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1 - 10 of 26 (0.37 seconds)The Limitation Act, 1963
Section 29 in The State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 [Entire Act]
Maharashtra State Financial ... vs Ashok K. Agarwal & Ors on 30 March, 2006
Under the first deed of guarantee, though the Corporation has the option to
proceed against the petitioner when the principal borrower has committed default
as also to make a demand under the said deed of guarantee, it has not chosen to
do so, but only proceeded against the borrower under section 29 of the SFC Act.
On 22.5.1996 the Corporation addressed letter to the District Collector,
Hyderabad to initiate action under the Revenue recovery Act and on 15.7.1996 the
Mandal Revenue Officer, Golconda issued distraint warrant, but, it appears that
no steps have been taken and again notice was given on 23.6.1998 to the
petitioner for payment of Rs.135.33 lakhs and thereafter no steps appears to
have been taken and finally the impugned notice dated 6.1.2000 was issued by the
2nd respondent. From the above, it is clear that though the Corporation issued
notices to the principal debtor from time to time for sale of the Unit of the
Company no concrete steps have been taken for realization of the debt due by
sale of the Unit of the Company and it could realize the debts to the extent of
Rs.61.00 lakhs only on 29.12.1993. Nothing prevented the Corporation to proceed
against the guarantors for realization of the debt due simultaneously when the
proceedings under section 29 SFC Act are taken up against the Company for sale
of the Unit by issuing a demand for payment of the amount due. It failed to
initiate the steps for realization of the debt from the guarantor within the
period of limitation of three years ie from 28.3.1990 when the liability of the
petitioner was crystallized. Even if we take the letter dated 28.5.1992 into
consideration as the date when the debt was crystallized the demand made against
the petitioner on 22.3.1996 is clearly time barred. Article 137 of the
Limitation Act provides that any other application for which no period of
limitation is provided elsewhere in the Act, it provides that the period of
limitation begins to run when the right to apply accrues. The Supreme Court in
MAHARASHTRA STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATION v. ASHOK K. AGARWAL AND OTHERS held
that the liability of the sureties would crystallize when the proceedings under
the State Financial Corporation Act would be initiated for sale of properties of
the borrower company. Therefore, whether we take the date of crystallization of
debt as 28.3.1990 or 28.5.1992 the letter of demand issued to the petitioner on
22.3.1996 is clearly beyond the period of limitation.
State Of Kerala & Ors vs V.R.Kalliyanikutty & Anr on 1 April, 1999
27. The contention of the Corporation that no period of limitation has
been prescribed for recovery of the dues of the Corporation for instituting the
proceedings under the Revenue Recovery Act has also no merit. Section 52-A of
the Revenue Recovery Act only equates the debts of the banks, Governmental
corporations, as stated above, as akin to land revenue and are recoverable on
par with land revenue. Thus, the recovery of land revenue as well as the dues
falling under Section 52-A of the Revenue Recovery Act stand on the same footing
and can be recovered only in accordance with the provisions of the Limitation
Act, as has already been held by the Supreme Court in STATE OF KERALA v. V.R.
KALLIYANIKUTTY.
Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968
Article 136 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Margaret Lalita Samuel vs Indo Commercial Bank Ltd on 25 September, 1978
4. On behalf of the appellant-petitioner it was argued before the learned
single Judge that the guarantee bonds executed by the petitioner are co-terminus
with the directorship of the petitioner and the moment he had resigned as
director on 16.10.1989, the guarantee bonds shall be deemed to have been
revoked. It was also argued that since the personal bonds executed by Dr.A.K.
Chaterjee were not revoked by the Corporation till 15.11.1994 and continue to be
in force even after the petitioner had resigned as director on 16.10.1989
proceedings ought to have been initiated against Dr.A.K. Chaterjee and no action
could have been taken on the personal guarantee bonds executed by the petitioner
in place of Dr. A.K. Chaterjee. It was vehemently argued before the learned
single Judge that since no proceedings were initiated against the petitioner
subsequent to the demand notice dated 28.3.1990, which was denied by the
petitioner, the distraint order dated 15.7.1996 is without jurisdiction, even
though there was a subsequent demand on 28.5.1992 because the claim of the
Corporation was barred by limitation and it cannot be permitted to take
recourse to the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act and reliance was placed
on the decision of the Supreme Court in MARGARET LALITA SAMUEL v. INDO
COMMERCIAL BANK LTD.1 and a decision of the Division Bench decision of this
Court in B.C.MULAJKAR v. STATE2. It was also argued that there was no
determination of the liability of the petitioner to the Corporation determined
in any of the demands issued to the petitioner including the demands issued
under the Revenue Recovery Act and the same is violative of the principles of
natural justice.