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Bodh Narain Prasad vs Deo Narain Singh And Ors. on 29 November, 1957 cites

Sarat Krishna Bose vs Bisweswar Mitra And Ors. on 21 December, 1926

If that is so then what is referred to a Civil Court under Section 146(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is neither a suit, as contemplated under the Code of Civil Procedure, nor a proceeding as provided in its Section 141, for Section 141, as interpreted by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Thakur Prasad v. Fakir Ullah, 22 Ind App 44 (PC) (A), is meant to include original matters in the nature of stilts, namely, matters which originate in themselves and not those which spring up from a suit or from some other proceeding or arise in connection therewith Sarat Krishna Base v. Bisweswar Mitra, AIR 1927 Cal 534 (B). Therefore, in coming to a true decision on the point raised here what has to be considered is whether in a proceeding like the one stated above the jurisdiction of a Civil Court rests exclusively on territorial consideration or both on territorial and pecuniary.
Calcutta High Court Cites 3 - Cited by 24 - Full Document

Shamsunder Saha And Ors. vs Anath Bandhu Saha And Ors. on 18 March, 1910

This shows that the consideration of pecuniary jurisdiction in the case of jurisdiction oi a Civil Court arises in the case of suits alone or at best for that reason in the case of tho e proceedings which are in continuation of suits or arise therefrom but in no case in the case of those which are neither suits nor arise therefrom or are connected therewith. Therefore, in my opinion, a reference made under Section 146 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to a Civil Court not being either a suit or a proceeding, as held above, cannot be put to any limitation of pecuniary jurisdiction nor there is any indication cither in that section or in Section 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure in support of any construction like that, That being so, the contention, raised in this case 011 behalf of the petitioner that the learned Munsif to whom the reference was made is not competent to hear it fails. As for the decisions relied upon in support of that contention, namely, those in Shams under Saha v. Anath Bandhu Saba, ILR 37 CM 574 (C); Gokul Kristo Chundar v. Ankil Chunder Chatterjee, ILR 16 Cal 457 (D); Amrit Lal v. Murlidhar, AIR 1922 Pat 188 (E); Firm Ganeshdas Badrinarain v. Amuluk Chand, AIR 1940 Cal 161 (F); Basant Lal v. Mt. Chiranji, AIR 1934 All 86 (G) and Rameshwar Singh v. Raghunath Singh, ILR 35 Cal 571 (H), it is enough to say that they do not apply to the facts of this case. The first four cases deal with the pecuniary jurisdiction of a Court to which a decree is transferred for execution either under Section 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure or some such similar provision provided in other Acts and the decision in those cases is broadly speaking based on the principle that the word 'suit' as contemplated in Section 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not limited only to the proceedings in cause up to the passing of the decree hut on the other hand covers all its proceedings including those in execution. Therefore, they are not of any assistance in disposing of the present case. In the case reported in AIR 1934 All 86 (G), the reference made to the Civil Court was by a revenue Court, and in those circumstances the question raised was whether the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure applied to that proceeding. In answer thereto the learned Judges held that it was a proceeding of a character as contemplated under Section 141 and therefore the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure did apply to it. So the decision in that case is not based on the consideration of jurisdiction. In the last case, namely, the one reported in ILR 35 Cal 571 (H), the reference was under Section 55 of the Land Registration Act and originally the Land Registration Court had referred it to the District Judge. The District Judge in his own turn, however, transferred it to the Court of the Munsif whose pecuniary jurisdiction was less than Rs. 2000/-. But as the value of the property involved in the proceeding was more than Rs. 2,000/- an objection was taken in that Court that it was not competent to hear the reference. The objector having failed there brought that question to High Court. But unfortunately by the time the case came up for decision in the High Court, the Civil Court became functus officio in that matter and so the proceeding in the High Court had to be finally disposed of without any relief to the objector. Yet in the course of discussion, their Lordships expressed the view that the objection taken on the ground of pecuniary jurisdiction was a valid one. But the discussion on this point is rather scanty and is based on the general proposition that the competency of a Court consists both in territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction without any detailed discussion on the consideration as to whether the provisions of Section 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure did at all apply to a case like that. Therefore, these cases do not throw any light on the point raised here.
Calcutta High Court Cites 3 - Cited by 5 - Full Document
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