Search Results Page
Search Results
1 - 10 of 12 (0.49 seconds)The Indian Contract Act, 1872
Section 151 in The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [Entire Act]
Section 9 in The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [Entire Act]
Banwari Lal vs Smt. Chando Devi (Through L.R.) And ... on 11 December, 1992
56. The judgments of Pushpa Devi [Pushpa Devi
Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 566] as well
as Banwari Lal [Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi, (1993) 1 SCC
581] were referred to and relied on by this Court. This Court
held that no sooner a question relating to lawfulness of the
agreement or compromise is raised before the court that
passed the decree on the basis of any such agreement or
compromise, it is that court and that court alone which can
examine and determine that question.
The Code Of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1956
Triloki Nath Singh vs Anirudh Singh (D) Thr. Lrs . on 6 May, 2020
In subsequent judgment, Triloki Nath Singh v. Anirudh
Singh [Triloki Nath Singh v. Anirudh Singh, (2020) 6 SCC
629 : (2020) 3 SCC (Civ) 732] , this Court again referring to
earlier judgments reiterated the same proposition i.e. the
only remedy available to a party to a consent decree to avoid
such consent decree is to approach the court which recorded
the compromise and separate suit is not maintainable. In
paras 17 and 18, the following has been laid down: (SCC p.
Smt. Prem Lata And Ors. vs Shri Rajender Soni on 8 December, 2005
11.Respondent Nos. 3 to 5 also filed their written statement in Civil
Suit No. 59302/2016 and denied the averments made by the
Appellant. Firstly, it was stated by them that after the death of their
father in 1988, the suit property fell into the share of Appellant,
Respondent No.2 to 5 and their mother, Smt. Shakuntala Devi
jointly. Thereafter on 26.08.1996, the Appellant was given the
Mukundpur property by their mother in lieu of the Appellant's
share in the suit property and it was agreed that the Appellant will
relinquish her share in the suit property and will not claim any
right, title, interest in respect of the suit property in future.
Similarly, an adjacent plot was also given to Respondent No.2
(sister) in lieu of her relinquishing her share in the suit property in
favor of Respondent Nos. 3 to 5. Unfortunately, the mother expired
in 2013 and thereafter Respondent Nos. 3 to 5, being absolute
owners of the suit property, sold the same to a bonafide purchaser
in the year 2014. Subsequently, the Appellant after coming to
know about the purchase, with a malafide intention, filed a civil
suit for permanent injunction bearing No. 139/2014, titled as Prem
Lata v. Rajender Prasad &Ors. against Respondent Nos. 2 to 5
praying to restrain the said Respondents from selling, alienating, or
parting with possession of the suit property. It is further stated that
since the suit was filed by their sister/Appellant, the Respondents,
in order to settle the matter, gave the Appellant a sum of
Rs.30,00,000/-, even though the Mukundpur property was already
given to her in lieu of her share in the suit property. It was also
stated that a declaration dated 20.11.2014 had also been executed
by the Appellant to that effect. Consequently, the Appellant
withdrew the aforesaid Suit No. 139/2014 filed by her in view of
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:KOMAL DHAWAN RFA 235/2023 Page 6 of 26
Signing Date:01.06.2023
19:00:01
the Settlement Deed dated 20.11.2014 which is also a part of Suit
No. 139/2014. Further, the Appellant had also appeared in person
and made a statement with regard to the settlement which has been
recorded vide order dated 26.11.2014. Secondly, it was also stated
by Respondent Nos. 3 to 5 that Respondent No.2 who is also the
sister of the Appellant and Respondent Nos. 3 to 5, have clearly
stated in her written statement in Suit No. 139/2014 that after the
death of their father, the Appellant and Respondent Nos. 2 to 5
relinquished their rights arising out of 50% share of the father in
the suit property in favor of their mother and by virtue of the said
relinquishment deed, the mother became the absolute owner of the
suit property. In order to satisfy the Appellant and Respondent
No.2 (both daughters), the mother purchased properties in the
name of both of them. Later, the mother being the absolute owner,
executed a Power of Attorney along with other documents for
transferring the suit property. Thirdly, the Appellant has filed the
Suit No. 59302/2016, with the same cause of action against the
Respondents challenging the Compromise Decree, Declaration,
receipt of Rs. 30 Lakhs etc. Fourthly, the suit is liable to be
dismissed particularly when the suit property has already been sold
to a third party by virtue of genuine documents and hence neither
the Appellant nor Respondent Nos. 2 to 5 are left with any right,
title or interest in the suit property. Fifthly, it was also stated that
the suit is bad for non-joinder of the necessary party i.e., Mr.
Yogesh Kumar, Advocate, who the Appellant alleges has forged
the Declaration as well as the Settlement Deed dated 20.11.2014.
R.Jankiammal vs S.K.Kumaraswamy (D) Thr.Lrs. on 30 June, 2021
39.Furthermore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of R.
Janakiammal v. S.K. Kumarasamy, reported as (2021) 9 SCC 114
has examined the law laid down under Order XXIII Rule 3 as well
as Rule 3A CPC and found out the ratio of judgments of the Apex
Court in context of Rule 3 and Rule 3A:
R. Rajanna vs S.R.Venkataswamy & Ors on 20 November, 2014
55. The next judgment is R. Rajanna v. S.R.
Venkataswamy [R. Rajanna v. S.R. Venkataswamy, (2014) 15
SCC 471 : (2015) 4 SCC (Civ) 238] in which the provisions
of Order 23 Rule 3 and Rule 3-A were again considered.
After extracting the aforesaid provisions, the following was
held by this Court in para 11: (SCC p. 474)
"11. It is manifest from a plain reading of the above that
in terms of the proviso to Order 23 Rule 3 where one party
alleges and the other denies adjustment or satisfaction of any
suit by a lawful agreement or compromise in writing and
signed by the parties, the Court before whom such question is
raised, shall decide the same. What is important is that in
terms of Explanation to Order 23 Rule 3, the agreement or
compromise shall not be deemed to be lawful within the
meaning of the said Rule if the same is void or voidable
under the Contract Act, 1872. It follows that in every case
where the question arises whether or not there has been a
lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the
parties, the question whether the agreement or compromise
is lawful has to be determined by the court concerned. What
is lawful will in turn depend upon whether the allegations
suggest any infirmity in the compromise and the decree that
would make the same void or voidable under the Contract
Act. More importantly, Order 23 Rule 3-A clearly bars a suit
to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on
which the decree is based was not lawful. This implies that
no sooner a question relating to lawfulness of the agreement
or compromise is raised before the court that passed the
decree on the basis of any such agreement or compromise, it
is that court and that court alone who can examine and
determine that question. The court cannot direct the parties
to file a separate suit on the subject for no such suit will lie
in view of the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3-A CPC. That is
precisely what has happened in the case at hand. When the
appellant filed OS No. 5326 of 2005 to challenge the validity
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:KOMAL DHAWAN RFA 235/2023 Page 22 of 26
Signing Date:01.06.2023
19:00:01
of the compromise decree, the court before whom the suit
came up rejected the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC on
the application made by the respondents holding that such a
suit was barred by the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3-A CPC.
Having thus got the plaint rejected, the defendants (the
respondents herein) could hardly be heard to argue that the
plaintiff (the appellant herein) ought to pursue his remedy
against the compromise decree in pursuance of OS No. 5326
of 2005 and if the plaint in the suit has been rejected to
pursue his remedy against such rejection before a higher
court."