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1 - 10 of 26 (0.45 seconds)Section 30 in The Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 [Entire Act]
Section 29 in The Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 [Entire Act]
Section 25 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
The Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985
Section 3 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Emperor vs Lalit Mohan Chuckerbutty And Ors. on 19 April, 1911
(1964) 6 SCR 623 at 631-633
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the proper approach to adopt is to consider the other evidence
against such an accused person, and if the said evidence appears to
be satisfactory and the court is inclined to hold that the said evidence
may sustain the charge framed against the said accused person, the
court turns to the confession with a view to assure itself that the
conclusion which it is inclined to draw from the other evidence is
right. As was observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. Lalit
Mohan Chuckerburty a confession can only be used to “lend
assurance to other evidence against a co-accused”. In re
Periyaswami Moopan Reilly. J., observed that the provision of
Section 30 goes not further than this: “where there is evidence
against the co-accused sufficient, if believed, to support his
conviction, then the kind of confession described in Section 30 may
be thrown into the scale as an additional reason for believing that
evidence”.
Kashmira Singh vs State Of Madhya Pradesh on 4 March, 1952
Thus,
though confession may be regarded as evidence in that generic sense
because of the provisions of Section 30, the fact remains that it is not
evidence as defined by Section 3 of the Act. The result, therefore, is
that in dealing with a case against an accused person, the court
cannot start with the confession of a co-accused person; it must
begin with other evidence adduced by the prosecution and after it
has formed its opinion with regard to the quality and effect of the
said evidence, then it is permissible to turn to the confession in order
to receive assurance to the conclusion of guilt which the judicial
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mind is about to reach on the said other evidence. That, briefly
stated, is the effect of the provisions contained in Section 30. The
same view has been expressed by this Court in Kashmira Singh v.
State of Madhya Pradesh where the decision of the Privy Council in
Bhuboni Sahu case has been cited with approval.”
Bhuboni Sahu vs The King on 17 February, 1949
Thus,
though confession may be regarded as evidence in that generic sense
because of the provisions of Section 30, the fact remains that it is not
evidence as defined by Section 3 of the Act. The result, therefore, is
that in dealing with a case against an accused person, the court
cannot start with the confession of a co-accused person; it must
begin with other evidence adduced by the prosecution and after it
has formed its opinion with regard to the quality and effect of the
said evidence, then it is permissible to turn to the confession in order
to receive assurance to the conclusion of guilt which the judicial
12
mind is about to reach on the said other evidence. That, briefly
stated, is the effect of the provisions contained in Section 30. The
same view has been expressed by this Court in Kashmira Singh v.
State of Madhya Pradesh where the decision of the Privy Council in
Bhuboni Sahu case has been cited with approval.”