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1 - 10 of 10 (0.23 seconds)Section 91 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Section 20 in The Specific Relief Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
Ishwar Dass Jain (Dead) Thr. Lrs vs Sohan Lal (Dead)By Lrs on 29 November, 1999
24. The opinion that the defendant could have led
oral evidence to contradict or disprove Ex.P1 has been
considered in the case of GANGABAI VS. CHHABUBAI
reported in AIR 1982 SC 20 and ISHWAR DASS JAIN VS.
SOHAN LAL (AIR 2000 SC 426). In the first decision cited
supra, the apex court referring to the scope of Section 92 of the
Evidence Act, has observed thus:
Gangabai W/O Rambilas Gilda vs Chhabubai W/O Pukharajji Gandhi on 6 November, 1981
24. The opinion that the defendant could have led
oral evidence to contradict or disprove Ex.P1 has been
considered in the case of GANGABAI VS. CHHABUBAI
reported in AIR 1982 SC 20 and ISHWAR DASS JAIN VS.
SOHAN LAL (AIR 2000 SC 426). In the first decision cited
supra, the apex court referring to the scope of Section 92 of the
Evidence Act, has observed thus:
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Tyagaraja Mudaliyar vs Vedathanni on 6 December, 1935
The sub- section is not attracted when the case of
a party is that the transaction recorded in the
document was never intended to be acted upon at
all between the parties and that the document is a
sham. Such a question arises when the party
asserts that there was a different transaction
altogether and what is recorded in the document
was intended to be of no consequence whatever.
For that purpose oral evidence is admissible to
show that the document executed was never
intended to operate as an agreement but that
some other agreement altogether not recorded in
the document, was entered into between the
parties. Tyagaraja Mudaliyar and another v.
Vedathanni. The Trial Court was right in permitting
the respondent to lead parole evidence in support
of her plea that the sale deed dated January 7,
1953 was a sham document and never intended to
be acted upon. It is not disputed that if the parole
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evidence is admissible, the finding of the court
below in favour of the respondent must be
accepted. The second contention on behalf of the
appellant must also fail.'
From the opinion of the apex court referred to above, it
could be seen that the bar created by proviso (1) of
Section 92 for tendering oral evidence against a written
document would apply only when a party seeks to rely
upon the document embodying the terms of the
transaction. In that event, the law declares that the nature
and intent of the transaction must be gathered from the
terms of the document itself and no evidence of any oral
agreement or statement can be admitted as between the
parties to such document for the purpose of contradicting
or modifying its terms. Proviso (1) is attracted in a case
where a party is disputing the transaction recorded in the
agreement and intends to prove it was never intended to
be acted upon at all between the parties and that the
document is sham. Such a question arises when the party
asserts that there was a different transaction altogether
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and what is recorded in the document was intended to be
of no consequence whatever. For that purpose oral
evidence is admissible to show that the document
executed was never intended to operate as an agreement,
but that some other agreement altogether, not recorded in
the document, was entered into between the parties.
Section 98 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872
Section 20 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
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