5. The Revenue urged that the findings in the impugned order are erroneous, and
relied upon Sonebhadra Fuels (supra) to argue that the High Court was bound by this
Court’s decision since it was directly on an interpretation of the expression
‘manufacture’ in the same enactment. In Sonebhadra Fuels, the court had considered
whether coal briquettes fell with the generic description of ‘coal’. This court held that
the process involved mixing crushed coal with suitable binders pressed in briquetting
press, from which regular shaped briquettes were suitably carbonised. This process
was held to amount to ‘manufacture’.
8. In Sonhbadra, this court while deciding the facts of the case before it cited a
large number of decisions rendered in the context of what was meant by
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CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5937 OF 2011 etc.
‘manufacture.’ This court specifically noticed in Union of India V. Delhi Cloth and
General Mills (1963) Suppl. 1 SCR 586 that ‘manufacture’ meant bringing into
existence a ‘new’ substance and did not mean merely to bring about some change in
the substance. In Mahalaxmi Stores, it was held that processing or variation/finishing
of goods would not per se amount to manufacture unless it resulted in the emergence
of a new commercial commodity.
The decision in Aspinwall & Co. Ltd. V.
Commissioner of Income Tax, Ernakulam (2001) 7 SCC 525 follows the same
principle. The court held that manufacture must be understood in common parlance
and means production of articles for use from raw or prepared materials by giving
them forms, qualities or combination. Importantly however, it was held that if the
change made in the article resulted in a ‘new’ and ‘different’ article, it would amount
to ‘manufacturing’. The tipping point, or the determinative test, therefore is that the
result of the process (amounting to ‘manufacture’) must be the emergence of a
commercially recognizable new commodity, and not mere variation of an existing one.