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1 - 5 of 5 (0.19 seconds)Article 119 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Section 5 in The Arbitration Act, 1940 [Entire Act]
Raja Bhupendra Narain Singha Bahadur vs Maharaj Bahadur Singh And ... on 2 April, 1952
5. In this court Mr. Parmanand Sharan Sinha in support of this application contended that the objection petition filed by opposite party No. 1 should be held to be barred by limitation. It is difficult to accept this contention as the period of limitation under Article 119(b) for setting aside an award starts running from the date of the service of the notice of the filing of the award. The notice that was filed in this case on opposite party No. 1, as stated earlier, was the notice of the application of the petitioner. It was an application under Section 14(2) and not of the filing of the award ; rather the award filed in pursuance of the application of the petitioner aforesaid on the 9th. December, 1967. Any period before the filing of the award was, therefore, wholly irrelevant Mr. Sinha places reliance on a decision of this court in Mr. Bahadur Singh v. Fulesfwar Singh and Ors. and contended that the service of a notice contemplated within Article 119(b) would include constructive or informal notice as well. In that case, after the filing of the award an application for its inspection was filed and the objection was filed beyond the period of thirty days therefrom. In this circumstance, it was held that defendant No. 1 should be deemed to have constructive or informal knowledge of the filing of the award and the period of limitation fixed for the same had expired by that time. It is plain from the above authority itself that an application under the Arbitration Act to set aside an award must be filed within thirty days from the date of the service of notice of the filing of the award. In a case, therefore, where there is no notice to the party concerned, even constructive or informal, period of limitation would not begin to run. The contention of Mr. Sinha that the position of opposite party No. 1, who instituted the miscellaneous case in question, was that of a plaintiff and, therefore he should have made necessary statement for conflicting the delay in filing the objection must be rejected for the simple reason that the period of limitation had not expired for filing of the abjection in question, and no averments were required to be made in the objection petition. In any view of the matter, the trial court under the relevant orders was standing the date for filing objections by the parties and it cannot be disputed that Section 5 of the limitation Act, 1963, applies also to an application under the Arbitration Act to set aside an award. It is, however, not necessary to take recourse to the provisions of Section 5 at all in this case because, the question of enlarging the period fixed by the Arbitration Act did not arise. According to the scheme of the Arbitration Act itself, the commencement of the period of limitation for an application under Article 119(h) takes place only after the parties have been served either with a notice of the filing of the award or as held by this court in the above mentioned decision, they derive knowledge of the said fact even in an informal manner ; and not before that. In this case the court of appeal below is right in holding that opposite party No. I became aware of the fact of filing the award for the first time on 5th March, 1968. The objection filed on the 29th March, 1968 was therefore well within time.
Section 14 in The Arbitration Act, 1940 [Entire Act]
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