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1 - 10 of 14 (0.33 seconds)Section 12 in The Transfer Of Property Act, 1882 [Entire Act]
The Transfer Of Property Act, 1882
Section 111 in The Transfer Of Property Act, 1882 [Entire Act]
L.T. Thadani vs Yogeshwar Dayal on 27 October, 1970
22. Another decision that lends support to my view is L.T. Thadani v. Coyashwar Dayal 1971 RCR 207. In this case counsel for the landlord urged that as the defence against eviction has been struck out, it was open to the Rent Controller straightway to pass a decree for eviction. Rajinder Sacher J. held that this was not a correct reading of the provision of Section 15(7) of the Act (Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958) which provides that after striking out the defence against eviction, the court shall proceed with the hearing of the application. This obviously meant, according to the learned Judge, that after the defence of the tenant had been struck out, under the Act the Court has still to be satisfied that the ground has been made out before a landlord can get relief.
The M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961
D.R. Gellatly vs J.R.W. Cannon on 9 January, 1953
In support of this view, I may cite D.R. Gellatly v. R.R.W. Cannot which was a case in which Section 14(4) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act which contained a provision similar to Section 13(5) of the Act was considered. It empowered the court to order striking out the defence and placing the tenant in the same position as if he had defended the claim to ejectment in case the defendant contested the suit as regards the claim for ejectment and failed to make deposit of the rent at such rate month by month as ordered by the court. Chakravartti C.J. observed as follow:
Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001
Kaushalya Devi & Ors vs Shri K.L. Bansal on 3 December, 1968
23. On behalf of the appellant, reliance has been placed on smt. Kaushalya Devi and Ors. v. K.L. Bansal AIR 1970 SC 538. This case is not directly on the point The case arose under the Deihi and Ajmer Rent Control Act (38 of 1952) for the ejectment of the tenant. The parties entered into a compromise and a decree for ejectment was passed against the tenant in terms of the compromise. According to the compromise, the decree was to be executed after a certain date. It was held by their lordships of the Supreme Court that the decree passed on the basis of an award was in contravention of Section 13 I) of the Act because the court had passed the decree in terms of the award without satisfying itself that the ground of eviction existed. Accordingly, the decree in so far as it directed the delivery of possession of the premises to the landlord was a nullity and could not be executed. Though the question involved in that case was entirely different, but all the same it does lend support to the contention of the appellant that a decree for eviction without the court having satisfied itself as to the existence of any ground contained in cLauses (a) to (1) of Section 13(1) cannot be passed. The case before the Supreme Court was On a worse footing. There the defendant agreed to abide by the award and to vacate the premises even if he was not asked to vacate. Here in the present case, the plaintiff comes with certain averments alleging that the defendant has made himself liable for eviction on the grounds specified in cLauses (a) and (h). The defendant denied those allegations. The defence against eviction having been struck out will mean as if the defendant has not taken any ground for controverting the plaintiff's allegations. This situation does not take the place Of the defendants having admitted the plaintiff's averments. In this state of affairs, the allegations in the plaint remain mere averments and must be proved. The plaintiff cannot be entitled to a decree as a matter of course. He must satisfy the court as to the existence of those grounds or any of them.