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Cellular Operators Association Of ... vs Union Of India & Ors on 17 December, 2002

In this appeal we would do well to bear in mind the pronouncement of the Supreme Court as to the jurisdiction of this Tribunal while sitting in appeal against an order of the Respondent Tribunal enunciated in the case of Cellular Operators of India and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. wherein the Apex Court while holding that the jurisdiction of this Tribunal in an appeal is not limited or akin to judicial review also indicated that the Tribunal should give due weight to the recommendations of TRAI which consist of an expert body. With this in mind we will consider the various issues arising in this appeal.
Supreme Court of India Cites 25 - Cited by 102 - S B Sinha - Full Document

Commissioner Of Police, Bombay vs Gordhandas Bhanji on 23 November, 1951

17.1 In support of the above issue the appellants had placed reliance on a judgment of the Bombay High Court in Commissioner of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji and Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner . Before referring to the above judgments we should notice that the Explanatory Memorandum which forms part of the impugned TTO gives a comprehensive analysis of all the points raised in the appeal and takes into account the objections / concerns of VSNL and we do not find that any relevant material has been excluded by TRAI or consideration has been given to any irrelevant material for reaching the conclusions contained in the impugned order. It is true that certain details of costing are not there in the Explanatory Memorandum but these details had actually been obtained by TRAI from VSNL and TRAI has informed VSNL fully about the use of this data. During the course of hearing, this data was brought to our notice and the documents were shown to the learned counsel of the appellant. We are satisfied that in the interest of maintaining confidentiality of business information obtained from an individual company it was not necessary for it to be published in the public notification of 8-9-2005.
Supreme Court of India Cites 6 - Cited by 973 - V Bose - Full Document

Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr vs The Chiief Election Commissioner, New ... on 2 December, 1977

17.1 In support of the above issue the appellants had placed reliance on a judgment of the Bombay High Court in Commissioner of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji and Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner . Before referring to the above judgments we should notice that the Explanatory Memorandum which forms part of the impugned TTO gives a comprehensive analysis of all the points raised in the appeal and takes into account the objections / concerns of VSNL and we do not find that any relevant material has been excluded by TRAI or consideration has been given to any irrelevant material for reaching the conclusions contained in the impugned order. It is true that certain details of costing are not there in the Explanatory Memorandum but these details had actually been obtained by TRAI from VSNL and TRAI has informed VSNL fully about the use of this data. During the course of hearing, this data was brought to our notice and the documents were shown to the learned counsel of the appellant. We are satisfied that in the interest of maintaining confidentiality of business information obtained from an individual company it was not necessary for it to be published in the public notification of 8-9-2005.
Supreme Court of India Cites 56 - Cited by 4221 - V R Iyer - Full Document

Mohamed Oomer, Mohamed Noorullah vs S.M. Noorudin on 13 August, 1951

18. We may note another technical argument advanced on behalf of the appellant. Learned senior counsel for the appellant contended that the respondent has committed an impropriety by filing an affidavit in this Tribunal and engaging a counsel to defend its decisions which a judicial Tribunal ought not to do. In support of this contention the learned counsel relied on a decision of the Bombay High Court in Mohd. Oomer v. S.M. Noorudin [AIR 1951 Bombay 156] and Sayed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishan wherein the Bombay High Court and the Supreme Court deprecated the practice of a quasi-judicial body which decided an issue between two parties appearing through counsel before the Court in appeal and trying to justify its order. We do not think that these two judgments would apply to the facts of the case. The Respondent Authority while fixing a tariff which it is entitled to do so under the Act, follows a procedure of consultation and interaction with various players in the concerned field and its ultimate decision is enforceable in law. Though during the process of consultation and interaction it is bound to follow the principles of natural justice, the Authority cannot be called as a court or a judicial forum while exercising its function of tariff fixation. In our opinion the final decision of the Authority is more in the nature of an administrative decision than a judicial verdict. Therefore, when its decision of tariff fixation is challenged before this Tribunal or other appellate forum the Authority has to justify its decision and in that process of justification the Respondent Authority has to file its pleadings and also has to be represented to explain its stand. The procedure of tariff fixation as noted hereinabove by us is so complicated that it is necessary for the appellate authority to have the assistance of all parties concerned, especially the regulator to arrive at a just conclusion. If the Authority is not permitted to be represented in an appeal challenging its order of fixation of tariff then this Tribunal will have to adjudicate only on the basis of allegations made in the appeal memorandum without any assistance from the Respondent. Tariff fixation is contemplated under the statute in public interest hence if the Respondent is not permitted to present its case there is every likelihood of public interest suffering. The decision of the two courts referred to in support of this argument of the appellant in our opinion does not apply to the facts of this case. Hence we find no merit in this argument of the appellant as to the impropriety of the Respondent Authority in filing objections to the appeal memorandum and representing itself before this Tribunal through its counsel.
Bombay High Court Cites 5 - Cited by 10 - B P Sinha - Full Document

Syed Yakoob vs K.S. Radhakrishnan & Others on 7 October, 1963

18. We may note another technical argument advanced on behalf of the appellant. Learned senior counsel for the appellant contended that the respondent has committed an impropriety by filing an affidavit in this Tribunal and engaging a counsel to defend its decisions which a judicial Tribunal ought not to do. In support of this contention the learned counsel relied on a decision of the Bombay High Court in Mohd. Oomer v. S.M. Noorudin [AIR 1951 Bombay 156] and Sayed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishan wherein the Bombay High Court and the Supreme Court deprecated the practice of a quasi-judicial body which decided an issue between two parties appearing through counsel before the Court in appeal and trying to justify its order. We do not think that these two judgments would apply to the facts of the case. The Respondent Authority while fixing a tariff which it is entitled to do so under the Act, follows a procedure of consultation and interaction with various players in the concerned field and its ultimate decision is enforceable in law. Though during the process of consultation and interaction it is bound to follow the principles of natural justice, the Authority cannot be called as a court or a judicial forum while exercising its function of tariff fixation. In our opinion the final decision of the Authority is more in the nature of an administrative decision than a judicial verdict. Therefore, when its decision of tariff fixation is challenged before this Tribunal or other appellate forum the Authority has to justify its decision and in that process of justification the Respondent Authority has to file its pleadings and also has to be represented to explain its stand. The procedure of tariff fixation as noted hereinabove by us is so complicated that it is necessary for the appellate authority to have the assistance of all parties concerned, especially the regulator to arrive at a just conclusion. If the Authority is not permitted to be represented in an appeal challenging its order of fixation of tariff then this Tribunal will have to adjudicate only on the basis of allegations made in the appeal memorandum without any assistance from the Respondent. Tariff fixation is contemplated under the statute in public interest hence if the Respondent is not permitted to present its case there is every likelihood of public interest suffering. The decision of the two courts referred to in support of this argument of the appellant in our opinion does not apply to the facts of this case. Hence we find no merit in this argument of the appellant as to the impropriety of the Respondent Authority in filing objections to the appeal memorandum and representing itself before this Tribunal through its counsel.
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