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1 - 10 of 18 (0.27 seconds)Section 5 in The Essential Commodities Act, 1955 [Entire Act]
The Essential Commodities Act, 1955
Article 301 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Article 14 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Atulya Kumar De And Ors. vs The Director Of Procurement And Supply ... on 3 March, 1953
Quite recently, the Calcutta High Court in Tarakdas
Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal(1) and Lila Biswas v.
State of West Bengal 12) following the dictum of Sinha, J.
in Atulya Kumar's case, supra, have held that the delegation
of specific powers to issue an impugned order of this nature
is derived from sub-s. (1) of s. 3 and that the provisions
of sub-s. (2) thereof are merely illustrative. It has
further held that the various clauses of sub-s. (2) of s. 3
of the Act cannot be made operative independently by any
notification
(1) [1978] 2 Cal. LJ 383
(2) [1978-9] 83 CWN 539
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under s. 5 of the Act without deriving the general powers
under sub-s. (1) of s. 3 of the Act. We are of the
considered opinion that the view of the Calcutta High Court
accords both with reason and principle. The view to the
contrary taken by the Punjab, Allahabad and Orissa High
Courts in Sujan Singh's. Suraj Ban's and Bejoy Kumar
Routrai's cases, supra, dose not lay down good law. It must
accordingly be held that although cl. (d) of sub-s. (2) of
s. 3 of the Act deals only with a specific power, the
general power to issue the impugned order flows from the
provisions of sub-h. (1) of s. 3 which stands delegated to
the State Government by virtue of the notification issued
under s. S of the Act.
Narendra Kumar And Others vs The Union Of India And Others on 3 December, 1959
Shri P. Govindan Nair, learned counsel for the
appellant however contends that the word 'regulation' should
not be confused with the expression 'reasonable
restrictions' occurring in Art. 19(2) to (6) of the
Constitution and therefore the view t-taken in Narendra
Kumar's case is not applicable. According to him, the word
'regulation' in cl. (d) of sub-. (2) of s. 3 of the Act does
not take in 'prohibition'. He seeks to draw a distinction
between prohibition or prevention o-certain activities and
their regulation or governance. It is said that a power to
regulate or govern would imply continued existence of that
which is to be regulated or governed; and to be inconsistent
with absolute prohibition. He therefore submits that cl. 3
(IA) of the Order was ultra vires because the State
Government had only power under cl. (d) of sub-s, (2) of s.
3 of the Act to regulate production, supply and distribution
of, and trade and commerce in, essential commodities like
foodstuffs by
(1) [1960] 2 SCR 361.
State Of Mysore vs H. Sanjeeviah on 16 January, 1967
In
Sanjeeviah's case, the question arose whether two provisos
framed by the State Government under s. 37 of the Mysore
Forest Act, 1900 which empowered the making of rules to
regulate the transit of forest produce which placed absolute
prohibition against transportation of forest produce between
sunset and sunrise and a qualified prohibition in certain
circumstances, was beyond the rule-making power of the State
Government. The contention on behalf of the State was. that
the two provisos were regulatory and prohibitory- In
repelling the contention, the Court observed:
G. K. Krishnan Etc. Etc vs The State Of Tamil Nadu & Anr. Etc on 12 November, 1974
In State of Tamil Nadu v. M/S Hind Stone and
Ors.(') Chinnappa Reddy, J. referred with approval the
observations of Mathew, J. in G.K. Krishnan v. State of
Tamil Nadu(2) laying down that the word 'regulation' has no
fixed connotation and that its meaning differs according to
the nature of that, thing to which it is applied. The
learned Judge also observed:
Sujan Singh Matu Ram vs The State Of Haryana on 8 February, 1967
Shri P. Govindan Nair, learned counsel appearing for
the appellant argued the case with much learning and
resource. Learned counsel with his usual fairness did not
advance some of the contentions raised before the High Court
as they were apparently misconceived. He has confined his
submissions to only two grounds, namely: (l)Cl. 3 (IA) of
the impugned Order issued by the State Government under s. 3
of the Act read with G. S. R. 800 dated June 9, 1978 issued
by the Central Government under s. 5 of the Act with the
prior concurrence of the Government of India placing a ban
on the transport, movement or otherwise carrying of
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paddy from out of Thanjavur district, the two taluks of
South Arcot district and the four taluks of Thiruchirapalli
district, was ultra vires the State Government being in
excess of the delegated powers. It is urged that the
delegation of a specific power under cl. (d) of subs. (2) of
s. 3 of the Act by the aforesaid notification issued by the
Central Government under s. 5 of the Act to regulate the
storage, transport, distribution, disposal etc. Of an
essential commodity, in relaston to foodstuffs, does not
carry with it the general power of the Central Government
under sub-s. (l) of s. 3 to regulate or prohibit the
production, supply and distribution thereof and trade and
commerce therein. And (2) The word 'regulating' in cl. (d)
of sub- s. (2) of s. 3 of the Act does not take in
'prohibiting' for the words 'regulating' and 'prohibiting'
denote two distinct and separate attributes of power and
they are mutually exclusive Otherwise according to learned
counsel, there was no point in the Legislature using both
the words 'regulating' and 'prohibiting' in sub-s. (1) of s.
3 of the Act and the words 'regulating' and 'prohibiting'
differently in various clauses of sub-s. (2) thereof. It is
urged that there cannot be a total prohibition on transport,
movement or otherwise carrying of paddy out of the areas in
question under cl. (d) of subs. (2) of s 3 but only
regulation of such activities in the course of trade and
commerce by grant of licences or permits The learned counsel
is fortified in his submissions by the decisions of the
Punjab, Allahabad and Orissa High Courts in Sujan Singh v
State of Haryana,(1) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Suraj Bhan(2)
and Bejoy Kumar Routrai v. State of Orissa(3) and he
questions the correctness of the decision of the Gujarat
High Court in Nanalal Navalnathji Yogi Collestor of Bulsar&
Ors.(4) taking a view to the contrary. We are afraid, we are
unable to accept any of the contentions advanced by him.