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1 - 8 of 8 (0.31 seconds)The Limitation Act, 1963
Article 311 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
V.P. Gidroniya vs State Of Madhya Pradesh And Ors. on 3 November, 1966
(9) In , in re. V. P. Gidroniya v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others, a Division Bench of that Court observed that "where the appointing authority elects to dismiss or remove a temporary servant after holding a departmental enquiry and in accordance with Article 311(2) of the Constitution, then, while the departmental enquiry is pending, neither the temporary Government servant nor the appointing authority can put an end to the services of the Government servant by passing an order in terms of the contract of employment or the relevant rule. The departmental enquiry has to be stopped first before the services of a temporary servant can be terminated in the exercise of the powers under the terms of the contract of employment or the relevant rule." The principle laid down in this authority applied with greater force to a case where although there is an order of suspension not even a departmental enquiry is commenced against the Government servant concerned.
Province Of Punjab vs Pandit Tara Chand on 11 April, 1947
In view of the decision of the Federal Court in Punjab Province v. Tara Chand, reported in A.LR. 1947 F.C. 23, and the decision of the Supreme Court in Vaikunthe's case reported in A.LR. 1962 S.C. 8, it cannot now be disputed that a suit by a Government servant for salary is governed by Article 102 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, which provides a period of three years from the time when the wages accrue due. It is, therefore, contended that the respondent's claim. would be within limitation only with respect to a peried cf three years and two months immediately preceding the institution of the suit.
Union Of India vs T.L. Dakshinamurthy on 29 September, 1961
In the case , in re. Union of India v. T. L. Dakshinamurthy, the railway servant concerned was placed under suspension and his services were terminated without any enquiry into the charges and a month's salary was paid to him in lieu of notice. It was held that if the order was regarded only as terminating the services of the railway servant, the railway administration would not be entitled to withhold half the salary which it did by virtue of the order of suspension and that since the order of termination did not nullify the effect of the order of suspension in regard to the withholding of salary, it was by way of punishment and contravened Article 311 of the Constitution.
General Manager, Southern Railway vs J.B. Purushottam on 3 December, 1963
In another case from the Madras High Court , in re. General Manager, Southern Railway v. J. B. Purushottam, it was observed as under :- "BEFOREparting with this case, it appears to us that in similar cases, the railway administration will be well advised to make up their mind at a sufficiently early stage of the proceedings against a delinquent or unsatisfactory subordinate, regarding the proper way to deal with him, whether it should be by way of punishment, or by way of termination of his service under rule 148. When they choose the first course, but in the middle of the proceedings there under, they change their mind and elect to follow the second course, it will be essential to see that no vestige is left of anything that can be construed as a punishment, and which can be substantially linked up with the order of termination of service under rule 148 passed under the second course."
Union Of India (Uoi) Through The Secy. ... vs Ram Nath Chitory on 16 February, 1966
(13) Reliance has been placed by the appellant upon a Division Bench judgment of the Punjab High Court , in re. Union of India v. Ram Nath Chitory. In this case Ram Nath had been suspended on April 9, 1946, and he remained under suspension up to January 18, 1952. He was dismissed from service on January 19, 1952, after a departmental enquiry. He filed a suit challenging the order of his dismissal on March 5, 1957, and also claimed arrears of his pay from the date of his suspension till February 28, 1957, and future pay and. allowances. In these circumstances, it was observed :- "MR.Hardy then says that, so far as the suspension order is concerned, we should declare that it falls with the declaration of the dismissal order, order being held illegal, and, consequently, the plaintiff should be allowed a decree for full salary and allowances during the period of suspension. The fact of the suspension order is not really linked with and is not dependent upon the decision as to validity or invalidity of the dismissal order. Validity of the suspension order must stand or fall on its own merits unaffected by the ultimate finding as to the legality or illegality of the dismissal order. The plaintiff, nowhere in the plaint, challenged the legality of the suspension order and it is hardly open to us to examine that question at this stage. The claim of the plaintiff was only based on the plea that the order of dismissal was illegal, and, therefore, he should be held entitled to his pay. In any case, the claim with respect to the suspension period would be barred by time on the construction of Article 102 of the Limitation Act, as discussed hereinabove. Mr. Hardy argues that the cause of action to challenge the suspension order would arise only after the dismissal is set aside. As I have said already, the fate of the suspension order has to be decided irrespective of the validity or invalidity of the dismissal order. It must, therefore, be held that the plaintiff's claim on this account is without merit."
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