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1 - 10 of 11 (1.30 seconds)Section 100 in The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [Entire Act]
The Specific Relief Act, 1963
Vithalbhai Pvt. Ltd vs Union Bank Of India on 11 March, 2005
20. Following the declaration of law made by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to above, as there is no
provision in the Specific Relief Act requiring the plaintiff
claiming the relief of specific performance to wait for
expiry of the due date for performance of the agreement
in a situation where the defendant may have made its
intention clear by not replying to the legal notice at Ex.P8,
I am of the view that, the contentions raised by the
learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent is to
be accepted. It is well settled principle in law that the
Section 3 in The Limitation Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
Section 20 in The Specific Relief Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
A.V.G.P. Chettiar & Sons & Ors vs T. Palanisamy Gounder on 8 May, 2002
In this regard it is relevant to cite the judgment
of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sri. Siddu
Venkappa Devadiga Vs. Smt. Rangu S. Devadiga &
Ors reported in AIR 1977 SC 890 and in the case of
A.V.G.P. Chettiar & Sons & Ors Vs. T.Palanisamy
Gounder reported in (2002) 5 SCC 337, wherein it is
held that the plea which has not been raised by the
defendant as to the premature of the suit before the
courts below and same cannot be urged for the first time
in second appeal as it would be deciding the case on
entirely new issue. In that view of the matter, I am of the
view that, the substantial questions of law referred to
above favours the plaintiff and I do not find any perversity
in the judgment and decree passed by the courts below.
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
M/S Virgo Industries (Eng) P.Ltd vs M/S Venturetech Solutions P.Ltd on 7 September, 2012
It is also argued by the learned
Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent by referring
to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
of M/s.Virgo Industries (Eng) P. Ltd. Vs. M/S.
Venturetech Solutioons P. Ltd., reported in (2013) 1
SCC 625 at paragraphs 15 and 16 of the said judgment
that the plea raised by the appellant herein as to the
Samar Singh vs Kedar Nath Alias K.N. Singh And Ors. on 28 July, 1987
(ii) when the institution of the suit before the lapse of
a particular time or occurrence of a particular event
would have the effect of defeating a public policy or
public purpose; (iii) if such premature institution
renders the presentation itself patently void and the
invalidity is incurable such as when it goes to the root
of the court's jurisdiction; and (iv) where the lis is not
confined to parties alone and affects and involves
persons other than those arrayed as parties, such as
in an election petition which affects and involves the
entire constituency. (See Samar Singh v. Kedar Nath
[1987 Supp SCC 663] .) One more category of suits
which may be added to the above, is: where leave of
Siddu Venkappa Devadiga vs Smt. Rangu S. Devadiga And Ors. on 6 January, 1977
In this regard it is relevant to cite the judgment
of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sri. Siddu
Venkappa Devadiga Vs. Smt. Rangu S. Devadiga &
Ors reported in AIR 1977 SC 890 and in the case of
A.V.G.P. Chettiar & Sons & Ors Vs. T.Palanisamy
Gounder reported in (2002) 5 SCC 337, wherein it is
held that the plea which has not been raised by the
defendant as to the premature of the suit before the
courts below and same cannot be urged for the first time
in second appeal as it would be deciding the case on
entirely new issue. In that view of the matter, I am of the
view that, the substantial questions of law referred to
above favours the plaintiff and I do not find any perversity
in the judgment and decree passed by the courts below.
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.