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1 - 10 of 14 (0.29 seconds)Section 309 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
K. Sukhendar Reddy vs State Of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. on 5 April, 1999
Our attention has also been drawn to K. Sukhendar
Reddy v. State of A.P. 1999 (6) SCC 257, which is topical in that it
castigates selective suspension perpetuated indefinitely in circumstances
where other involved persons had not been subjected to any scrutiny.
Reliance on this decision is in the backdrop of the admitted facts that all
the persons who have been privy to the making of the Office-notes have not
been proceeded against departmentally.
State Of Andhra Pradesh vs N. Radhakishan on 7 April, 1998
So far as the question of
prejudicial treatment accorded to an employee is concerned, this Court in
State of A.P. v. N. Radhakishan 1998 (4) SCC 154, has observed that it
would be fair to make this assumption of prejudice if there is an
unexplained delay in the conclusion of proceedings.
Union Of India & Ors vs Dipak Mali on 15 December, 2009
However, the decision
of this Court in Union of India v. Dipak Mali 2010 (2) SCC 222 does not
come to the succour of the Appellant since our inspection of the records
produced in original have established that firstly, the decision to
continue the suspension was carried out within the then prevailing period
and secondly, that it was duly supported by elaborate reasoning.
Kartar Singh vs State Of Punjab on 11 March, 1994
In Kartar Singh vs. State of Punjab (1994) 3 SCC 569 the
Constitution Bench of this Court unequivocally construed the right of
speedy trial as a fundamental right, and we can do no better the extract
these paragraphs from that celebrated decision -
Hussainara Khatoon & Ors vs Home Secretary, State Of Bihar, Govt. Of ... on 12 February, 1979
87. This Court in Hussainara Khatoon (I) v. Home Secretary, State of
Bihar while dealing with Article 21 of the Constitution of India has
observed thus:
Abdul Rehman Antulay & Ors vs R.S. Nayak & Anr on 10 December, 1991
11 The legal expectation of expedition and diligence being present at
every stage of a criminal trial and a fortiori in departmental inquiries
has been emphasised by this Court on numerous occasions. The Constitution
Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak, 1992 (1) SCC 225, underscored
that this right to speedy trial is implicit in Article 21 of the
Constitution and is also reflected in Section 309 of the Cr.P.C., 1973;
that it encompasses all stages, viz., investigation, inquiry, trial,
appeal, revision and re-trial; that the burden lies on the prosecution to
justify and explain the delay; that the Court must engage in a balancing
test to determine whether this right had been denied in the particular case
before it. Keeping these factors in mind the CAT had in the case in hand
directed that the Appellant's suspension would not be extended beyond 90
days from 19.3.2013. The High Court had set aside this direction, viewing
it as a substitution of a judicial determination to the authority
possessing that power, i.e., the Government. This conclusion of the High
Court cannot be sustained in view of the following pronouncement of the
Constitution Bench in Antulay:
Sate Of Punjab And Ors vs Chaman Lal Goyal on 31 January, 1995
12 State of Punjab v. Chaman Lal Goyal (1995) 2 SCC 570 deserves
mention, inter alia, because action was initiated on 25.3.1992 and a
Memorandum of Charges was issued on 9.7.1992 in relation to an incident
which had occurred on 1.1.1987. In the factual matrix obtaining in that
case, this Court reserved and set aside the High Court decision to quash
the Inquiry because of delay, but directed that the concerned officer
should be immediately considered for promotion without taking the pendency
of the Inquiry into perspective.
Raghubir Singh & Others Etc vs State Of Bihar on 19 September, 1986
13 It will be useful to recall that prior to 1973 an accused could be
detained for continuous and consecutive periods of 15 days, albeit, after
judicial scrutiny and supervision. The Cr.P.C. of 1973 contains a new
proviso which has the effect of circumscribing the power of the Magistrate
to authorise detention of an accused person beyond period of 90 days where
the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment
for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years, and beyond a
period of 60 days where the investigation relates to any other offence.
Drawing support from the observations contained of the Division Bench in
Raghubir Singh vs. State of Bihar, 1986 (4) SCC 481, and more so of the
Constitution Bench in Antulay, we are spurred to extrapolate the
quintessence of the proviso of Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. 1973 to
moderate Suspension Orders in cases of departmental/disciplinary inquiries
also. It seems to us that if Parliament considered it necessary that a
person be released from incarceration after the expiry of 90 days even
though accused of commission of the most heinous crimes, a fortiori
suspension should not be continued after the expiry of the similar period
especially when a Memorandum of Charges/Chargesheet has not been served on
the suspended person. It is true that the proviso to Section 167(2)
Cr.P.C. postulates personal freedom, but respect and preservation of human
dignity as well as the right to a speedy trial should also be placed on the
same pedestal.