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1 - 9 of 9 (0.20 seconds)Section 6 in The Partition Act, 1893 [Entire Act]
Section 2 in The Partition Act, 1893 [Entire Act]
Section 4 in The Partition Act, 1893 [Entire Act]
Pandharinath Kikalal vs Thakoredas Shankardas Vani And Ors. on 5 December, 1928
This ease was cited with approval in a later decision of the same High Court, Pandharinath v. Thakordas Shankardas ('29) 16 AIR 1929 Bom 262 at p. 459, as authority for the view that a suit and all appeals made therein are to be regarded as one legal proceeding.
Section 6 in The General Clauses Act, 1897 [Entire Act]
Deb Narain Dutt vs Narendra Krishna And Anr. on 9 February, 1889
6. Mr. Sen referred also to certain decisions of this High Court, such as, Pran Krishna v. Surath Chandra ('19) 6 AIR 1919 Cal 1055 and Deb Narain Dutt v. Narendra Krishna ('89) 16 Cal 267 (FB). In the first case, the question turned on the construction of the word "Court" in Section 4, Partition Act, (Act 4 of 1893), and it was held, that this would include the appellate Court, and in this connexion, it was stated that an appeal was a continuation of the suit. In the second case, which was a Full Bench decision, the question was as to the meaning of the word "proceeding" in Section 6, General Clauses Act, (Act 1 of 1868) and Wilson J., delivering the judgment of the Full Bench referred to the uniform course of decisions to the effect that an appeal is a part of the same proceeding within the meaning of this section as the thing appealed against, and that, therefore, if the thing appealed against is a decree in a suit, the appeal is a part of the same proceeding as the earlier steps in the suit. In each case, the decision proceeded on a consideration of the provisions of the particular Act which fell to be construed.
Bengal Money-Lenders Act, 1933
Commissioner Of Wakfs vs Mahmuda Bibi And Ors. on 23 April, 1936
In support of the contrary view, reference may be made, among others, to a much later decision of this Court, Commissioner of Wakfs, Bengal v. Mahmuda Bibi , in which it was expressly held, with reference to Section 70 (1), Bengal Wakf Act, (Bengal Act 13 of 1934), that the words "suit or proceeding" used therein do not include an appeal. The learned Judges relied upon some authorities to show that a suit does not include an appeal, but the decision was ultimately based on the provisions of the Act and a consideration of its underlying aim and policy, and this in my opinion was the right basis of interpretation. Applying a similar test to the Act in question in the present case, I do not think it can be said that the Legislature intended an appeal to come within the scope of Sections 3 and 6, thereof. These sections, it will be seen, contain provisions for stay of suits and proceedings, Section 3 applying to suits and proceedings instituted after the date of commencement of the Act, and Section 6 to those pending at that date. An appeal may in a sense be regarded as a continuation of a suit, but where a suit is stayed, as it must be under these provisions, there can be no question of its proceeding to the appellate stage, and an appeal may, therefore, easily be supposed to be excluded from the purview of a "suit." The meaning of " proceeding ' may perhaps be regarded as more doubtful, but here, again, the context in which the word occurs, and particularly its close juxtaposition with the word "suit," would seem to show that it is intended to denote only a proceeding ancillary to and directly arising out of a suit; in other words, a proceeding in the nature of execution to enforce a decree made in the suit.
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