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Ishwar Dass Jain (Dead) Thr. Lrs vs Sohan Lal (Dead)By Lrs on 29 November, 1999

24. The opinion that the defendant could have led oral evidence to contradict or disprove Ex.P1 has been considered in the case of GANGABAI VS. CHHABUBAI reported in AIR 1982 SC 20 and ISHWAR DASS JAIN VS. SOHAN LAL (AIR 2000 SC 426). In the first decision cited supra, the apex court referring to the scope of Section 92 of the Evidence Act, has observed thus:
Supreme Court of India Cites 25 - Cited by 438 - M J Rao - Full Document

Gangabai W/O Rambilas Gilda vs Chhabubai W/O Pukharajji Gandhi on 6 November, 1981

24. The opinion that the defendant could have led oral evidence to contradict or disprove Ex.P1 has been considered in the case of GANGABAI VS. CHHABUBAI reported in AIR 1982 SC 20 and ISHWAR DASS JAIN VS. SOHAN LAL (AIR 2000 SC 426). In the first decision cited supra, the apex court referring to the scope of Section 92 of the Evidence Act, has observed thus:
Supreme Court of India Cites 23 - Cited by 147 - R S Pathak - Full Document

Tyagaraja Mudaliyar vs Vedathanni on 6 December, 1935

The sub- section is not attracted when the case of a party is that the transaction recorded in the document was never intended to be acted upon at all between the parties and that the document is a sham. Such a question arises when the party asserts that there was a different transaction altogether and what is recorded in the document was intended to be of no consequence whatever. For that purpose oral evidence is admissible to show that the document executed was never intended to operate as an agreement but that some other agreement altogether not recorded in the document, was entered into between the parties. Tyagaraja Mudaliyar and another v. Vedathanni. The Trial Court was right in permitting the respondent to lead parole evidence in support of her plea that the sale deed dated January 7, 1953 was a sham document and never intended to be acted upon. It is not disputed that if the parole 21 evidence is admissible, the finding of the court below in favour of the respondent must be accepted. The second contention on behalf of the appellant must also fail.' From the opinion of the apex court referred to above, it could be seen that the bar created by proviso (1) of Section 92 for tendering oral evidence against a written document would apply only when a party seeks to rely upon the document embodying the terms of the transaction. In that event, the law declares that the nature and intent of the transaction must be gathered from the terms of the document itself and no evidence of any oral agreement or statement can be admitted as between the parties to such document for the purpose of contradicting or modifying its terms. Proviso (1) is attracted in a case where a party is disputing the transaction recorded in the agreement and intends to prove it was never intended to be acted upon at all between the parties and that the document is sham. Such a question arises when the party asserts that there was a different transaction altogether 22 and what is recorded in the document was intended to be of no consequence whatever. For that purpose oral evidence is admissible to show that the document executed was never intended to operate as an agreement, but that some other agreement altogether, not recorded in the document, was entered into between the parties.
Bombay High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 72 - Full Document
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