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1 - 10 of 23 (0.38 seconds)The Arbitration Act, 1940
Parbhat General Agencies Etc vs Union Of India & Anr. Etc on 12 October, 1970
In Prabhat General Agencies v. Union of India, AIR 1971 SC 2298, the Supreme Court held that the language of the provision in Section 8 is not that the parties intended to supply the vacancy but on the other hand it is that 'the parties did not intend to supply the vacancy'. The Supreme Court made it clear that if the agreement is silent as regards supplying the vacancy, the law presumes that the parties intended to supply the vacancy.
Section 9 in The Arbitration Act, 1940 [Entire Act]
Union Of India vs R. B. Ch. Raghunath Singh & Co on 27 July, 1979
This principle of the Supreme Court has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in its latter decision in Union of India v. Raghunath Singh & Co., AIR 1980 SC 103. In the present agreement there is absence of negative intention as required by Section 8 to hold that the arbitration agreement failed and Judge was, therefore, perfectly justified in rejecting
the objection of the appellant-Corporation.
Section 23 in The Arbitration Act, 1940 [Entire Act]
The Public Sector Iron and Steel Companies (Restructuring) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1978
Section 5 in The Arbitration Act, 1940 [Entire Act]
Sushila Seth And Ors. vs State Of Madhya Pradesh on 27 February, 1980
In this context learned counsel appearing for the opposite party has cited a decision of the Delhi High Court reported in AIR 1980 Delhi 244 (Mrs. Sushila Seth v. State of Madhya Pradesh) wherein on interpretation of the arbitration clause of the relevant contract was held that in the absence of the Chief Engineer who was nominated as the Arbitrator the Deputy Chief Engineer placed in charge of the work of the Chief Engineer was equally qualified to decide the dispute between the parties. This decision was based on the peculiar facts of that case. According to the terms of the contract the Chief Engineer was chosen as the Arbitrator because of his technical qualification and familiarity with the intricacies of the civil engineering work which was required to be done by the contractor and it was found that these considerations would also hold good in respect of the Deputy Chief Engineer who was placed in charge of the work of the Chief Engineer. In the present case neither the agreement reveals nor have any materials been placed before the Court to show that Mr. Wadhawan was the successor of Mr. Bhaya or that Mr. Bhaya was nominated as the Arbitrator by the parties because of his expertise in relation to the terms and conditions contained in the lease deed dated 3-10-63 or in the hotel-cum-restaurant business for which the said lease was granted. The decision of the Delhi High Court can have no application to the facts of this case. The petitioner's contention in this case is that Mr. Wadhawan was never appointed as the regular Chairman of Hindusthan Steel Limited. In this Court on behalf of the opposite party some resolutions of the Board of Directors of Hindusthan Steel Limited have been filed. Resolution No. 1 dated 2-4-77 is extracted hereunder :
Mohanlal Goenka vs Benoy Krishna Mukherjeeand Others on 9 December, 1952
It is urged on behalf of the opposite party that principles of res judicata are applicable to arbitration proceedings and a number of decisions including AIR 1953 SC 65 (Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Krishna Mukharjee) and AIR 1978 Cal 449 (Talcher Coalfields Ltd. v. Central Coalfields Ltd.) have been cited in support of this proposition. It is not necessary to refer to those decisions as it is well established that principles of res judicata are applicable to arbitration proceedings. However it has been stated on behalf of the petitioner that the said judgment is now pending in this Court in First Appeal No. 77 of 1982. Law is well established that a decision liable to appeal may be 'final' within the meaning of Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code until an appeal is preferred, but once the appeal is filed the decision loses its character of 'finality' and what was once res judicata again becomes res sub judice that is, matter under judicial enquiry.