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1 - 10 of 10 (0.80 seconds)The Hindu Succession Act, 1956
Section 42 in The Specific Relief Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
Gostha Behari Bera And Ors. vs Haridas Samanta And Ors. on 19 December, 1956
In the case of
Gostha Behari v. Haridas Samanta (2), P. N. Mookherjee, J.,
expressed his opinion as to the meaning of the words " any
property possessed by a female Hindu " in the following
words:-
Harak Singh vs Kailash Singh And Anr. on 1 July, 1958
Harak Singh v. KailaSh Singh (1) overruled its previous
decisions referred to above, and rightly pointed out that
the object of the Act was to improve the legal status of
Hindu women, enlarging their limited interest in property
inherited or held by them to an absolute interest, provided
they were in possession of the property when the Act came
into force and, therefore, in a position to take advantage
of its beneficial provisions; but the Act was not intended
to benefit alienees who with their eyes open purchased the
property from the limited owners without justifying
necessity before the Act came into force and at a time when
the vendors had only a limited interest of Hindu women.
In the case before us, the essential question for con-
sideration is as to how the words "any property possessed by
a female Hindu, whether aquired before or after the
commencement of this Act " in a. 14 of the Act should be
interpreted. Section 14 refers to property which was either
acquired before or after the commencement of the Act and
that such property should be possessed by a female Hindu.
Reference to property acquired before the commencement of
the Act certainly makes the provisions of the section re-
trospective, but even in such a case the property must be
possessed by a female Hindu at the time the Act came into
force in order to make the provisions of the section
applicable. There is no question in the present case that
Veeravva acquired the property of her deceased husband
before the commencement of the Act. In order that the
provisions of s. 14 may apply to the present case it will
have to be further established that the property was
possessed by her at the time the Act came into force. It
was the case of the appellant that the estate of Veerappa
was in actual possession of the second defendant and not
Veeravva at the relevant time. On behalf of the respondent
it was urged that the words " possessed by " had a wider
meaning than actual physical possession, although physical
possession may be included in the expression.
(1) A.I.R. 1958 Pat. 581.
Section 15 in The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 [Entire Act]
Section 20 in The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 [Entire Act]
Mt. Janki Kuer And Ors. vs Chhathu Prasad And Ors. on 23 July, 1957
In the
case of Rama Ayodhya Missir v. Raghunath Missir (1) and in
the case of Mt. Janki Kuer v. Chhathu Prasad (2) the Patna
High Court took the view that the effect of ss. 14 and 15 of
the Act was that a reversioner recognised as such under the
Hindu law was no more a reversioner, as a female Hindu
possessing any property, whether acquired before or after
the commencement of the Act, held not a limited estate but
an absolute estate therein, and after the coming into force
of the Act, he had no right of reversion or any kind Of Spes
successionsis.
Ram Ayodhya Missir And Ors. vs Raghunath Missir And Ors. on 8 November, 1956
In the
case of Rama Ayodhya Missir v. Raghunath Missir (1) and in
the case of Mt. Janki Kuer v. Chhathu Prasad (2) the Patna
High Court took the view that the effect of ss. 14 and 15 of
the Act was that a reversioner recognised as such under the
Hindu law was no more a reversioner, as a female Hindu
possessing any property, whether acquired before or after
the commencement of the Act, held not a limited estate but
an absolute estate therein, and after the coming into force
of the Act, he had no right of reversion or any kind Of Spes
successionsis.
Mt. Lukai W/O Katikram And Ors. vs Niranjan Dayaram And Ors. on 31 January, 1958
The High Courts of Calcutta, Andhra Pradesh
and Madhya Pradesh have taken a view which does not support
the view expressed by the Patna High Court in the aforesaid
cases, The High Court of 'Madhya Pradesh in the case of Mt.
Lukai v. Niranjan (3) dissented from the decisions of the
Patna High Court in the above-mentioned cases.' Indeed, the
Patna High Court in the case of
(1)A.I.R. 1957 Pat. 480. (2) A.I.R. 1957 Pat. 674.
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