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1 - 10 of 23 (0.25 seconds)The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
The Limitation Act, 1963
Balbindra Singh Joga Singh vs The Union Of India on 13 July, 1989
31. True it is as pointed out by the learned Counsel for the defendants/appellants, no petition was filed by the plaintiff to get the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. But as would appear from different decisions in the cases of Parmeswaran v. N. Ramchandran (supra), Balbindra Singh Joga Singh v. Union of India (supra), Naram Das v. Banarsi Lal and Ors. v. (supra), L/Naik Mahabir Singh v. Chief of Army Staff 1990 (Supp) SCC 89 and Ms. Nirmala Chaudhary v. Bisheshwar Lal (supra) failure on the part of the plaintiff to file an application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act will not be fatal, particularly when all such facts were known to the defendants.
Ram Kishun Rai And Anr. vs Ashirbad Rai And Ors. on 3 May, 1950
v.(supra), Madhavrao Narayanrao Patwardhan v. Ram Krishna Govind Bhanu and Ors., AIR 1958 SC 767 as well as Ram Kishun Rai and Ors. v. Ashirbad Rai and Ors. (supra). According to the appellants, in this case the plaint was presented before the learned sub-ordinate Judge on September 10, 1975 and on July 27, 1976 the plaintiff was allowed to sue the case as forma pauperies. Therefore, July 27, 1976 has to be treated as the relevant date on which the suit was instituted.
Zafar Khan And Ors vs Board Of Revenue, U.P. & Ors on 31 July, 1984
25. True it is as pointed out by the senior counsel appearing for the appellants, the period for filing a suit for a decree of damages as prescribed under different provisions of the Limitation Act, is three years from the day the contract is broken i.e. October 6, 1966 in the present case. It is also true that for the purpose of counting the period of three years, the date of the presentation of the plaint before an approiriate Court would be the relevant factor; Reliance in this regard has already been made to different decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Zafar Khan and Ors. v. Board of Revenue, UP and Ors.
Pandit Rudranath Mishir And Ors. vs Pandit Sheo Shankar Missir And Ors. on 19 October, 1982
21. Before considering the claim of the plaintiff for a decree of damages, I would like to go to the next question whether the learned Munsif was competent to allow the amendment of the plaint and, if so, whether the relief of the plaintiff for damages on such amendment was barred by limitation. I have already noticed that on behalf of the appellants, while placing reliance on the decisions of this Court in the cases of Ratan Lal Pachisia v. Ranchhor Das Ramji (supra) and Pandit Rudranath Mishir and Ors. v. Pandit Sheo Shankar Missir and Ors. (supra). It was urged that in a case where the Court inherently lacks jurisdiction to entertain the suit, it has no jurisdiction to bring the suit within its jurisdiction, by allowing the amendment of the plaint under Order VI Rule 17 or Order XXIII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But in my view, on a bare reading of the facts of both the cases it appears difficult to apply the ratio of those cases to the present one. Because there cannot be any dispute that on the first occasion when the suit was filed before the Munsif, he had the jurisdiction to entertain. This has also been noticed when the matter was taken up under appeal and in fact, the appellate Court permitted the withdrawal of the appeal to enable the plaintiff to get his plaint amended before the learned Munsif. But certainly after the amendment of the plaint for a decree of damages of Rs. 1,00,000/- the Munsif had no jurisdiction. Therefore, he had no option but to return the plaint for presentation before the proper Court. This is not the case of the defendants that even after amendment of the plaint, the learned Munsif entertained the suit as was done in those reported cases, which have been relied upon on behalf of the appellants. That apart, while considering the submission of Mr. Devi Prasad, senior counsel, I have already noticed that a plaint can be amended even at the appellate stage in appropriate cases for the ends of justice.
Narain Das vs Banarsi Lal And Ors. on 20 February, 1969
31. True it is as pointed out by the learned Counsel for the defendants/appellants, no petition was filed by the plaintiff to get the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. But as would appear from different decisions in the cases of Parmeswaran v. N. Ramchandran (supra), Balbindra Singh Joga Singh v. Union of India (supra), Naram Das v. Banarsi Lal and Ors. v. (supra), L/Naik Mahabir Singh v. Chief of Army Staff 1990 (Supp) SCC 89 and Ms. Nirmala Chaudhary v. Bisheshwar Lal (supra) failure on the part of the plaintiff to file an application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act will not be fatal, particularly when all such facts were known to the defendants.
Misrilal Jain Etc. Etc vs State Of Orissa & Another on 2 May, 1977
27. No doubt, in terms of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 a law Court cannot pass a decree if the suit is barred by limitation, even if the question of limitation has not been raised in the written statement. But having regard to the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act as well as different pronouncements of this Court as well as the Apex Court is well settled that in a case where the plaintiff who was prosecuting the remedies before a wrong Court with due diligence and care, time spent before such Court can be excluded for the purposes of counting limitation. Reference in this regard has already been made to different decisions including that in the case of Misrilal Jain v. State of Orissa and Anr. (supra).