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1 - 10 of 11 (0.26 seconds)Section 218 in West Bengal Municipal Act, 1993 [Entire Act]
Joseph Severance And Ors vs Benny Mathew And Ors on 23 September, 2005
8. The alternative argument of Mr. Roy is that the order of demolition dated
November 04, 2016 passed by the said Board of Councillors was never
communicated to the petitioner, however the Hon'ble Division Bench granted
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liberty to the petitioner by the judgment and order dated December 24, 2021 to
challenge the communication of the Chairman of the said municipality dated
November 28, 2016 in appeal, immediately thereafter in the month of January,
2022, the said appeal was filed challenging the said communication, therefore
it cannot be said that there was unreasonable delay in filing the said appeal.
Mr. Roy refers to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
JOSEPH SEVERANCE AND OTHERS vs. BENNY MATHEW AND OTHERS
reported in (2005) 7 Supreme Court Cases 667 to contend that the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the said decision has laid down what are the factors required
to be considered in reckoning a reasonable time and if the said factors are
taken into account, it can be safely concluded that the said appeal was filed
within a reasonable time.
Esha Bhattacharjee vs Mg.Commit.Of Raghunathpur Nafar ... on 13 September, 2013
9. Mr. A.K. Gayen, learned advocate for the opposite party no. 4, on the
other hand, submits that in terms of Section 16(2) of the said Act, the
Chairman of the said municipality presides over the meeting in which the
Board of Councillors passed the order of demolition, as such the
communication by the Chairman is amounting to communication of the said
order by the Board of Councillors and the said communication although was
made on November 28, 2016 but the petitioner did not take any steps to
challenge the said communication till the orders were passed in the contempt
proceeding, therefore, according to him, the said delay since has been caused
due to the laches and negligence of the petitioner, the petitioner is not entitled
to condonation of the said delay. Mr. Gayen refers to the decision of Hon'ble
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Supreme Court in the case of ESHA BHATTACHARJEE vs. MANAGING
COMMITTEE OF RAGHUNATHPUR NAFAR ACADEMY AND OTHERS reported
in (2013) 12 Supreme Court Cases 649 to contend that the conduct of the
parties is a relevant consideration in deciding the prayer for condonation of
delay. He further submits that the validity of the building plan of the petitioner
since has already expired, he cannot make any construction on the basis of the
said plan.
Ram Chand vs Union Of India (N.P. Singh, J) on 30 September, 1993
"4. Mr. Bhasme, learned counsel for the appellant,
contends that in the absence of fixation of the rule of
limitation, the power can be exercised within a
reasonable time and in the absence of such
prescription of limitation, the power to enforce the
order is vitiated by error of law. He places reliance on
the decisions in State of Gujrat v. Patil Raghav Natha,
Ram Chand v. Union of India and Mohd. Kavi
Mohamad Amin v. Fatmabai Ibrahim. We find no force
in the contention. It is seen that the order of ejectment
against the applicant has become final. Section 21 of
the Mamlatdar's Court Act does not prescribe any
limitation within which the order needs to be
executed. In the absence of any specific limitation
provided thereunder, necessary implication is that the
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genera law of limitation provided in the Limitation Act
(Act 2 of 1963) stands excluded. The Division Bench,
therefore, has rightly held that no limitation has been
prescribed and it can be executed at any time,
especially when the law of limitation for the purpose
of this appeal is not there. Where there is statutory
rule operating in the field, the implied power of
exercise of the right within reasonable limitation does
not arise. The cited decisions deal with that area and
bear no relevance to the facts."
Article 227 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Section 21 in The Mamlatdar's Courts Act, 1906 [Entire Act]
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Collector Of Central Excise, Jaipurc vs M/S Raghuvar (India) Ltd on 11 May, 2000
7. Mr. Partha Pratim Roy, learned advocate for the petitioner submits that
the Court below has committed a gross error of law in fixing a period of
limitation for an appeal under Section 218(3) of the said Act by treating such
an appeal as an appeal under Order XLIII of the Code of Civil Procedure. He
further submits that the statute which is providing the said right of appeal to
the petitioner when has not prescribed any period of limitation, the Court by
analogy cannot import a period of limitation for preferring the said appeal. Mr.
Roy in support of his said contention refers to the decision of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, JAIPUR vs.
RAGHUVAR(INDIA) LTD. reported in (2000)5 Supreme Court Cases 299. He
further argues that the applicability of The Limitation Act, 1963 in respect of
such an appeal since has been excluded by implication, the petitioner is not
obliged, even to demonstrate that the said appeal was filed within a reasonable
time.