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1 - 10 of 24 (0.25 seconds)Section 302 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Babu vs State Of Kerala on 11 August, 2010
In paras 25 and 26, it is
observed and held as under: [Babu v. State of Kerala,
(2010) 9 SCC 189], SCC pp. 200-01)
“25.
Section 313 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
State Of Rajasthan vs Kashi Ram on 7 November, 2006
Insofar as the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the
State on the judgment of Kashi Ram (supra) is concerned, it would
reveal, that this Court had used the factor of non-explanation under
Section 313 Cr.P.C. only as an additional link to fortify the finding,
that the prosecution had established chain of events unquestionably
leading to the guilt of the accused and not as a link to complete the
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chain. As such, the said judgment would not be applicable to the
facts of the present case.
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs State Of Maharashtra on 17 July, 1984
32. It is more than settled principle of law that if two views are
possible, the benefit shall always go to the accused. It will be
apposite to refer to the following observations of this Court in the
case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra):-
Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade & Anr vs State Of Maharashtra on 27 August, 1973
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the
circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may
be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a
legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be
or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji
Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra (1973) 2 SCC
793 where the observations were made : [SCC para 19,
p. 807 : SCC (Cri) p. 1047]
“19. …..Certainly, it is a primary principle that
the accused must be and not merely may be
guilty before a court can convict and the
mental distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must
be’ is long and divides vague conjectures from
sure conclusions.”
(2) the facts so established should be
consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt
of the accused, that is to say, they should not
be explainable on any other hypothesis
except that the accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a
conclusive nature and tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible
hypothesis except the one to be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so
complete as not to leave any reasonable
ground for the conclusion consistent with the
innocence of the accused and must show that
in all human probability the act must have
been done by the accused.
Trimukh Maroti Kirkan vs State Of Maharashtra on 11 October, 2006
In the case of Subramaniam (supra), reliance was placed on
behalf of the State on the judgments of this Court in Trimukh
Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra 9 and Ponnusamy v. State
of Tamil Nadu10. This Court observed thus:-
K.Ponnusamy vs State By Inspector Of Police Sendamaram ... on 23 November, 2015
In the case of Subramaniam (supra), reliance was placed on
behalf of the State on the judgments of this Court in Trimukh
Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra 9 and Ponnusamy v. State
of Tamil Nadu10. This Court observed thus:-
Sawal Das vs State Of Bihar on 9 January, 1974
“33.1. Insofar as the “last seen theory” is concerned,
there is no doubt that the appellant being none other than
the wife of the deceased and staying under the same
roof, was the last person the deceased was seen with.
However, such companionship of the deceased and the
appellant, by itself, does not mean that a presumption of
guilt of the appellant is to be drawn. The trial court and
the High Court have proceeded on the assumption that
Section 106 of the Evidence Act directly operates against
the appellant. In our view, such an approach has also not
9 (2006) 10 SCC 681
10 (2008) 5 SCC 587
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been free from error where it was omitted to be
considered that Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not
absolve the prosecution of its primary burden. This Court
has explained the principle in Sawal Das v. State of Bihar,
(1974) 4 SCC 193 in the following: (SCC p. 197, para 10)
“10. Neither an application of Section 103 nor
of 106 of the Evidence Act could, however,
absolve the prosecution from the duty of
discharging its general or primary burden of
proving the prosecution case beyond
reasonable doubt. It is only when the
prosecution has led evidence which, if
believed, will sustain a conviction, or which
makes out a prima facie case, that the
question arises of considering facts of which
the burden of proof may lie upon the
accused.””