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1 - 10 of 29 (0.87 seconds)Section 417 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
Section 302 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Sanwat Singh & Others vs State Of Rajasthan on 9 December, 1960
In some cases (Ramaphupala
Reddy v. State of A.P., (AIR 1971 SC 460) Bhim Singh Rup
Singh v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1974 SC 286), it has
been said that to the principles laid down in Sanwat Singh
case may be added the further principle that `if two
reasonable conclusions can be reached on the basis of the
evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb
the finding of the trial court'. This, of course, is not a new
principle. It stems out of the fundamental principle of our
criminal jurisprudence that the accused is entitled to the
benefit of any reasonable doubt. If two reasonably probable
and evenly balanced views of the evidence are possible, one
must necessarily concede the existence of a reasonable
doubt. But, fanciful and remote possibilities must be left out
of account. To entitle an accused person to the benefit of a
doubt arising from the possibility of a duality of views, the
possible view in favour of the accused must be as nearly
reasonably probable as that against him. If the
preponderance of probability is all one way, a bare
possibility of another view will not entitle the accused to
claim the benefit of any doubt. It is, therefore, essential that
any view of the evidence in favour of the accused must be
reasonable even as any doubt, the benefit of which an
accused person may claim, must be reasonable."
Surajpal Singh And Others vs The State on 20 December, 1951
In some of the earlier decisions of this Court, however,
in emphasising the importance of adopting a cautious
approach in dealing with appeals against acquittals, it was
observed that the presumption of innocence is reinforced by
the order of acquittal and so, `the findings of the trial court
which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and
hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very
substantial and compelling reasons': vide Surajpal Singh v.
State (1952 SCR 193).
Ajmer Singh vs The State Of Punjab on 10 December, 1952
Similarly in Ajmer Singh v. State of
Punjab (1953 SCR 418), it was observed that the
interference of the High Court in an appeal against the order
of acquittal would be justified only if there are `very
substantial and compelling reasons to do so'. In some other
decisions, it has been stated that an order of acquittal can be
reversed only for `good and sufficiently cogent reasons' or
for `strong reasons'. In appreciating the effect of these
observations, it must be remembered that these observations
were not intended to lay down a rigid or inflexible rule
which should govern the decision of the High Court in
appeals against acquittals. They were not intended, and
should not be read to have intended to introduce an
additional condition in clause (a) of Section 423(1) of the
Code. All that the said observations are intended to
emphasize is that the approach of the High Court in dealing
with an appeal against acquittal ought to be cautious
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because as Lord Russell observed in Sheo Swarup the
presumption of innocence in favour of the accused `is not
certainly weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at
his trial'. Therefore, the test suggested by the expression
`substantial and compelling reasons' should not be
construed as a formula which has to be rigidly applied in
every case.
Sheo Swarup vs King-Emperor on 26 July, 1934
11. The first important decision was rendered by the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup v. R. Emperor (1934) 61 IA 398). In
Sheo Swarup the accused were acquitted by the trial court and the local
Government directed the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High
Court from an order of acquittal under Section 417 of the old Code (similar
to Section 378 of the present Code). At the time of hearing of appeal before
the High Court, it was contended on behalf of the accused that in an appeal
from an order of acquittal, it was not open to the appellate court to interfere
with the findings of fact recorded by the trial Judge unless such findings
could not have been reached by him had there not been some perversity or
incompetence on his part. The High Court, however, declined to accept the
said view. It held that no condition was imposed on the High Court in such
appeal. It accordingly reviewed all the evidence in the case and having
formed an opinion of its weight and reliability different from that of the trial
Judge, recorded an order of conviction. A petition was presented to His
Majesty in Council for leave to appeal on the ground that conflicting views
had been expressed by the High Courts in different parts of India upon the
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question whether in an appeal from an order of acquittal, an appellate court
had the power to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the trial
Judge. Their Lordships thought it fit to clarify the legal position and
accordingly upon the "humble advice of their Lordships", leave was granted
by His Majesty. The case was, thereafter, argued. The Committee
considered the scheme and interpreting Section 417 of the Code (old Code)
observed that there was no indication in the Code of any limitation or
restriction on the High Court in exercise of powers as an Appellate
Tribunal. The Code also made no distinction as regards powers of the High
Court in dealing with an appeal against acquittal and an appeal against
conviction. Though several authorities were cited revealing different views
by the High Courts dealing with an appeal from an order of acquittal, the
Committee did not think it proper to discuss all the cases.
Ramaphupala Reddy And Ors. vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 28 September, 1970
In some cases (Ramaphupala
Reddy v. State of A.P., (AIR 1971 SC 460) Bhim Singh Rup
Singh v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1974 SC 286), it has
been said that to the principles laid down in Sanwat Singh
case may be added the further principle that `if two
reasonable conclusions can be reached on the basis of the
evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb
the finding of the trial court'. This, of course, is not a new
principle. It stems out of the fundamental principle of our
criminal jurisprudence that the accused is entitled to the
benefit of any reasonable doubt. If two reasonably probable
and evenly balanced views of the evidence are possible, one
must necessarily concede the existence of a reasonable
doubt. But, fanciful and remote possibilities must be left out
of account. To entitle an accused person to the benefit of a
doubt arising from the possibility of a duality of views, the
possible view in favour of the accused must be as nearly
reasonably probable as that against him. If the
preponderance of probability is all one way, a bare
possibility of another view will not entitle the accused to
claim the benefit of any doubt. It is, therefore, essential that
any view of the evidence in favour of the accused must be
reasonable even as any doubt, the benefit of which an
accused person may claim, must be reasonable."
Ramesh Babulal Doshi vs The State Of Gujarat on 2 May, 1996
In Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225, this
Court said:
Allarakha K. Mansuri vs State Of Gujarat on 14 February, 2002
In Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat (2002) 3 SCC 57,
referring to earlier decisions, the Court stated: