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1 - 10 of 11 (0.24 seconds)Section 2 in The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 [Entire Act]
Section 11 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
The Indian Penal Code, 1860
Section 11 in The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 [Entire Act]
Amar Nath And Others vs State Of Haryana & Others on 29 July, 1977
As pointed out in Amar Nath's case (supra) the purpose of putting a bar on the power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in an appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding is to bring about expeditious disposal of the cases finally. More often than not, the revisional power of the High Court was resorted to in relation to interlocutory orders delaying the final disposal of the proceedings. The Legislature in its wisdom decided to check this delay by introducing Sub-section (2) in See. 397. On the one hand, a bar has been put in the way of the High Court (as also of the Sessions Judge) for exercise of the re-visional power in relation to any interlocutory order, on the other, the power has been conferred in almost the same terms as it was in the 1898 Code. On a plain reading of Section 482, however, it would follow that nothing in the Code, which would include Sub-section (2) of Section 397 also, "shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court." But, if we were to say that the said bar is not to operate in the exercise of the inherent power at all, it will be setting at naught one of the limitations imposed upon the exercise of the revisional powers. In such a situation, what is the harmonious way out? In our opinion, a happy solution of this problem would be to say that the bar provided in Sub-section (2) of Section 397 operates only in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court, meaning thereby that the High Court will have no power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order. Then in accordance with one or the other principles enunciated above, the inherent power will come into play, there being no other provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. But then if the order assailed is purely of an interlocutory character which could be corrected in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court under the 1898 Code the High Court will refuse to exercise its inherent power. But in case the impugned order clearly brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the Court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in Section 397 (2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. But such cases would be few and far between. The High Court must exercise the inherent power very sparingly. One such case would be the desirability of the quashing of a criminal proceeding initiated illegally, exatiously or as being without jurisdiction.
The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955
Madhu Limaye vs The State Of Maharashtra on 31 October, 1977
Untwalia, J. said in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra :
Raj Kumari vs Yashodha Devi And Anr. on 20 July, 1977
10. Mr. Sankara Menon relies on the ruling of Gurnam Singh J. of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Raj Kumari v. Yashoda Devi 1978 Cri LJ 600. The learned Judge said there: