Search Results Page
Search Results
1 - 3 of 3 (0.49 seconds)Batoo Mal vs Rameshwar Nath And Ors. on 6 May, 1970
A similar question came up for consideration in Batoo Mal v.
Rameshwar Nath,MANU/DE/0044/1971 : AIR1971Delhi98, before a
Division Bench and that Division Bench took the view that waiver is
of a right; parties may enter into contract to the contrary at the time
of entering into a lease; since the lease itself is based on a contract,
the parties may agree to vary its terms by a subsequent contract; one
of the parties may even agree to abandon a right given to it by S.
106, in the absence of a contract to the contrary; and if the
requirement of notice can thus be waived by an agreement between
the parties, it would be reasonable to think that it could also be
waived by such contract as would be the evidence of the intention of
the parties. In my view, this appears to be the reasonable and the
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
5/8
S.A.(MD)No.77 of 2007
practical construction that could be put on S. 106 of the Act, with
reference to the contract to the contrary contemplated therein.”
Krishnan Servai vs Arulmighu Kaliamman Temple, ... on 27 September, 1982
6.The second and third substantial questions of law proceed on the
premise as if the plaintiff did not adhere to the mandate set out under Section
106 of Transfer of Property Act. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel
for the plaintiff, the said provision opens with the expression “in the absence of
a contract to the contrary”. In the present case, the tenant had made an
endorsement on 16.04.1993 that he would vacate and hand over possession of
the suit property by September 1997 and that he would not ask for any
extension. This endorsement made by the tenant was marked as Ex.A3. The
learned counsel for the plaintiff draws my attention to the decision reported
AIR 1983 Madras 142 (Krishnan Servai Vs. Arulmigu Kaliamman Temple,
Batalagundu). Paragraph No.4 of the said decision reads as follows:-
1