a), we have to harmonise the provisions of Section 6(2) with that of Rule 11 even though the expression 'in the prescribed manner' is not mentioned in Sub-section (2) of Section 6.
Calcutta High Court Cites 16 - Cited by 139 - Full Document
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