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1 - 10 of 18 (0.54 seconds)Article 226 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978
Section 4 in Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 [Entire Act]
Manchegowda Etc vs State Of Karnataka Etc on 17 April, 1984
10. The Hon'ble Apex Court in
Manchegowda's case referred supra in fact
visualized the present conundrum by
holding that any negligence and delay on the
part of the authorities, entitled to take action
to avoid such transfers through appropriate
legal process for resumption of such grant
may be further impediments in the matter of
avoiding such transfers and resumption of
possession of the granted lands. The relevant
paragraph is extracted hereunder for quick
reference.
Mansaram vs S. P. Pathak And Others on 29 September, 1983
12. It is relevant to state the principle
enunciated by the Hon'ble Apex Court that
the exercise of power vested in an authority
should be exercised in a reasonable manner
and more importantly even a reasonable
time more so, when time is not stipulated
under the statute is not a principle of recent
origins and the Hon'ble Apex Court way back
in 1983 itself has enunciated the principle in
the case of Mansaram vs. S.P.Pathak and
others reported in 1984(1) SCC 125 where
the issue involved was one of eviction of a
tenant and the Hon'ble Apex Court has held
that where the time limit for taking action for
eviction is not stipulated in the statute, the
eviction after an unreasonable long lapse of
time on the ground of initial occupation of
the premises being unlawful is not
sustainable. In para.12 the Hon'ble Apex
Court has held thus:
Murlidhar Agarwal And Anr vs State Of U.P. And Ors on 26 July, 1974
In this
connection, we may refer to
Murlidhar Agarwal v. State of U.P.
wherein one Ram Agyan Singh
who came into possession of
premises without an order of
allotment in his favour as required
by sec. 7(2) of the U.P.
(Temporary) Control of Rent and
Eviction Act, 1947, was permitted
to retain the premises by treating
his occupation lawful and this
court declined to interfere with
that order. No doubt it must be
confessed that sec. 7A conferred
power on the District Magistrate to
take action against unauthorised
occupation in contravention of the
15
provisions of the U.P. (Temporary)
Control of Rent and Eviction Act,
1947, but there was a proviso to
the section which enabled the
District Magistrate not to evict a
person found to be in
unauthorized occupation, if the
District Magistrate was
satisfied that there has been
undue delay or otherwise it is
inexpedient to do so. There is
no such proviso to clause 28
which confers power on the
Collector to take necessary action
for the purpose of securing
compliance with the Rent Control
Order. But as stated earlier,
where power is conferred to
effectuate a purpose, it has to be
exercised in a reasonable manner
and the reasonable exercise of
power inheres its exercise within
a reasonable time. This is too well
established to need buttressing by
a precedent.
State Of Gujarat vs Patel Raghav Natha & Ors on 21 April, 1969
However, one is
readily available in State of
Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha &
Ors. In that case Commissioner
exercised suo motu revisional
jurisdiction under sec. 211 of the
Bombay Land Revenue Code
which did not prescribe any
period of limitation for exercise of
revisional jurisdiction. The
Commissioner exercised revisional
jurisdiction one year after the
Collector made the order which
was sought to be revised. The
High Court set aside the order of
the Commissioner. In the appeal
by State of Gujarat, this Court
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declined to interfere holding inter
alia that the revisional power in
the absence of prescribed period
of limitation must be exercised
within a reasonable time and
period of one year was held to be
too late. This aspect must be
present to the mind of House
Allotment Officer before just
rushing in on an unproved
technical contravention brought to
his notice contrived by the
successor-in-interest of the
deceased landlord, and evicting
the appellant 22 years after his
entry and 9 years after his
retirement on the short ground
that his entry in the year 1954
was in contravention of clause
22(2)."
Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil & Ors vs Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale & Ors on 2 September, 2009
13. The above decision has been
reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its
subsequent judgment in the case of
Santhoshkumar Shivgonda Patil &
others vs. Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale
and others reported in (2009) 9 SCC 352
wherein at para.10 referring to the ruling in
the case of State of Punjab vs. Bhatinda
District Co-op Milk Producers Union Ltd.,
held that where the statute does not
prescribe the time limit, same has to be
exercised within a reasonable time be it suo
motu or otherwise. It was pleased to hold
17
that the reasonable period under the
Maharashtra Land Revenue Code could be
three years subject to exceptional
circumstances and categorically held that
the exercise of revisional power after lapse of
17 years can by no stretch of imagination be
construed as being within a reasonable time.
The observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court in
para.10,11 and 12 is reproduced below.
State Of Punjab & Ors vs Bhatinda District Coop. Milk P. Union ... on 11 October, 2007
13. The above decision has been
reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its
subsequent judgment in the case of
Santhoshkumar Shivgonda Patil &
others vs. Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale
and others reported in (2009) 9 SCC 352
wherein at para.10 referring to the ruling in
the case of State of Punjab vs. Bhatinda
District Co-op Milk Producers Union Ltd.,
held that where the statute does not
prescribe the time limit, same has to be
exercised within a reasonable time be it suo
motu or otherwise. It was pleased to hold
17
that the reasonable period under the
Maharashtra Land Revenue Code could be
three years subject to exceptional
circumstances and categorically held that
the exercise of revisional power after lapse of
17 years can by no stretch of imagination be
construed as being within a reasonable time.
The observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court in
para.10,11 and 12 is reproduced below.