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1 - 4 of 4 (0.62 seconds)Section 138 in The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 [Entire Act]
Amar Nath And Others vs State Of Haryana & Others on 29 July, 1977
6. Before coming to the case of the petitioner and points raised on his behalf
in this petition, it may be mentioned here that the learned counsel for the
respondent took an objection to the maintainability of this petition under
Section 561-A Cr. P. C. Inviting the attention of the Court to the provision of
561-A Cr.P.C 186/16 3|Page
Section 430 Cr. P.C., the learned counsel argued that since there is a finality
attached to the judgment and orders passed by an appellate court upon appeal
and since the order impugned herein has been passed by the learned Sessions
Judge as an appellate court upon the appeal preferred before it by the
respondent, no further proceedings can lie in any court against the said order
which would include this petition under Section 561-A Cr. P. C. The learned
counsel sought to draw analogy and support from the judgment of the Supreme
Court in Amar Nath v State of Haryuana, AIR 1977 SC 2185.
M/S. Amar Nath Om Parkash And Ors. Etc vs State Of Punjab And Ors. Etc on 29 November, 1984
- not anything, no single thing - in the Code, which includes Section 430 of the
Code. The inherent power of the High Court in relation to the three fields
specified in the Section itself is not controlled by any of the other provisions of
the Code. In fact, Section 561-A Cr. P. C. itself also does not confer such power
on the High Court; this power is inhered by the High Court and the Section only
saves it and, therefore, it cannot be controlled by, or be subject to, any other
provision of the Code. That being so, the argument put forth that a petition
under Section 561-A Cr. P. C against the judgment or orders passed by an
appellate court upon an appeal would not be maintainable is wholly untenable
and not sustainable. It is a different thing, that the Courts have evolved a
mechanism of self restraint in invoking the inherent powers. The judgment in
Amar Nath v State of Haryuana (supra), cited and relied upon by the learned
counsel for the respondent basically deals with interlocutory orders and in that
context it is held therein that where there is an express provision barring a
particular remedy, the Court cannot resort to the exercise of inherent powers.
That is not the case herein. Of course, the Court would invoke and exercise the
561-A Cr.P.C 186/16 4|Page
inherent power under Section 561-A Cr. P. C. sparingly, carefully and with
caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid
down in the section itself. It is trite law that this power is to be exercised ex
debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which
alone the courts exist. If the Court is satisfied that it is necessary to give effect
to any order under the Code; or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice, it will invoke the inherent power. These
are the only three circumstances in which such power can be invoked. The
question is which of the circumstance does the petitioner herein claim to be
existing in the instant matter?
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