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1 - 10 of 12 (0.31 seconds)The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Section 19 in The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [Entire Act]
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Nain Sukh Das And Another vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others on 22 May, 1953
In support of this argument, Mr. Banerjee refers to ; Narain Das v. State of Uttar Pradesh and submits that in paragraph 5 of this decision, the Supreme Court observed that in M. S. Shariff s case the question considered was whether an appeal lay to the Supreme Court under Section 476B of the old Cr. P. C. from an order of a Division Bench of a High Court.
M/S. Pratap Ch. Dey And Others vs Allahabad Bank And Others on 30 September, 1996
It is next contended by Mr. Banerjee that the Tribunal is not vested with the discretion to decide a preliminary point as contemplated under Order 14, Rule 2, C.P.C. Reliance has been placed by Mr. Banerjee on a single Bench decision of our High Court, ; Pratap Ch. Dey v. Allahabad Bank. On the question of stay of the proceeding under Section 19 of the Act till disposal of the criminal case, Mr. Banerjee argued that the Supreme Court decision cited on behalf of the petitioner in M. S. Sheriff dealing with the question of stay as between civil case and a criminal case cannot apply here because the proceeding before the Tribunal cannot be a civil case. He also argued that there was no identity of issues involved in the present proceeding before the Tribunal and the criminal case initiated by the bank. Mr. Banerjee also argued that the question of embarrassment of the petitioner is not a relevant factor in considering the question of stay. The embarrassment for avoiding which the stay should be granted is the embarrassment of the Court and not of the accused. Mr. Banerjee also argued that the observations made by the Supreme Court in M. S. Sharrif s case were obiter dictum and do not constitute the ratio decidendi so as to bind this Court.
Section 17 in The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [Entire Act]
M/S. Spectrum Electronics & Ors. vs State Bank Of India & Ors. on 14 May, 1998
Next, he argued that both the applications that were filed on 14-9-94 by the petitioner before the Tribunal were virtually grounded on identical facts. It is submitted that the real intention of the
petitioner was to delay the disposal of the proceeding before the Tribunal because even in the application under Section 17 read with Section 22 of the Act, the petitioner prayed not only for summary rejection of the application under Section 19 but also for stay of all the proceedings before the Tribunal and the stay was sought for on the selfsame ground of pendency of the criminal case on which the other application was filed on 14-9-94 primarily for stay and also for injunction restraining the bank from proceeding with the application under Section 19 of the Act. According to Mr. Banerjee, a scrutiny of the two petitions dated 14-9-94 would at once reveal the fact that they were designed only to arrest further proceeding of the O.A. No. 41 of 1994 before the Tribunal till the final disposal of the criminal case. It is submitted that Sections 17 and 22 of the Act do not warrant summary rejection of an application under Section 19 of the Act, unlike Order 7, Rule 11 of C.P.C. It is submitted that the provisions of Order 7, Rule 11 of the C.P.C. do not apply to the instant proceeding under Section 19 of the Act because the Tribunal is neither a Civil Court nor governed by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. Mr. Banerjee made a reference to (1998) 1 Cal LJ 571; Spectrum Electronics v. State Bank of India in support of his contention that the Tribunal is not a Civil Court to be governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. It is submitted that the prayer for summary rejection of the application under Section 19 was incompetent. Mr. Banerjee contended that the allegation of forgery that was made on behalf of the bank related to the bill of exchange and the connected bill but not to the demand promissory note which is said to have been executed by the petitioner. According to Mr. Banerjee, the allegations made in the application under Section 19 of the Act would leave no room for doubt that the bank did make out a prima facie case for recovery of a debt within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the Act against the petitioner. The alleged debt is said to be based on the demand promissory note and has got nothing to do with the question as to whether the bill of exchange produced by the petitioner was forged or not. Mr. Banerjee contends that the petitioner might have practised fraud upon the bank so as to induce it to advance the loan on the basis of which the petitioner is said to have incurred the debt within the meaning
of the Act for recovery of which the application under Section 19 was filed by the bank. The fact that some forged documents were utilised by the petitioner in inducing the bank to advance the loan does not affect the existence of the debt for recovery of which the application under Section 19 was filed before the Tribunal. Accordingly Mr. Banerjee submits that even on merits the said application was quite within the scope of the Act and jurisdiction of the Tribunal to be adjudicated upon and in filing the two applications on 14-9-94, the petitioner was actuated with a mala fide intention to stall the proceeding before the Tribunal.
Section 22 in The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [Entire Act]
Kusheshwar Dubey vs Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Ors on 6 September, 1988
pelled to disclose his defence which might prejudicially affect his interest in the criminal case and that the refusal to grant the slay is likely to cause the embarrassment to the petitioner. Mr. Mukherjee places his reliance on two decisions of the Supreme Court , M. S. Sheriff v. State of Madras and ; Kusheshwar Dubey v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., in support of his contention that the present proceeding should have been stayed till the disposal of the criminal case. It is further submitted by Mr. Mukherjee that the petitioner being aggrieved by the said order dated 2-5-95 was entitled to pray for an adjournment of hearing of his two other applications dated 15-2-95 and 20-3-95 which were scheduled to be heard on 8-5-95 before the Tribunal so that he could move the High Court against the order dated 2-5-95 and bring the stay order and as such the ld. Tribunal was not at all justified in refusing to grant that adjournment. It is submitted that the ld. Tribunal in refusing to grant the adjournment by order No. 24 dated 8-4-95 acted unreasonably in disbelieving the intention of the petitioner to move the High Court only because of the fact that the petitioner did not already move the High Court during the period of six days that intervened between the date of passing of the impugned order dated 2-5-95 and 8-5-95, the date on which the adjournment was prayed for. It was further submitted that by the impugned order No. 25 dated 8-5-95 the Tribunal was not at all justified in refusing to grant the further adjournment that was sought for on the ground of physical unfitness of the senior advocate of the petitioner.