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Ajit Singh vs Charan Singh Pardeshi And Anr. on 27 February, 1973 cites

Ram Kishore vs State Of U.P on 28 March, 1966

The expression "of the offence charged" would, in our opinion, mean the offence for which the complaint had been made and cannot be construed as to mean the first offence. Infringement of trade mark may be committed several times and on several dates. The time of three years, prescribed by Section 92 of the Act, would run from the date of infringement of the trade mark constituting the offence for which the complaint is made and not from the date of first infringement of the trade mark. We are supported in this view by the judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ram Kishore v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 1820. Similarly, the period of two years prescribed by Section 92 of the Act would run from the date when the complainant came to know about the offence for which complaint had been brought. The complaint wad made, in the instant case, on 24th January, 1968, for the offence which was alleged to have been committed by the accused two months prior to the institution of the complaint. That means, that the offence for which the complaint was made had been committed in the month of November, 1967, i.e., within two months prior to making of the complaint and that the complainant had also come to know about the commission of that offence within two months prior to the institution of the complaint. As such, the complaint was made within three years from the date of commission of the offence charged and also within two years after the discovery thereof. Therefore, we, in disagreement with the learned Additional Sessions Judge, find that the complaint was instituted within time and that the prosecution of the accused is not barred by Section 92 of the Act.
Supreme Court of India Cites 9 - Cited by 37 - Full Document

Parle Products (P) Ltd vs J. P. & Co. Mysore on 28 January, 1972

It is plain from the said definition that it is not essential that both the trade marks, i.e., of 'Do Chiri' and 'Do Kabutar', should be exactly similar, and it is not required to examine the same by placing one by the side of the other to find out if there are any differences in the design. The test of such a comparison is not sound because a purchaser of the goods manufactured by the complainant or by the accused would seldom have the two trade marks before him when he makes the purchase. Therefore, it is of no use to discover as to on how many points the aforesaid two trade marks are similar or as to on how many points these are dissimilar. It is the element of similarity in both the trade marks which would cause deception or confusion. Therefore, if by looking on both the trade marks it can be said that the get up or general appearance of the trade mark of 'Do Kabutar' is such as would be likely to mislead a purchaser to take the goods bearing the said trade mark for the goods of the trade mark of 'Do Chiri', the trade mark of 'Do Kabutar' would be said to be deceptively similar. We are guided in this view by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Parle Products (P.) Ltd. v. J. P. & Co., Mysore, AIR 1972 SC 1359, and the judgment of the Privy Council in Thomas Bear & Sons (India) Ltd. v. Prayag Narain, AIR 1940 PC 86. The plate bearing the trade mark of 'Do Chiri' and the plate bearing the trade mark of 'Do Kabutar' are oval in shape. The colour of the said plates is similar and the colour in which the birds appear on the same is also similar. The customers of the goods of both the firms are mainly unsophisticated illiterate villagers. In these circumstances, we have no doubt in saying that the get up or general appearance of the two trade marks is likely to cause an ordinary purchaser to buy the goods of the trade mark of 'Do Kabutar', i.e., manufactured by the accused, believing that same had been manufactured by the complainant and were of the trade mark of 'Do Chiri'. To put it differently, the likeness of the two trade marks, i.e., of 'Do Kabutar' and 'Do Chiri' is likely to cause confusion and also deception. In that view of the matter, we find that the trade mark of 'Do Kabutar' does come within the definition of 'deceptively similar' reproduced above.
Supreme Court of India Cites 10 - Cited by 293 - Full Document

Thomas Bear And Sons (India) Limited vs Prayag Narain on 7 March, 1940

It is plain from the said definition that it is not essential that both the trade marks, i.e., of 'Do Chiri' and 'Do Kabutar', should be exactly similar, and it is not required to examine the same by placing one by the side of the other to find out if there are any differences in the design. The test of such a comparison is not sound because a purchaser of the goods manufactured by the complainant or by the accused would seldom have the two trade marks before him when he makes the purchase. Therefore, it is of no use to discover as to on how many points the aforesaid two trade marks are similar or as to on how many points these are dissimilar. It is the element of similarity in both the trade marks which would cause deception or confusion. Therefore, if by looking on both the trade marks it can be said that the get up or general appearance of the trade mark of 'Do Kabutar' is such as would be likely to mislead a purchaser to take the goods bearing the said trade mark for the goods of the trade mark of 'Do Chiri', the trade mark of 'Do Kabutar' would be said to be deceptively similar. We are guided in this view by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Parle Products (P.) Ltd. v. J. P. & Co., Mysore, AIR 1972 SC 1359, and the judgment of the Privy Council in Thomas Bear & Sons (India) Ltd. v. Prayag Narain, AIR 1940 PC 86. The plate bearing the trade mark of 'Do Chiri' and the plate bearing the trade mark of 'Do Kabutar' are oval in shape. The colour of the said plates is similar and the colour in which the birds appear on the same is also similar. The customers of the goods of both the firms are mainly unsophisticated illiterate villagers. In these circumstances, we have no doubt in saying that the get up or general appearance of the two trade marks is likely to cause an ordinary purchaser to buy the goods of the trade mark of 'Do Kabutar', i.e., manufactured by the accused, believing that same had been manufactured by the complainant and were of the trade mark of 'Do Chiri'. To put it differently, the likeness of the two trade marks, i.e., of 'Do Kabutar' and 'Do Chiri' is likely to cause confusion and also deception. In that view of the matter, we find that the trade mark of 'Do Kabutar' does come within the definition of 'deceptively similar' reproduced above.
Bombay High Court Cites 2 - Cited by 17 - Full Document
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