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1 - 10 of 14 (0.33 seconds)Section 25 in The Transfer Of Property Act, 1882 [Entire Act]
Section 106 in The Transfer Of Property Act, 1882 [Entire Act]
Section 17 in The Transfer Of Property Act, 1882 [Entire Act]
Rakesh Kumar & Shri Shakti Kumar vs Hindustan Everest Tool Ltd on 7 March, 1988
The learned counsel for the landlady has also rightly relied on another decision of the Apex Court in Rakesh Kumar and Anr. v. Hindustan Everest Tool Ltd. . Even in this decision the Apex Court has observed that the proper way of reading the notice and the appropriate logical way in which notices of such type should be read is that it must be read in common sense -- Point of view bearing in mind how such notice was to be understood by ordinary people. Applying the above principles and on reading the notice as a whole, I have no hesitation in taking the view that the suit notice is a proper demand notice giving particulars of the arrears of rent for more than 6 months but it also specifies the amount to be paid. Besides, this notice also determines the tenancy by calling upon the tenant to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the demised premises before the expiration of 30th December, 1980 which is after about more than one month from the date of the notice. In that sense no fault can be found with this notice. Whereas, on giving liberal construction this is clearly a demand notice as required for the purposes of Section 12(2) of the Act. As rightly contended by the counsel for the landlady that the tenant obviously fully understood the nature of notice and the same was replied through his Advocate on 12th November, 1980. The tenant chose only to dispute the factum regarding non payment of rent as alleged in the suit notice and nothing more. Even before the first court as well as before the Appellate Court this was the only plea pressed into service on behalf of the tenant, that the tenant was not in arrears as contended. No contention regarding the validity of notice as is pressed now was advisedly taken before the courts below.
Bapubhai Mohanbhal vs Mahila Sahakari Udyog Mandir on 26 August, 1975
In this context reliance was placed on the ruling , The Laxmi Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. Mohan Govind Doiwanji and Anr. and , Bapubhai Mohanbhai v. Mahila Sahakari Udyog Mandir to contend that the court will have to take into account whether the requirement alleged and proved by the landlady is not forbidden by any law. Reliance was placed on Section 25 of the Act to contend that the proposed user mentioned in the writ petition would be prohibited on account of the said provision as residential premises cannot be converted into non-residential premises. In the first place, some stray statement made in the writ petition cannot undo the pleadings on the basis of which courts below proceeded to adjudicate the controversy and has recorded finding of fact in that behalf. There can be no dispute that no such plea was taken before the courts below that the premises would be used for hospital of the son. On the other hand, the plaintiff pressed for eviction on the ground that the premises were required for residential purpose of her son Ravi and his family. Moreover, it is not understood how Section 25 will have application to the present premise. On plain reading of Section 25 the same would apply only to such premises which on the date of coming into operation of the Act 1947, were used for residential purpose. That provision obviously does not apply to all premises but the application is restricted only to those premises which were being used for residential purposes when the Act of 1947 came into force. There is nothing on record to show that the suit premises was in existence when the Act came into force on 31st March, 1948. Understood thus, Section 25 cannot non suit the plaintiff in this case. Moreover, as observed earlier, the requirement pressed into service and which has been accepted by the court below is not for the purpose of hospital but obviously for the residence of landlady's son Ravi and his family. In the event, the landlady after getting possession of the demised premises, does not use the premises for the purpose for which decree has been obtained, in that case the remedy for the tenant is one under Section 17 of the Act.
Mrs Labhkuwar Bhagwani Shaha And Ors. vs Janardhan Mahadeo Kalan And Anr. on 11 November, 1982
In support of this submission, reliance has been placed on the decision of this Court reported in 7970 Mh.LJ. Note 39 in C.R.A. No. 199/1966 decided on 26th Feb. 1970. In that decision, it was held that the defendant who had failed to take a plea of propriety, sufficiency or validity of the notice in his written statement cannot be allowed to raise the same for the first time before the High Court. Mr. Mandlik for the landlady has also placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mrs. Labhkuwar Bhagwani Shaha and Ors. v. Janardhan Mahadeo Kalan and Anr., wherein the Supreme Court has observed that the jurisdiction or otherwise when it is purely a question of fact requiring adjudication on appreciation of evidence, High Court could not convert it into even a mixed question of fact and law entitling it to interfere. He further submits that in any case if the suit notice is read as a whole, that surely would stand the test of a demand notice required for the purposes of Section 12(2) of the Act.
Article 227 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Section 26 in The Transfer Of Property Act, 1882 [Entire Act]
Smt. Ramkubai Since Deceased By Lrs. & ... vs Hajarimal Dhokalchand Chandak & Ors on 13 August, 1999
The Scheme of Section 17 has been considered by the Apex Court in , Ramkubai (Smt.) deceased by L.R. s and Ors. v. Hajarimal D. Chandak and Ors. and the Apex Court has observed that section provides complete protection to the tenant in the event landlord used the premises for some other purpose in contravention of that provision. Therefore, the apprehension expressed by the tenant before this court that in view of the grounds stated in Paragraph 4 of the writ petition, the issue of bonafide requirement be answered against the plaintiff, to my mind, is devoid of any substance.