Search Results Page
Search Results
1 - 10 of 10 (0.20 seconds)Section 148 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 149 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 307 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 34 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 147 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Ram Manorath vs State Of U.P on 10 March, 1981
But the F.I.R. describes specific acts of only some of the appellants. It is proper to treat F.I.R. as corroboration only with respect to those accused whose specific acts are mentioned therein. It is only in that way that innocent persons are not convicted along with guilty ones can be ensured on the testimony of interested and partisan witnesses. The use of F.I.R. as corroboration with respect to only those accused whose specific parts are described in it, was approved by the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Manorath v. State of U. P., 1981 2 SCC 654.
Dhanabal And Anr vs State Of Tamil Nadu on 13 December, 1979
Reference was made to observations of the Supreme Court in para 23 of the decision State of U. P. v. Ram Sarup, AIR 1974 SC 1570, and in para 7 of the decision Dhanabal v. State of T. N., AIR 1980 SC 628.
State Of U.P vs Ram Swarup & Anr on 2 May, 1974
Reference was made to observations of the Supreme Court in para 23 of the decision State of U. P. v. Ram Sarup, AIR 1974 SC 1570, and in para 7 of the decision Dhanabal v. State of T. N., AIR 1980 SC 628.
Rahim Beg And Anr. vs State Of U.P. on 20 April, 1972
6. Shri Rajendra Singh, learned counsel for the appellants, argued that first information report, Ex.P-1, was not a promptly recorded document as it purported to be. It was really brought into existence a day subsequent to the incident, i.e., on 22-11-1986 at Damoh, while the document purported to have been recorded on the date of incident itself, i.e., on 21-11-1986 at Hindoriya Police Station. It was argued that this had the effect of not only depriving the document of its evidentiary value but also showed that investigation in the case had not been carried out faithfully, vitiating the entire prosecution evidence. Reliance was sought from the observations made by the Supreme Court in para 21 of the decision Rahim Beg v. State of U. P., AIR 1973 SC 343. It was also argued that seizure memoranda Exs.P-9, P-10 and P-12, purporting to be of the date 22-1-1986, showing the registration of the crime under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, were also documents subsequently prepared by the Investigating Officer Shri B. D. Tripathi (P.W.21) because the latter admitted that registration of the crime from Section 307 to 302 was altered only on 23-11-1986 and not before that. It was further argued that alleged eye-witnesses Komal Singh (PW.l) and his cronies and servants Narayan (P.W.2) and Ganga Singh (P.W.3) were interested witnesses inimically disposed towards the accused persons. Their evidence was contrary to medical evidence. They had also told lies on material points. Their evidence was therefore totally unworthy of credit. The real fact was that killing of deceased Premsingh was the handiwork of two unknown hired assassins, as was the evidence of some of the witnesses for the prosecution itself, namely, Ramkumar (P.W.9), Ratanlal (P.W.10), Siddsingh (P.W. ll), Damodar Prasad (P.W.12) and Sarjoo (P.W.19). Finally, it was argued that alleged evidence about exhortation said to have been done by appellant No. 7 Ganga Prasad was an unsatisfactory kind of evidence on which no reliance could be placed. Such trite evidence is often spicy but little credence could be attached to the same.
1