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Sheo Shankar Ram vs Musammat Jaddo Kunwar on 12 May, 1914

9. From the provisions of the mortgage deed their Lordships came to the conclusion that what was intended to be mortgaged was the whole of the mortgaged property and not the mortgagor's share alone. Belying upon the facts adverted to above, they held that the circumstances of the case showed that the suit was brought against the managers in their representative character. There is yet another principle, though not material to the present purpose, which this case establishes. The suit, as already stated, was brought by the mortgagee-purchaser and their Lordships observed that the defendants had the opportunity of having the questions tried in that suit, first, whether in fact there was a debt due, and secondly, whether the mortgage was a valid mortgage which bound the ancestral property (pp. 192 and 197;. Without raising those questions, the defendants rested their defence on the ground that they had not been made parties to the suit and consequently their share in the property had not been sold and could not be sold under the execution: p. 195. The result was that the decree was held to be binding upon them, although they had not been made parties to the action. This theory of representation was pushed further in Sheo Shankar Ram v. Jaddo Kunwar 411 A. 216 : 24 Ind. Cas. 504 : A.I.R. 1914 P.C. 136 : 36 A 383 : 18 C.W.N. 968 : 16 M.W.N. 175 : (1914) M.W.N. 593 : 1 L.W. 645 : 20 C.L.J. 282 : 12 M.W.N. 1173 : 16 Bom. L.R. 810 (P.C.). There was a mortgage suit in which a foreclosure decree was passed against the managing members of a joint Hindu family. They did not avail themselves of their rights to redeem, so that the order absolute was pronounced against them. The other members of the family then brought a suit claiming that they were entitled to redeem the mortgaged properties. Their claim was negatived. The importance of this decision lies in the fact that the mortgagee never had notice < of the fact that the properties had been acquired by the mortgagors on behalf of their joint family (p. 219). That shows that neither were the mortgagors described in the plaint as the managers of the family nor was the decree passed against them in their representative character. But from the circumstances of the case it appeared that the joint family was effectively represented. It may be worth nothing what those circumstances are:
Bombay High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 44 - Full Document

Kishen Parshad vs Har Narain Singh on 1 February, 1911

In Kishen Prasad v. Har Narain Singh 38 I.A. 45 : 9 Ind. Cas. 739 : 33 A. 272 : 15 C.W.N. 321 : 8 A.L.J. 256 : 9 M.L.T. 343 : 13 C.L.J. 45 : 21 M.L.J. 378 : 13 Bom. L.R. 359 : (1911) 2 M.W.N. 395 (P.C.) the suit was brought in respect, of a loan and the question that was raised was one of limitation The action was originally brought by the managing members of the family and it was held that the joinder of the other members as co-plaintiffs after the expiry of the statutory period did not prevent the suit as originally constituted from being in time. It became necessary to determine whether the members newly added were necessary parties and their Lordships held they were not. In the course of their judgment they refer to two decisions of the Madras High Court.
Bombay High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 33 - Full Document

Radha Kishen And Anr. vs Fateh Ali Ram on 22 July, 1898

The decision of the Judicial Committee cited above render obsolete, Viraraqavamma v. Samudrala 8 M. 208 and Guruvappa v. Thimma 10 M. 316 I have refrained from quoting in support of my view the Indian decisions on the point, but to one decision I may refer, where the question has been exhaustively considered by Tek Chand, J.: Jai Kishen v. Ram Chand A.I.R. 1935 Lah. 1 : 157 Ind. Cas. 739.
Allahabad High Court Cites 0 - Cited by 10 - Full Document

Kanchamalai Pathar vs Ry. Shahaji Rajah Sahib (Deceased) And ... on 2 October, 1935

14. If the debt be regarded, as a joint family debt, I agree with my learned brother's judgment. But I think that the same conclusion can be supported upon the view that the decree debt was personal to defendant No. 5. The appellant who had an unsatisfied decree against defendant No. 5 has sought to execute that decree after the judgment-debtor's death against the present respondent as his legal representative. He was, therefore, bound to have recourse to Section 50 of the Code for that purpose. That is the effect of the Full Bench ruling in Kanchamali Pathar v. Shahaji Rajah Sahib 59 M 461 : 162 Ind. Cas. 156 : A.I.R. 1936 Mad. 205 : 70 M.L.J. 162 : (1936) M.W.N. 60 : 43 L.W. 238 : 8 R.M. 946. The liability of the legal representative in respect of such unsatisfied decree is by Section 50, limited to the extent of the property of the deceased judgment-debtor which has come into his hands and has not been duly disposed of by him. That is the sole measure of a legal representative's liability for the debts of the deceased. The share of ancestral property which a son takes in partition with his father ceases to be property in which the father has any right or proprietorship. Such share becomes the separate property of the son as against his father.
Madras High Court Cites 46 - Cited by 40 - Full Document

(Minor) Palanivel Ramasubramania ... vs Sivakami Ammal on 1 April, 1925

18. On the question whether the debt in the present case was a debt incurred by the father prior to the partition, I am content to accept what my brother Venkatasubba Rao, J. has stated in Ramasubramania v. Sivakami Animal 21 L.W. 606 : 90 Ind. Cas. 165 : A.I.R. 1925 Mad. 841 : (1925) M.W.N. 371 that the word in the texts which is translated 'debt' has a wider significance than a present obligation to pay a liquidated sum of money, which is the ordinary meaning of the word. It would include a liability for mesne profits incurred by the father before partition although the actual liability was not determined in a suit until after the partition. It will be a pre-partition debt in the sense in which the word debt is used in the texts. For these reasons I think the civil miscellaneous appeal should succeed.
Madras High Court Cites 19 - Cited by 19 - Full Document

Kuttayan Alias Kosikani Ravuthan And ... vs Mammanna Ravuthan And Ors. on 3 March, 1911

That a manager can represent the family in litigation has never been doubled and has been laid down as pointed out in Kuttayan v. Mammanna Rowthan 35 M. 681 : 18 Ind. Cas. 195 from the earliest times by the Privy Council. Where the suit relates to a joint family property and the parson sued is either the father or the eldest member, the accredited head of the family, it must be presumed that he was sued as representing his family and he need not be described as such in the pleadings, nor should the decree be specifically passed against him as such.
Madras High Court Cites 0 - Cited by 4 - Full Document
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