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Banwari Lal vs Smt. Chando Devi (Through L.R.) And ... on 11 December, 1992

56. The judgments of Pushpa Devi [Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 566] as well as Banwari Lal [Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi, (1993) 1 SCC 581] were referred to and relied on by this Court. This Court held that no sooner a question relating to lawfulness of the agreement or compromise is raised before the court that passed the decree on the basis of any such agreement or compromise, it is that court and that court alone which can examine and determine that question.
Supreme Court of India Cites 11 - Cited by 238 - N P Singh - Full Document

Triloki Nath Singh vs Anirudh Singh (D) Thr. Lrs . on 6 May, 2020

In subsequent judgment, Triloki Nath Singh v. Anirudh Singh [Triloki Nath Singh v. Anirudh Singh, (2020) 6 SCC 629 : (2020) 3 SCC (Civ) 732] , this Court again referring to earlier judgments reiterated the same proposition i.e. the only remedy available to a party to a consent decree to avoid such consent decree is to approach the court which recorded the compromise and separate suit is not maintainable. In paras 17 and 18, the following has been laid down: (SCC p.
Supreme Court of India Cites 7 - Cited by 52 - A Rastogi - Full Document

Smt. Prem Lata And Ors. vs Shri Rajender Soni on 8 December, 2005

11.Respondent Nos. 3 to 5 also filed their written statement in Civil Suit No. 59302/2016 and denied the averments made by the Appellant. Firstly, it was stated by them that after the death of their father in 1988, the suit property fell into the share of Appellant, Respondent No.2 to 5 and their mother, Smt. Shakuntala Devi jointly. Thereafter on 26.08.1996, the Appellant was given the Mukundpur property by their mother in lieu of the Appellant's share in the suit property and it was agreed that the Appellant will relinquish her share in the suit property and will not claim any right, title, interest in respect of the suit property in future. Similarly, an adjacent plot was also given to Respondent No.2 (sister) in lieu of her relinquishing her share in the suit property in favor of Respondent Nos. 3 to 5. Unfortunately, the mother expired in 2013 and thereafter Respondent Nos. 3 to 5, being absolute owners of the suit property, sold the same to a bonafide purchaser in the year 2014. Subsequently, the Appellant after coming to know about the purchase, with a malafide intention, filed a civil suit for permanent injunction bearing No. 139/2014, titled as Prem Lata v. Rajender Prasad &Ors. against Respondent Nos. 2 to 5 praying to restrain the said Respondents from selling, alienating, or parting with possession of the suit property. It is further stated that since the suit was filed by their sister/Appellant, the Respondents, in order to settle the matter, gave the Appellant a sum of Rs.30,00,000/-, even though the Mukundpur property was already given to her in lieu of her share in the suit property. It was also stated that a declaration dated 20.11.2014 had also been executed by the Appellant to that effect. Consequently, the Appellant withdrew the aforesaid Suit No. 139/2014 filed by her in view of Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:KOMAL DHAWAN RFA 235/2023 Page 6 of 26 Signing Date:01.06.2023 19:00:01 the Settlement Deed dated 20.11.2014 which is also a part of Suit No. 139/2014. Further, the Appellant had also appeared in person and made a statement with regard to the settlement which has been recorded vide order dated 26.11.2014. Secondly, it was also stated by Respondent Nos. 3 to 5 that Respondent No.2 who is also the sister of the Appellant and Respondent Nos. 3 to 5, have clearly stated in her written statement in Suit No. 139/2014 that after the death of their father, the Appellant and Respondent Nos. 2 to 5 relinquished their rights arising out of 50% share of the father in the suit property in favor of their mother and by virtue of the said relinquishment deed, the mother became the absolute owner of the suit property. In order to satisfy the Appellant and Respondent No.2 (both daughters), the mother purchased properties in the name of both of them. Later, the mother being the absolute owner, executed a Power of Attorney along with other documents for transferring the suit property. Thirdly, the Appellant has filed the Suit No. 59302/2016, with the same cause of action against the Respondents challenging the Compromise Decree, Declaration, receipt of Rs. 30 Lakhs etc. Fourthly, the suit is liable to be dismissed particularly when the suit property has already been sold to a third party by virtue of genuine documents and hence neither the Appellant nor Respondent Nos. 2 to 5 are left with any right, title or interest in the suit property. Fifthly, it was also stated that the suit is bad for non-joinder of the necessary party i.e., Mr. Yogesh Kumar, Advocate, who the Appellant alleges has forged the Declaration as well as the Settlement Deed dated 20.11.2014.
Delhi High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 4 - S Kumar - Full Document

R. Rajanna vs S.R.Venkataswamy & Ors on 20 November, 2014

55. The next judgment is R. Rajanna v. S.R. Venkataswamy [R. Rajanna v. S.R. Venkataswamy, (2014) 15 SCC 471 : (2015) 4 SCC (Civ) 238] in which the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 and Rule 3-A were again considered. After extracting the aforesaid provisions, the following was held by this Court in para 11: (SCC p. 474) "11. It is manifest from a plain reading of the above that in terms of the proviso to Order 23 Rule 3 where one party alleges and the other denies adjustment or satisfaction of any suit by a lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties, the Court before whom such question is raised, shall decide the same. What is important is that in terms of Explanation to Order 23 Rule 3, the agreement or compromise shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of the said Rule if the same is void or voidable under the Contract Act, 1872. It follows that in every case where the question arises whether or not there has been a lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties, the question whether the agreement or compromise is lawful has to be determined by the court concerned. What is lawful will in turn depend upon whether the allegations suggest any infirmity in the compromise and the decree that would make the same void or voidable under the Contract Act. More importantly, Order 23 Rule 3-A clearly bars a suit to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful. This implies that no sooner a question relating to lawfulness of the agreement or compromise is raised before the court that passed the decree on the basis of any such agreement or compromise, it is that court and that court alone who can examine and determine that question. The court cannot direct the parties to file a separate suit on the subject for no such suit will lie in view of the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3-A CPC. That is precisely what has happened in the case at hand. When the appellant filed OS No. 5326 of 2005 to challenge the validity Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:KOMAL DHAWAN RFA 235/2023 Page 22 of 26 Signing Date:01.06.2023 19:00:01 of the compromise decree, the court before whom the suit came up rejected the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC on the application made by the respondents holding that such a suit was barred by the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3-A CPC. Having thus got the plaint rejected, the defendants (the respondents herein) could hardly be heard to argue that the plaintiff (the appellant herein) ought to pursue his remedy against the compromise decree in pursuance of OS No. 5326 of 2005 and if the plaint in the suit has been rejected to pursue his remedy against such rejection before a higher court."
Supreme Court of India Cites 4 - Cited by 86 - T S Thakur - Full Document
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