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Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta, Etc vs Commissioner Of Police, Calcutta & Anr on 20 October, 1983
cites
Article 26 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Section 144 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Article 32 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
The Police Act, 1949
Ram Narain Prasad Sah vs Ramji Prasad Sah And Ors. on 13 January, 1956
(1) Similar view
was taken in Swaminatha Mudaliar v. Gopalakrishna Naidu;(2)
Taturam Sahu v. The State of Orissa;(3) Ram Das Gaur v. The
City Magistrate, Varanasi;(4) and Ram Narain Sah & Anr. v.
Parmeshwar Prasad Sah & Ors.(5) We have no doubt that the
ratio of these decisions represents a correct statement of
the legal position. The proviso to sub-s. (4) of s. 144
which gives the State Government jurisdiction to extend the
prohibitory order for a maximum period of six months beyond
the life of the order made by the Magistrate is clearly
indicative of the position that Parliament never intended
the life of an order under s. 144 of the Code to remain in
force beyond two months when made by a Magistrate. The
scheme of that section does not contemplate repetitive
orders and in case the situation so warrants steps have to
be taken under other provisions of the law such as s. 107 or
s. 145 of the Code when individual disputes are raised and
to meet a situation such as here, there are provisions to be
found in the Police Act. If repetitive orders are made it
would clearly amount to abuse of the power conferred by
s.144 of the Code.
Babulal Parate vs State Of Maharashtra And Others on 12 January, 1961
Similar view was expressed by this Court in Gulam Abbas
& Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., where it was said that "the
entire basis of action under s. 144 is provided by the
urgency of the situation and the power thereunder is
intended to be availed of for preventing disorders,
obstructions and annoyances with a view to secure the public
weal by maintaining public peace and tranquillity ...."
Certain observations in Gulam Abbas's decision regarding the
nature of the order under s. 144 of the Code-judicial or
executive-to the extent they run counter to the decision of
the Constitution Bench in Babulal Parate's case, may require
reconsideration but we agree that the nature of the order
under s. 144 of the Code is intended to meet emergent
situation. Thus the clear and definite view of this Court is
that an order under s. 144 of the Code is not intended to be
either permanent or semi-permanent in character. The
concensus of judicial opinion in the High Courts of the
country is thus in accord with the view expressed by this
Court. It is not necessary on that ground to quash the
impugned order of March 1982 as by efflux of time it has
already ceased to be effective.
Gulam Abbas & Ors vs State Of U.P. & Ors on 3 November, 1981
Similar view was expressed by this Court in Gulam Abbas
& Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., where it was said that "the
entire basis of action under s. 144 is provided by the
urgency of the situation and the power thereunder is
intended to be availed of for preventing disorders,
obstructions and annoyances with a view to secure the public
weal by maintaining public peace and tranquillity ...."
Certain observations in Gulam Abbas's decision regarding the
nature of the order under s. 144 of the Code-judicial or
executive-to the extent they run counter to the decision of
the Constitution Bench in Babulal Parate's case, may require
reconsideration but we agree that the nature of the order
under s. 144 of the Code is intended to meet emergent
situation. Thus the clear and definite view of this Court is
that an order under s. 144 of the Code is not intended to be
either permanent or semi-permanent in character. The
concensus of judicial opinion in the High Courts of the
country is thus in accord with the view expressed by this
Court. It is not necessary on that ground to quash the
impugned order of March 1982 as by efflux of time it has
already ceased to be effective.
Sastri Yagnapurushadji And Others vs Muldas Brudardas Vaishya And Another on 14 January, 1966
"Even a cursory study of the growth and development of
Hindu religion through the ages shows that whenever a
saint or a religious reformer attempted the task of
reforming Hindu religion and fighting irrational or
corrupt practices which had crept into it, a sect was
born which was governed by its own tenets, but which
basically subscribed to the fundamental notions of
Hindu religion and Hindu philosophy. '
456
The averments in the writ petition would seem to indicate a
situation of this type. We have also taken into
consideration the writings of Shri Ananda Murti in books
like Carya-Carya, Namah Shivaya Shantaya, A Guide to Human
Conduct, and Ananda Vachanamritam. These writings by Shri
Ananda Murti are essentially founded upon the essence of
Hindu philosophy. The test indicated by the learned Chief
Justice in the case referred to above and the admission in
paragraph 17 of the writ petition that Ananda Margis belong
to the Shaivite order lead to the clear conclusion that
Ananda Margis belong to the Hindu religion. Mr. Tarkunde for
the petitioner had claimed protection of Article 25 of the
Constitution but in view of our finding that Ananda Marga is
not a separate religion, application of Article 25 is not
attracted.