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1 - 10 of 44 (1.02 seconds)Section 434 in The Companies Act, 1956 [Entire Act]
Section 32 in The Arbitration Act, 1940 [Entire Act]
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
The Companies Act, 1956
Section 433 in The Companies Act, 1956 [Entire Act]
Satish Kumar & Ors vs Surinder Kumar & Ors on 27 September, 1968
47. In my opinion, by that observation, the Supreme Court did not mean that until an award would be made a decree of the court, the same would remain an invalid document or would be a mere waste paper. In my opinion, that isolated observation was made in the context of Section 36(6) of the Madras Aliyasantana Act (2 of 1949). It did not in any manner decide anything against the principles decided in the case of Satish Kumar v. Surinder Kumar, , which was a judgment of three learned judges dealing with the point directly. In any event, in this case, we are not concerned with the enforcement of the award. It would be noted that the said observation was made by a Bench of two judges of the Supreme Court without considering its own previous decision where the character of an unfiled award was elaborately discussed and it was, inter alia, held that the " award does not create right in property ". In any event, in my opinion, the said observation should be read in that background of the said special statute which was the subject-matter of the decision in that case. In the case before us, we are only concerned with the right which is created by the award and not in respect of the enforcement thereof.
Section 17 in The Arbitration Act, 1940 [Entire Act]
Official Receiver, Kanpur And Another vs Abdul Shakur And Others on 11 September, 1964
40. I think, the law is settled on the point that the bankruptcy court could go behind the judgment decree and decide for itself whether the debt existed or not. (See: Ko-ku-la Ltd., In re , and the case of Official Receiver, Kanpur v. Abdul Shakbor, ). In the case of Re: Welsh Brick Industries Ltd. [1946] 2 All ER 197 (CA), it was held that the Company Court could go behind the question and see for itself whether the defence was a bona fide one or not even in case where an unconditional leave to defend was granted in a summary proceeding. In the case of In re: Amalgamated Properties of Rhodesia (1913) Ltd. [1917] 2 Ch 115 (CA), it was held that the pendency of the appeal did not destroy the credit, and the winding-up court could make an order for winding up if the facts involved in that case so permitted. The pendency of the appeal by itself cannot be put up as a defence to a winding-up petition.