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1 - 10 of 11 (0.82 seconds)Article 136 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
The Central Excise Act, 1944
Section 51 in The Finance Act, 2018 [Entire Act]
The Gujarat Finance Act, 1932
Vashist Narain Sharma vs Dev Chandra And Others on 20 May, 1954
Consideration of justice,
therefore, require that this Court
should in appropriate cases permit
a party placed in such a position
to support the judgment in his
favour even favour even upon
grounds which were negatived in
that judgement. We are therefore,
of the opinion that in Vashisht
Narain Sharma's Case, too narrow a
view was taken regarding the powers
of this Court".
Sri Baru Ram vs Shrimati Prasanni & Others on 30 September, 1958
The aforesaid decision was cited before another three-
judge bench in the case of Sri Baru Ram v. Shrimati Prasanni
and Others 1959 SCR 1403 where it was not dissented from.
Ramanbhai Ashabhai Patel vs Dabhi Ajithkumar Fulsinji And Others on 9 October, 1964
But in the light of the decision of the Constitution bench
of this Court in Ramanbhai Ashabhai Patel v. Dabhi Ajitkumar
Fulsinji and Others, 1965 (1) SCR 712, the ratio adopted in
the earlier mentioned two decisions is no more in vogue. The
Constitution Bench held that this Court has power to decide
all points arising from the impugned judgment and even in
the absence of an express provision like Order 41, Rule 22,
CPC, this Court can devise appropriate procedure to be
adopted at the hearing. The observations of the bench which
are relevant now are the following:
J.K. Cotton Spinning And Weaving Mills ... vs Union Of India & Ors on 30 October, 1987
That endeavour resulted in the
judicial pronouncement in J.K. Spinning and Weaving Mills
(supra) by placing those provisions subject to the time
limit fixed under Section 11-A.
If the said rider was not imposed by this Court as per
the decision in J.K. Cotton spinning and Weaving Co, case
(supra), what would have been the fate of Rules 9 and 49 (as
amended in the wake of the challenge to its vires cannot now
be reexamined. Whatever it be, the fact remains, that Rules
9 and 49 survived the challenge when this Court nailed their
sweep to the limitation specified in Section 11-A. Hence
that limitation period should not be stretched more than the
elasticity supplied in the Section itself. So, in our
opinion, the eventuality envisaged in Section 11-A for the
further lengthening of the limitation period must be
strictly construed.