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1 - 10 of 26 (0.54 seconds)Section 114 in The Transfer Of Property Act, 1882 [Entire Act]
Section 13 in East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 [Entire Act]
Namdeo Lokman Lodhi vs Narmadabai And Others on 27 February, 1953
The discretion conferred by Section 114 of TP Act is
of wide amplitude guided by the principles of justice, equity and
good conscience and the Court would examine the conduct of the
parties, the comparative hardship and lean in favour of one whose
hands are clean (Namdeo Lokman Lodhi Vs. Narmadabai and Ors.
AIR 1953 SC 228.
The Transfer Of Property Act, 1882
Praduman Kumar vs Virendra Goyal (Dead) By L. Rs on 11 March, 1969
The discretion to grant relief again forfeiture is
available not only to the trial court but also to appellate court ( R.S.
Lala Praduman Kumar Vs. Virendra Goyal (dead) by his Lrs. And
Ors. 1969 (1) SCC 714.
Mam Chand Pal vs Smt. Shanti Agarwal on 14 February, 2002
What follows from the abovesaid discussion is that the proviso
to clause (i) of sub-section (2) of Section 13 must be read as obliging
the Controller to assess, by means of passing an order, the arrears of
rent, the interest and the cost of litigation all the three, which the
tenant shall pay or tender on the first date of first hearing of the main
petition following the date of such assessment by Controller. Such
order based on an opinion formed prima facie by perusal of the
pleadings and such other material as may be available before the
Controller on that day would be an interim or provisional order which
shall have to give way to a final order to be made on further enquiry
to be held later in the event of there being a dispute between the
parties calling for such determination. The Controller would,
however, at the outset assess the rent, the interest and the cost of
application in the light of and to the extent of dispute, if any, raised by
the tenant. Such amount, as determined by Controller shall be liable
to be paid or tendered by the Controller on the 'first date of hearing'
falling after the date of the preliminary or provisional order of
Controller. The expression "the date of first hearing" came up recently
for the consideration of this Court in Mam Chand Pal Vs Smt. Shanti
Agarwal (C.A. No.1187 of 2002 decided on 14.2.2002). It was held
that 'the date of first hearing' is the date on which the Court applies its
mind to the facts and controversy involved in the case. Any date prior
to such date would not be date of first hearing. For instance, date for
framing of issues would be the date of first hearing when the Court
has to apply its mind to the facts of the case. Where the procedure
applicable is the one as applicable to Small Cause Courts, there being
no provision for framing of the issues, any date fixed for hearing of
the case would be the first date for the purpose. The date fixed for
filing of the written statement is not the date of hearing. Keeping in
view the interpretation so placed on 'the date of first hearing' the
obligation cast by the proviso under consideration can be discharged
by the Controller on any date fixed for framing of the issues or for
hearing. It would be the obligation of the parties to place the relevant
material on record, in the shape of affidavits or documents, which
would enable the Controller to make a provisional judicial assessment
and place it on record to satisfy the spirit of the proviso. It would be
desirable if the Rent Controller specifically appoints a date for the
purpose of such assessment and order so that the parties are put on
adequate notice and bring the relevant material on record to assist the
Controller. A litigant cannot be expected to be ready to comply with
the order of the Controller on the very day on which the order is
made. How could he anticipate what order the Controller would be
making?
Manohar Lal Chopra vs Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal on 16 November, 1961
A statute can never be exhaustive, and therefore, Raghubar
Dayal,J. speaking for himself and Wanchoo and Das Gupta, JJ.
observed in Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth
Hiralal, AIR 1962 SC 527 at page 532, "that the Legislature is
incapable of contemplating all the possible circumstances which may
arise in future litigation and consequently for providing the procedure
for them."
The Newabganj Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. And ... vs The Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 16 September, 1975
Sometimes when a difficult situation arises it may demand
such directions being made as would pragmatically meet the needs of
the situation and resort can be had to the inherent powers of the
Court, if need be. Krishna Iyer, J. in The Newabganj Sugar Mills Co.
Ltd. and others v. The Union of India and others, (1976) 1 SCC 120,
held "The difficulty we face here cannot force us to abandon the
inherent powers of the Court to do", and he quoted Jim. R. Carrigam
to say - "The inherent power has its roots in necessity and its breadth
is co-extensive with the necessity."
Jaipur Mineral Development Syndicate, ... vs The Commissioner Of Income Tax, New ... on 16 December, 1976
H.R. Khanna, J. observed in M/s.
Jaipur Mineral Development Syndicate, Jaipur v. The
Commissioner of I.T., New Delhi, (1977) 1 SCC 508 : "The Courts
have power, in the absence of any express or implied prohibition, to
pass an order as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent
the abuse of the process of the court. To hold otherwise would result
in quite a number of cases in gross miscarriage of justice."
Jurisdiction to pass procedural orders though not specifically
contemplated by statute can be spelled out from what was said by
Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) in Mahant Ram as Vs. Ganga Das,
AIR 1961 SC 882, when orders are 'in essence in terrorem so that
dilatory litigants might put themselves in order and avoid delay' the
Courts are not powerless to meet a situation for 'such orders are not
like the law of the Medes and the Persians'.