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1 - 10 of 10 (0.32 seconds)Section 39 in The Delhi Rent Act, 1995 [Entire Act]
Zainab Bai, Wife Of Hussainbhai Ebrahim ... vs Navayug Chitrapat Co. Ltd. on 16 December, 1967
(8) In Hussenbhai Ebrahim Bohri v. Navayug Chitrapat Co. Ltd., which is a decision of the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench), relied upon by the appellants, an opinion was given that the grounds of ejectment are not a part of the cause of action in bringing an ejectment suit. The decision is based on the view that the grounds of ejectment relied upon have to be stated in the plaint in anticipation of the defendant's claim for protection under the Rent Control Act. I regret I am unable to accept this view. If the ground of ejectment is not alleged or proved by the landlord he cannot get ejectment. The causes of action in my view are the facts necessary to establish the plaintiffs claim. They are the facts which the plaintiff has to prove in order to get the relief claimed. Assuming that in an application for ejectment under Section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 the landlord does not prove any ground of ejectment, clearly the ejectment petition will fail. It only fails because one of the necessary ingredients forming part of the cause of action for ejectment is the existence of one or more of the grounds set out in Section 14(1) of the Act. Hence, the inevitable conclusion must be that the grounds of ejectment on which the petition is based are part and parcel of the cause of action. I, therefore, come to the conclusion that the cause of action for getting ejectment on the ground of sub-letting is different from the cause of action forgetting ejectment from the same premises on and of the other grounds. Thus the cause of action in the first petition brought by the landlady in the present case was different from the cause of action in the second petition.
Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001
The Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Section 14 in The Delhi Rent Act, 1995 [Entire Act]
The Delhi Rent Act, 1995
S. Rajdev Singh vs Royal Studios And Ors. on 29 July, 1971
(9) I have been referred to Rajdev Singh v. Royal Studio, which is a decision of this Court, there Desh pande J. held that if a particular ground of ejectment was not raised in a former petition for ejectment, the same cannot be a ground of ejectment in a second petition Mr. R. M. Lal, submits on behalf of the appellants, that the same principle ib. applicable to the present case. I must point out that the rule of constructive res judicata is quite different from the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code. If the first petition in the present case had conuluded, then the landlady would have been precluded from bringing the ejectment petition on the ground of sub-lifting on the ground that she highr and ought to have included this claim in the former suit. It may be noted that Deshpande J. observed as follows :- "ORDER2, Rule 2(1) Civil Procedure Code only requires that the plaintiff shall include the whole of the claim which be is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action in every suit. It does not, therefore, seem to require that the landlord must plead in the same eviction petition all the grounds available to him under the various provisions to section 14(1) on the date of the filing of the petition for eviction. But explanation Iv to section 11 is stricter than Order 2, rule 2(i)Civil Procedure Code. According to Explanation Iv to section 11 "any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defense or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit. The principles underlying the provisions of the Civil Proceedings under the Act in view of rule 23 of the Rules made there under and section 37(2) thereof "
Mohammad Khalil Khan vs Mahbub Ali Mian on 31 May, 1948
(6) Assuming that my conclusion on this question is erroneous, there remains the question whether the landlady could have instituted the second ejectment petition even if she had deliberately excluded the ground of sub-letting from the first petition. On this aspect of the case, what has to be seen is whether each,"round of ejectment constitutes a separate cause of action. According to the contentions of Mr. Makhija, who appears for the landlady, each ground of ejectment raises a separate cause of action because the evidence supporting that ground is substantially diffrent from the evidence supporting the other grounds. This is the test which has been adopted by the Privy Council in Mohainmad Khalil Khan v. Mahbub Ali Mian.
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