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1 - 10 of 20 (0.24 seconds)Section 95 in The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 [Entire Act]
Section 95 in Gold (Control) Act, 1968 [Entire Act]
Gold (Control) Act, 1968
The Employee's Compensation Act, 1923
New India Assurance Compafiy vs Shri Satpal Singh And Ors on 2 December, 1999
29. We may consider the matter from another angle. Section 147(2) of the 1988 Act enables the insurers to raise defences against the claim of the claimants. In terms of Clause (a) (i) (c) of Sub-section (2) Section 149 of the Act one of the defences which is available to the insurer is that the vehicle in question has been used for a purpose not allowed by the permit under which the vehicle was used. Such a statutory defence available to the insurer would be obliterated in view of the decision of this Court in Saptal Singh's case, . "
The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
New India Assurance Co. Ltd vs Asha Rani & Ors on 17 August, 2001
In Asha Rani's case (supra) the Hon'ble Judges of the Apex Court dealt with the liability of the Insurance Company with reference to goods vehicle and found that the expression 'any person' will not cover either the owner of the goods or authorised representative being carried in the vehicle prior to the amendment Act 1994, even if widest interpretation could be given to the expression "to any person". This conclusion was arrived at only on the basis of the objects and reasons engrafted in the amended provisions. On that basis, it is found that it is difficult for the Court to construe that expression "include owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle" which was added to the pre-existing provision 'injury to any person' is either clarificatory or amplification of the preexisting statute and it clearly demonstrates that the legislature wanted to bring within the sweep of Section 147 and making it compulsory for the insurer to insure even in the case of a goods vehicle, the owner of the goods or his authorised representative being carried in a goods vehicle when that vehicle met with an accident and the owner of the goods or his representative either dies or suffers bodily injury. His Lordship, Mr. Justice S.B. Sinha, who gave separate judgment though concurred with conclusion of the other Hon'ble Judges, held as follows:
Section 93 in Gold (Control) Act, 1968 [Entire Act]
Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi & Ors vs Ranjit Ginning & Pressing Co. (P) Ltd. & ... on 25 March, 1977
"3. Secondly, learned Counsel would submit that the claimant would not come within the category of 'third party' so as to be covered by the policy. According to learned Counsel for the Insurance Company-appellant herein, the expression 'third party' could only mean a person outside the vehicle and on the road and as such the policy would not cover the claimant. The terms of the policy, as such do not support such a theory. Nothing is stated in the policy to the above effect. But, learned Counsel would rely on a pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co., , in support of the theory advanced by him. The Supreme Court has dealt with the case of a car which was driven rashly and negligently and as a result of which the accident occurred, causing the death of a person who was travelling in the car. There was advertence to Section 95(1)(b), Proviso (ii) of the Act, to hold that it is not required that the policy of insurance should cover such a risk. That is the position evident from a reading of the said proviso. The operative or the latter portion of the proviso, as such, stated that a policy shall not be required to cover liability in respect of death or for bodily injury to a person being carried in or entering or mounting or alighting from the vehicle at the time of the occurrence of the event out of which a claim arises. But, there is an exception adumbrated in the first part of that proviso by virtue of which if the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, then it will fall outside that proviso and the general provisions requiring coverage by the policy shall govern. The vehicle with which the Supreme Court was concerned was a car and not a vehicle, in which the passengers were carried for hire or reward, as in the present case, and hence the view was expressed that it is not required that the policy of insurance should cover such risks, this would be the position, where the policy is in terms of the provisions of the Act. But, in addition to statutory terms, wider risks could be covered by what we call as a comprehensive policy. But, in our case, as we shall presently see the policy in terms of the Act itself will cover the claimant. We do not think that this decision can be availed of by the learned Counsel for the Insurance Company-appellant herein, to wriggle out of the liability on this ground. In any event, the pronouncement of the Supreme Court relied on by the learned Counsel for the Insurance Company-appellant herein, does not at all support the theory projected by him that a third party could only mean a person outside the vehicle and on the road.