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1 - 10 of 28 (0.45 seconds)Section 15 in The Limitation Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
Section 5 in The Limitation Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag & ... vs Mst. Katiji & Ors on 19 February, 1987
Learned Counsel for the petitioner in this regard also pressed into service the observations of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katyi .
Shyamcharan Sharma vs Dharamdas on 4 December, 1979
24. Likewise in Kamla Devi v. Shri Vasdev reported in 1995(1) RCR 411 the Hon'ble Supreme Court was again considering the provisions of Delhi Rent Control Act wherein after referring to the aforesaid judgments of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Hemchand's case, Santosh Mehta's case, Shyamcharan Sharma's case and Ram Murti's case it was held that:
Santosh Mehta vs Om Prakash And Anr on 2 April, 1980
34. But then it is to be grasped that ground of default Under Section 13(1)(a) is as good ground of eviction as any other ground, mentioned in other clauses of Section 13(1), and only in cases of ground of default the tenant is given an additional opportunity by way of a benefit, to get over that ground. Here itself I may recapitulate that Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Santosh Mehta's case has clearly observed and held the striking out of the defence to be "punitive extreme" and a "harsh extreme" and has cautioned it to be used in a grossly recalcitrant situation. Likewise this Court also in M/s. Sunmoon Stationers' ease has held that the "right to defend the suit is very valuable right" and before the same is taken away a very strong ground must exist i.e. it is only when the court comes to the conclusion that the default in making payment in terms of Section 13(3) or (4) was wilful and contumacious that the court ought to exercise the discretion to strike out the defence. Thus, the anxiety of the various decisions holding in favour of exercising the discretion by not striking out the defence is that the action to strike out the defence is punitive, and extreme harsh, and takes away a very valuable right of the defendant to defend the suit even on the ground of default. I whole heartedly associate with the feeling and agree with the same, but at the same time I am of the view that the power to condone or not to condone delay depending on the existence or want of sufficient cause, and the discretion to or not to strike out defence need not be always interlinked. Inasmuch as if the tenant makes out sufficient cause for condonation of delay, the delay is to be condoned, and then obviously the defence cannot be struck out, on the other hand if the tenant fails to make out the sufficient cause, the Court need not condone the delay, and then even after declining to condone the delay, rather only after declining to condone the delay, the court is to exercise judicial discretion, on the question, as to whether in the facts and circumstances it would like to strike out the defence or not? In other words merely because, the court declines to condone the delay, it need not mandatorily or mechanically strike out the defence.
Vishandas vs Savitri Devi on 8 February, 1988
25. After the judgment of Full Bench of this Court in Vishan Das's case, the Court started considering the cases of non-compliance of Sections 13(3) and (4) by the tenant by applying the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, wherever invoked, and in the event of declining to condone the delay, the defence against eviction is struck out, and where the delay is condoned the striking of the defence is declined. And in that process ofcourse view was taken that the provisions of Section 5 are to be liberally construed, and in the case of even slightest bonafide ground, the delay should be condoned.