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1 - 10 of 32 (0.42 seconds)Section 105 in The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [Entire Act]
Bombay Enamel Works vs Purshottam S. Somaiya on 25 February, 1974
As is apparent from the discussions of the judgments, the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Bombay Enamel Works (supra) was not cited before the Bench hearing M/s. D. Shanalal's case (supra). The judgment of equi-bench on the same principle with similar facts, if is a precedent applicable in law, goes unnoticed in a subsequent judgment, the subsequent judgment may not be termed as a good law in face of the doctrine of stare decisis. While interpreting the judgment, the court has to pin point its attention to the ratio of the judgment. Keeping in view the principle of stare decisis a view which has been holding the fort need not be disturbed only because another view would be possible. The judgments which have held the field for a fairly long time ought not to be disturbed unless there is a prepondering necessity dictated by the demands of justice to overturn them. Taking of a different view on a mere thought that it would have been proper that a different view was taken is not healthy tradition to the law of precedents. The doctrine of stare decisis is based upon rule of convenience, expectancy and public policy. It is to be adhered to even if it is not imperative to do so. Applicability of law must be determined in respect of each case to avoid error of fact and law. Controversies must be determined in each case by use of discretion by the court. It may be appropriate not to perpetuate errors but it should also be ensured that consistency of law is not done away with by such discretion. Reference can be made in the cases of (i) Mishri Lal (dead) by Lrs. v. Dhirendra Nath (dead) by Lrs.
Satyadhyan Ghosal And Others vs Sm. Deorajin Debi And Another on 20 April, 1960
13. This principle is recognised by Section 105(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure and reaffirmed by Order 43 Rule 1-A of the Code. The two exceptions to this rule are found in Section 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which provides that a preliminary decree passed in a suit could not be challenged in an appeal against the final decree based on that preliminary decree and Section 105(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 which precludes a challenge to an order of remand at a subsequent stage while filing an appeal against the decree passed subsequent to the order of remand. All these aspects came to be considered by this Court in Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Deorajin Debi wherein, after referring to the decisions of the Privy Council, it was held that an interlocutory order which had not been appealed from either because no appeal lay or even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, can be challenged in an appeal from a final decree or order. It was further held that a special provision was made in Section 105 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure as regards orders of remand where the order of remand itself was made appealable. Since Section 105(2) did not apply to the Privy Council and can have no application to appeals to the Supreme Court, the Privy Council and the Supreme Court could examine even the correctness of an original order of remand while considering the correctness of the decree passed subsequent to the order of remand.
Section 17B in The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [Entire Act]
D. Shanalal And Etc. Etc. vs Bank Of Maharashtra on 27 July, 1988
24. Firstly, we must notice that these two judgments have been pronounced by the court on entirely different facts and laid down principles of law which cannot be termed as contradictory or in conflict with each other. Every principle of law stated in a judgment essentially must be read on the basis of the facts stated in the judgment and the reasons recorded for arriving at such conclusion. The facts have no similarity much less that they are identical. The fact of the matter is that in the case of M/s. D. Shanalal (supra), the orders passed by the court granting conditional leave were challenged not only by filing an intra appeal but even a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court was rejected. Thus, the defendants in that suit had exercised their option of challenging the order at the very initial stage and the challenge was found to be without merit. It was in these circumstances that the Division Bench held that the defendants-appellants in the appeal had no right to challenge that order in an appeal. This conclusion of law is primarily based upon the doctrine of finality and is not founded on the interpretation of Clause 15 and/or for that matter, Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We have already noticed in great detail that for a judgment to be applied as an acceptable precedent, it must satisfy the test of "ratio decidendi".
Article 225 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
State Of Tripura vs Tripura Bar Association And Ors. on 16 April, 1998
(Reference : (i) Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd. AIR 1996 SC 806, (ii) Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi , (iii) State of Tripura v. Tripura Bar Association and (iv) Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka ).
Islamic Academy Of Education And ... vs State Of Karnataka And Others on 14 August, 2003
(Reference : (i) Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd. AIR 1996 SC 806, (ii) Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi , (iii) State of Tripura v. Tripura Bar Association and (iv) Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka ).
Narayan Putapa Chandragatgi vs Vaikunt Subaya Sonde on 9 August, 1926
In this regard, the court has referred to the observations of the Chief Justice in the Full Bench decision in Narayan Putapa v. Vaikunt Subava AIR 1927 Bom 1: