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1 - 10 of 15 (0.39 seconds)Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978
Section 5 in Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 [Entire Act]
Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961
The Limitation Act, 1963
Section 5A in Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 [Entire Act]
Satyan vs Deputy Commissioner . on 30 April, 2019
23. The delay from the date of the Deeds of
Confirmation may be around 8 years 5 months or less than
8 years. The learned Senior Counsel is right while
submitting that the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Satyan (supra) has held that delay of 8 years is not so
enormous, having regard to the objective of the beneficial
legislation. In fact, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that
the law of limitation does not apply to the Act.
D.R. Venkatachalam & Ors vs Dy. Transport Commissioner & Others on 10 December, 1976
25. On a plain reading of the said provisions, this
Court finds no such restriction, that an application invoking
the provisions of the PTCL Act is prohibited if granted lands
are transferred after they are resumed and restored in
favour of the grantee or his legal heirs in an earlier round of
litigation under the provisions of the Act. A larger Bench of
the Apex Court, in the case of D.R.Venkatachalam and
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Others Vs. Dy. Transport Commissioner and Others
(1977) 2 SCC 273 held as follows:
Gurudevdatta Vksss Maryadit & Ors vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors on 22 March, 2001
In Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit And Others
Vs. State of Maharashtra And Others (2001) 4 SCC
534 the Apex Court has held that an Ordinance, if does not
infringe the constitutional safeguards, it cannot be
examined nor can the motive for such a promulgation be in
question. Courts cannot interfere with the legislative malice
in passing a statute. Interference is restrictive in nature
and that too on the constitutionality aspect and not beyond
the same. Legislative malice is beyond the pale of
jurisdiction of the law courts and since there is no
constitutional invalidity nor the same been contended
before the Court, question of interference does not arise. It
was reiterated that,
"It is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statute
that the words of a statute must be understood in
their natural, ordinary or popular sense and construed
according to their grammatical meaning, unless such
construction leads to some absurdity or unless there is
something in the context or in the object of the
statute to suggest to the contrary. The golden rule is
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that the words of a statute must prima facie be given
their ordinary meaning. It is yet another rule of
construction that when the words of the statute are
clear, plain and unambiguous, then the Courts are
bound to give effect to that meaning, irrespective of
the consequences. It is said that the words
themselves best declare the intention of the law giver.
The Courts have adhered to the principle that efforts
should be made to give meaning to each and every
word used by the legislature and it is not a sound
principle of construction to brush aside words in a
statute as being inapposite surpluses, if they can have
a proper application in circumstances conceivable
within the contemplation of the statute."