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1 - 10 of 16 (1.94 seconds)Section 12 in The Limitation Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
Ramlal, Motilal And Chhotelal vs Rewa Coalfields Ltd on 4 May, 1961
Looking at the leading decisions of the Supreme Court in Ramlal v. Reva Coalfields Limited , and in State of West Bengal v. Howrah Municipality , mentioned above, the principle appears to be that the connotation "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and ordinarily delay in preferring appeal should be condoned, when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to a party.
The Limitation Act, 1963
Article 116 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
State Of West Bengal vs Administrator, Howrah Municipality & ... on 14 December, 1971
We are not able to find how any appellant/applicant can be prevented from filing any application under Section 5 of the Act. Even if the appellant/applicant has not applied for certified copies of decree and order before the prescribed period, in our view, it is to be seen whether 'sufficient cause' has been shown. That is all the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal v. Howrah Municipality an occasion to consider the term 'sufficient cause' which occurs in Section 5 of the Act.
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
S. Pakkiaraj vs S.N. Kulasekaran on 14 September, 1993
However, Abdul Hadi, J. in an unreported decision in S. Pakkiaraj v. S.N. Kulasekaran C.M.P. No. 14089 of 1991 etc., by order dated 14.9.1993, differed from the decision rendered by one of us (Srinivasan, J.) which is reported in 1993 T.N.L.J. 278 : (1993) 2 L.W. 382 and also other decisions, cited supra, except that of the decision rendered by Padmini Jesudurai, J. in C.M.P. No. 2328 of 1991 in C.R.P.S.R. No. 5453 of 1991, dated 17.7.1991, which has not been brought to the notice of any of the learned Judges, who decided the issue, in the decisions cited above.
Ramalingam Pillai vs Arunachalam Pillai And Ors. on 26 July, 1988
and in Ramalingam Pillai v. Antnachalam Pillai (1988) 2 M.L.J. 139, mentioned above, it has been held that for the purpose of calculating the period of limitation, a party cannot claim to exclude the time taken for obtaining the copies while computing the period of ninety days.
S.A.R.M.S.P.A. Annamalai Chetti And ... vs S.A.R.M.S.P. Palaniappa Chettiar And ... on 20 April, 1934
7. We are not able to find any decision which holds that the application under Section 5 of the act itself is not maintainable, we are not able to find any principle laid down by any Court as if Section 5 of the Act cannot be invoked at all by the party, who has applied for certified copies of decree and order, after the prescribed period. What all required is, in our view, that a person who files an application under Section 5 of the Act, has to explain that period also as a part of the delay. That is all. In fact, Padmini Jesudurai, in C.M.P. No. 2328 of 1991 in CRPSR. No. 5453 of 1991 dated 17.7.1991, has taken a similar view.