Patna High Court
Anil Bihari Saran vs State Of Bihar on 12 April, 1966
Equivalent citations: AIR1967PAT43, (1967)IILLJ540PAT, AIR 1967 PATNA 43, (1967) 2 LABLJ 540
JUDGMENT Nakasimham, C.J.
1. The petitioner was serving in the Government of Bihar as Commandant of the Bihar Military Police. On the 27th November 1957, orders were issued by the Inspector General of Police (Annexure B) placing him under suspension on the basis of certain serious charges of corruption that were made against him. On the 3rd February, 1998 (Annexure D), the Government of Bihar framed eight specific charges against the petitioner and directed that a regular enquiry should be held by Shri P.K.J. Menon, I. A. S., then Commissioner of Bhagalpur Division. Shri Menon took some preliminary steps, but he was subsequently transferred from the place and then the Government of Bihar by their order dated 25th October, 1958 (Annexure I) directed Shri (now Justice) Ram Ratna Singh, then Secretary to Government in the Law Department and Legal Remembrancer, to conduct the departmental proceedings.
That Officer conducted the proceedings on a very elaborate scale and maintained a regular order-sheet as is maintained in civil suits recording in detail what happened on every one of the dates to which the proceedings were adjourned. He allowed the Department and the petitioner to be represented by advocates. Both parties were allowed to adduce evidence, oral and documentary. The proceedings before him terminated on 31-5-1960 after hearing arguments on both sides. He submitted his report to Government on the 31st October, 1960 (Annexure 2 N) holding the petitioner guilty of charges 5 and 7 which deal with allegations of corruption. As regards charge No. 1 and certain items in respect of charges 3 and 4, he exonerated the petitioner of the charge of corruption but found him guilty of gross negligence, lack of supervision and showing unusual zeal in favour of a party. The Government by their letter dated the 20th April, 196.1 (Annexure 2-0) called upon the petitioner to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service in view of the finding of the enquiring officer. A copy of the report of the enquiring officer was also sent to him. The petitioner showed cause (Annexure 2-P), but this was not accepted as satisfactory and he was eventually dismissed from service on 18-6-1963 (Annexure 2-Q). In the order of dismissal the Government merely stated that they had accepted the finding of the enquiring officer and that the explanation given by the petitioner was found to be wholly unsatisfactory. The Government have not given reasons separately so far as the proof or otherwise of the various charges framed against the petitioner.
2. The extremely limited jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to interfere with the order of dismissal passed by the competent authority against a public servant is well known. As pointed out in State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723, it is not the function of this Court to sit like an appellate authority to re-examine the evidence and come to its own view as regards the correctness of the findings. The high standard of proof required in a Criminal Case for proving the charges beyond reasonable doubt does not apply to departmental proceedings. So long as there is some evidence to support the findings, this Court's Jurisdiction to interfere is clearly ousted. This Court can only consider whether the constitutional guarantee given to a public servant by Article 311 (2) of the Constitution and the rules regulating the holding of departmental enquiry against a public servant [Rule 55 of Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 I have been fully complied with.
So long as the enquiry is properly conducted and the rules of natural justice are complied with the departmental authorities are the sole judges of facts and "if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution". As regards the principles of natural Justice which should be complied with by the departmental authorities, I may refer to State of Madhya Pradesh v. Chintaman Sadashiva, AIR 1961 SC 1623. A delinquent public servant must get a reasonable opportunity to defend himself and for that purpose must be given reasonable facilities for cross-examining the witnesses who may depose against him and also to adduce evidence on his behalf. No material should be relied on against him unless he is given an opportunity of explaining the same. The right to cross-examine is a very valuable right and if it appears that effective exercise of this right has not been given to a public servant, it must be held that the rules of natural justice wore not complied with.
3. Mr. Basudeva Prasad for the petitioner was fully conscious of the law on the subject and hence confined his attack against the order of dismissal to the following three grounds:
(i) The enquiring officer, Sri Ram Katna Singh, had, prior to the commencement of the enquiry, seen the papers dealing with the petitioner's case and had also expressed an opinion against him as Law Secretary prior to the institution of this case. Hence, according to Mr. Prasad, he started with an initial prejudice against the petitioner and should not have conducted the enquiry.
(ii) During the course of the enquiry many official documents which could have established the innocence of the petitioner were deliberately with-held by the departmental authorities under the false plea that they were not available and the petitioner was not given an opportunity to recall and further cross-examine some of the witnesses, specially witness No. 3. Balmiki Choubey.
(iii) The findings in respect of some of the charges were based on no evidence.
4. As regards the first point, I should observe that this was taken up for the first time in paragraph 30 of the petition filed before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. When Sri Ram Ratna Singh commenced the enquiry in October, 1958, no such objection was taken. As already pointed out, the enquiry was of a very protracted nature spread over a period of about two years. Innumerable adjournments were granted at the request of both parties. His report was submitted to the Government only on the 31st October. 1960. Then again in the second show cause petition (Annexure 2-P) filed by the petitioner before the Government on the 2nd February, 1962 also, though allegations of malice were made against several police officers and other persons who had participated in the departmental enquiry, the petitioner did not allege that the enquiring officer was biased against him in view of what he had previously written while seeing the papers as Law Secretary.
The only explanation given for this belated objection is that he came to know about this fact "from the Governmental source after his dismissal" (see paragraph 26 of the petitioner's reply to the counter-affidavit). It was urged by Mr. Prasad that as the allegations contained in paragraph 30 of his petition against the enquiring officer have not been specifically challenged in the counter-affidavit filed by the State of Bihar, the facts mentioned by the petitioner should be taken as correct. The enquiring officer, Sri Ram Ratna Singh, was not made a party in this petition, The State of Bihar could not obviously say anything on the subject. If the petitioner really wanted to attack the bona fide of the enquiring officer, he should have made the enquiring officer a party so that the latter may get an opportunity to meet the same. The petitioner by his own conduct has thus prevented the competent person from either affirming or denying the allegations made in Paragraph 30 of his petition.
5. Even if it be assumed that as Law Secretary to the Government of Bihar, Sri Ram Ratna Singh might have seen the papers on the basis of which disciplinary proceedings were subsequently initiated against the petitioner and that he also gave his opinion on the subject, it does not necessarily follow that he ought not to have conducted the enquiry. There can be no question of personal bias between him and the petitioner. Sri Ram Ratna Singh was then a senior officer of the Superior Judicial Service and even if he had expressed any opinion on the basis of the papers that were placed before him, it does not necessarily follow that in a subsequent departmental enquiry his conclusions would be in any way influenced by what he may have seen or written as Law Secretary. I shall show subsequently that the proceedings were conducted with scrupulous regard for fair play and maximum latitude was shown to the petitioner as will be clear from a perusal of the entire order-sheet which the State of Bihar has filed as Annexure I. Even a trial in a regular civil suit could not have been conducted in a more careful and meticulous manner and the enquiring officer has at every stage given full reasons for his orders. I have carefully gone through the same and cannot accept the suggestion of Mr. Prasad that his conclusions must have been influenced by the impression which he might have gathered when seeing the official papers as Law Secretary.
6. Apart from these considerations, I am not satisfied with the explanation given for raising this objection at such a belated stage. In October, 1958, when the Government decided to entrust the enquiry with their Law Secretary, the petitioner could easily have objected on this ground. His statement that he came to know about the part played by Sri Ram Ratna Singh in the initiation of departmental proceedings only after his dismissal cannot be believed. The petitioner was himself a senior gazetted officer. He knows very well that initiation of departmental proceedings against gazetted officers is carefully considered by the various departments in the Secretariat including the Law Department. The very "Governmental source" which (according to paragraph 26 of his reply to the counter-affidavit) gave him information about the part played by Shri Ram Ratna Singh was available to him when the enquiry commenced in October, 1958 and he could easily have raised an objection then. At any rate, when the enquiry was entrusted to the Law Secretary of the Government he could have asked the Government to entrust it to some other competent authority. It is strange indeed that during the course of a protracted enquiry spread over a period of two years where the petitioner was assisted by an able counsel, no objection against the enquiring officer was raised, and again in the second show cause petition also no such plea was taken In the circumstances of this case, therefore, I must overrule this objection and hold that no principle of natural justice was contravened when the law Secretary to the Government conducted the enquiry against the petitioner.
7. The Second objection also seems to be wholly without any substance. I have carefully gone through the entire order-sheet (Annexure I) commencing from 31-10-1958. And ending with 31-5-1960, when the defence arguments were heard. At every stage the enquiring officer has written a complete order-sheet meeting all the points raised at various interlocutory stages by Counsel for both sides and giving his decisions thereon. Many papers were rejected by him as irrelevant, whether produced by the departmental authorities or by the petitioner. He took special care to consult both parties before drawing out a detailed procedure for conducting the enquiry (see his order dated 10-2-1959). On several occasions at the request of the petitioner he directed either the I. G. or the Chief Secretary to the Government or other Governmental authorities to produce the papers called for. More than 63 witnesses were examined against the petitioner and a mass of documents was exhibited both for and against him. On 24-9-1959 a petition was filed on behalf of the petitioner (Annexure Q) to recall one Balmiki Choubey who had already been fully cross-examined for the purpose of further cross-examination. The learned enquiring officer wrote in the order-sheet: "The prayer to recall Balmiki Choubey is rejected". Much stress was laid down on this summary rejection of the prayer of the petitioner to recall Balmiki Choubey for further cross-examination and it was urged by Mr. Prasad that this order of the enquiring officer had materially prejudiced the petitioner.
I am, however, unable to accept this extreme contention. Shri Balmiki Choubey had been previously fully cross-examined on 8-8-1959, 10-9-1959, 11-9-1959 and 12-9-1959. The petitioner's prayer (Annexure Q) for recalling this witness was mainly to prove previous enmity between the Gotias of Balmiki Choubey on the one hand and the petitioner's wife on the other between whom there was a pending case in Balia district. Though the enquiring officer has not given reasons as to why he rejected the prayer of the petitioner for recalling Balmiki Choubey on 24-9-1959, the reason is apparent from a perusal of the contents of the petitioner's own petition (Annexure Q). Even if there was some litigation between the petitioner's wife and some Gotias of Balmiki Choubey, it will not have much importance in the present proceeding. Moreover, letters dealing with that pending case had already been exhibited and it was open to the petitioner to argue on the basis of those letters that his wife was not on good terms with the Gotias of Balmiki Choubey, In the peculiar circumstances, therefore, I must hold that the refusal of the enquiring officer to permit the petitioner to further cross-examine Balmiki Choubey did not materially affect the proper conduct of the proceedings nor did it in any way impair the petitioner's right to cross-examine the witness.
8. In the order-sheet dated 9-10-1959 the enquiring officer wrote: "I have also told the lawyers of the parties that I have no power to summon any witness, and if their witnesses do not turn up in time, it will be their responsibility." This entry has been seized upon by Mr. Prasad in support of his argument that the enquiring officer by declining to summon the petitioner's witnesses seriously handicapped him in his defence. But this entry must be construed in the light of the other entries in the order-sheet. All that the enquiring officer said was that he could not summon witnesses like a civil court but he was always prepared to help the petitioner in either producing witnesses or calling for documents either from the I. G.'s office or from the Chief Secretary's office with a view to enable the petitioner to defend himself. The order-sheet of subsequent dates show clearly that the enquiring officer made repeated attempts by personally writing letters to the departments concerned to see that all papers which have direct bearing on the case were produced before him and made available to the parties.
9. On 8-1-1960 the learned enquiring officer directed in the order-sheet that the evidence of the defence witnesses will commence on the next day, that is, 28-1-1960. On 28-1-1960, and on several subsequent dates of adjournment the prosecution was permitted to prove certain documents and the petitioner also was permitted to prove documents on his behalf (vide orders dated 3-2-1960, 4-2-1960, 5-2-1980 and 6-2-1960) So long as both parties were given equal facilities to prove their respective documents no advese comment can be made of the fact that after directing that defence evidence should commence from 28-1-1960 the enquiring officer permitted the prosecution also to adduce further evidence.
10. In the order dated 10th/12th March, 1960, the learned enquiring officer has written as follows; "I forgot to mention in my order No. 78 that the defence declined to examine Sri Saran or any witness and, therefore, I decided to question Sri Saran on the charges generally and to allow his examination by the defence Counsel and cross-examination by the defence Counsel continued on all the three days and concluded". It was urged with considerable vehemence that the statement in the order-sheet that the petitioner declined to examine either himself or any witness on his behalf was untrue and that the enquiring officer had made a false entry in the order sheet. I am not prepared to accept such an allegation against the enquiring officer in the absence of further materials. After the 12th March, 1960, the case dragged on before him till 31-5-1960 and innumerable adjournments were taken, several documents were admitted on behalf of the petitioner and his Counsel was heard on several dates.
On no such date did the petitioner's Counsel ever repeat his prayer for examination of his witnesses. On the other hand several other submissions were made vide orders dated 18th/ 19th March, 1960, 28th March 1960, 4th April 1960 and 11th April, 1960. Several petitions were also filed on behalf of the petitioner for proof of certain documents but nowhere was it alleged that the petitioner desired to examine witnesses on his behalf. I would, therefore, accept as true the statement made in the order dated 10th/12th March, 1960 and hold that though opportunities were given the petitioner declined to examine either himself or any witness on his behalf in the departmental proceeding. The enquiring officer on the other hand, with a view to give the petitioner an opportunity to explain the evidence against him, questioned him about the case and also permitted the petitioner's Counsel to put further questions to him in the light of the answers given by the petitioner to the enquiring officer. Counsel for the prosecution was very fair and declined to cross-examine the petitioner. It is true that though several documents were culled for from the Government some were not produced on the ground that they were not available or not traced. In respect of each of these documents the enquiring officer has made a special note in the order-sheet. Mr. Prasad, however, urged that the enquiring officer should have further enquired as to whether a search was made for these documents with due diligence and whether the documents were deliberately withheld by the departmental authorities because they apprehended that if produced they may support the petitioner's defence.
In an enquiry in a case of this type where about 63 witnesses were examined by the prosecution and hundreds of documents were produced by both sides, it will be fantastic to urge that in respect of other documents which were reported to be not available or missing the enquiring officer should embark on a collateral enquiry with a view to find out whether a search was made for these documents with due diligence. In the peculiar circumstances of this case I think the enquiring officer adopted the right procedure in not embarking upon such a collateral enquiry. The authorities in charge of the papers called for were specially requested to produce them. Most of them were produced but a few were reported to be not traceable. It is not unusual if certain old papers are not available in a Government office. Mr. Prasad also could not satisfy us as to how the papers which were not made available would have materially affected the case. On the other hand, in paragraph 99 of the petitioner's petition, his main grievance was that the documents mentioned in that paragraph were produced and proved at a belated stage and hence he could not effectively cross-examine the witnesses (see also paragraph 97 of the petition). Apart from his prayer for recalling Balmiki Choubey referred to above for further cross-examination, no other prayer was made for recalling any other prosecution witnesses after their cross-examination was over. As already pointed out, the enquiry continued for several months after the evidence against the petitioner was closed and it was always open to the petitioner's Counsel to file a fresh petition for recalling any of the prosecution witnesses for further cross-examination after giving special reasons for such a step. This was, however, not done. For these reasons, I must hold that the enquiry was done in a very proper manner, that the rules of natural justice were observed and the petitioner got ample opportunities not only to cross-examine the witnesses who deposed against him but also to prove his own documents and he of his own accord declined to examine any witness on his behalf.
11. The third point will be dealt with while discussing the charges separately.
12. The main charge against the petitioner is charge No. 5 which is as follows:--
"That while posted as Camp Commandant, C.T.C. Bihta, and Commander/Commandant, Home Guards Bihar, Patna, Shri Anil Bihari Saran, during the period from 1951 to 1956, deposited in instalments from month to month heavy amounts of money at the Patna Branch of the State Bank of India, Bihar Bank, Bihar State Co-Operative Bank, Punjab National Bank, Allahabad Bank etc. The annual deposits in the above mentioned banks during the years 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955 and 1956 approximately came to Rs. 19,182 A Rs. 52,756/-, Rs. 24,252/-, Rs. 44,151/-, Rs. 50,490/- and Rs. 67,263/-, respectively. These deposits were disproportionate to his known sources of income and were acquisitions made illegally."
It will be found that the total amount in deposit in the said banks for the years 1951 to 1956 comes to more than rupees two and half lacs. An officer of the petitioner's status drawing a pay of about Rs. 1,000/- or, so could not possibly save such a large sum in such a short period. Though Sub-rule (5) of Rule 15 of the Bihar Government servants' Conduct Rules, 1956 was not expressly referred to in the charge, it is obvious that this sub-rule was in view when the charge was framed. This sub-rule is as follows:--
"A Government servant found to be in possession of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of in-come, for which he cannot satisfactorily account, shall, unless the contrary is proved, be presumed to have been guilty of grave misconduct in the discharge of his official duty,"
The petitioner's explanation was that apart from his salary he was getting handsome income from his landed property near Buxar and also from the dairy which was run in the name of his wife in Boring Road, Patna, and other sources. Nevertheless, he did not lead any oral evidence in support of this explanation. At a belated stage, he filed certain diaries, papers and registers in support of this explanation. The learned enquiring officer was not prepared to accept this explanation because the persons who wrote the diaries and the registers, namely, Kailash Lal, Jamuna Frasad and Sukliraj Yadav, were not examined as witnesses. To quote his own words:
"Non-examination of these persons and the production of the documents so late deprived the prosecution of the opportunity or means to test the correctness or genuineness of these documents or to test the veracity of Sri Saran's oral statements. All these documents are private documents and, therefore, examination of the aforesaid persons was absolutely necessary".
13. It was then urged that after having admitted in evidence and marked as exhibits the personal diaries and other papers filed on behalf of the petitioner, it was not open to the learned enquiring officer to refuse to give any importance to those papers on the ground that they were filed at a belated stage. This argument also is unsound. The marking of a document as an exhibit by a tribunal in a quasi judicial proceeding merely means that formal proof of the documents is dispensed with and that the document is considered relevant. The tribunal does not commit itself as regards the weight to be attached to the document, or else as regards the truth or otherwise of the contents of the documents. Here the persons who wrote the documents, namely, Kailash Lal, Jamuna Prasad and Sukhraj Yadav, were not examined as witnesses by the petitioner. It was, therefore, open to the tribunal not to accept as correct the facts stated in the documents.
14. In my opinion, this finding of the learned enquiring officer is unassailable in a writ petition. The amount standing to the credit of the petitioner in the various banks is disproportionate to his salary making deduction for cost of living for himself and his family and the petitioner was bound to explain satisfactorily how he could obtain such a large sum. It Is true that he gave some explanation about additional income from his landed property, the dairy farm in the name of his wife and the house in the name of his mother. But it is Open to a court of tact to accept this explanation or to reject it. The enquiring officer was not prepared to accept it because the persons who could have corroborated the petitioner's statement, namely, his tahsildar, accountant etc. were not examined as witnesses and some private documents were produced at a belated stage. There is no error of law in this reasoning of the learned enquiring officer,
15. After the issue of the second notice and when the petitioner filed the second show cause petition before the Government a belated prayer was made on his behalf to permit him to examine his wife, mother and some other relatives. This was rightly rejected. The enquiry took place for nearly two years and if even with the assistance of an able Counsel the petitioner was not prepared to examine any witness on his behalf, he cannot claim as of right that when the finding in respect of the charge went against him on the ground of non-examination of material witnesses he should be permitted after the second notice had been issued to him to examine additional witnesses.
16. Mr. Prasad then urged that the Government Servants' Conduct Rules, 1956, which contains the aforesaid Sub-rule (5) to Rule 15 could not be given retrospective effect when in the Government Servants' Conduct Rules which were in force prior to 1956 'there was no such sub-rule casting on the delinquent public servant the burden of accounting for his possession of pecuniary resources disproportionate to his known sources of income. He argued that inasmuch as this charge refers to deposits in banks for the years 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954 and 1955 also which took place prior to the coming into force of the Government Servants' Conduct Rules, 1956, Sub-rule (5) of Rule 15 should not have been, applied. This argument is unsound. The charges were framed against the petitioner on the 3rd of February, 1958 when the said rules were in force. Merely because moneys found to be in his possession prior to 1956 were taken into consideration when the charge was made against him in 1958, it cannot be said that the rules were given retrospective effect.
As pointed out by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Sajjan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 464. "to take into consideration the pecuniary resources or property in the possession of the accused or any other person on his behalf which are acquired before the date of the Act is not in any way giving the Act a retrospective operation. A statute cannot be said to be retrospective because a part of the requisitions for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing." They have also relied on State of Bombay v. Vishnu Ramchandra, AIR 1961 SC 307 and Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th edition, p. 211. This is a well known principle. There was, therefore, no illegality in applying the provisions of the Government Servants' Conduct Rules, 1956. against the petitioner.
17. Charge No. 7. This charge is as follows:--
"Shri Anil Bihari Saran committed ads of misappropriation and serious irregularities in respect of part of the money drawn as cartage in connection with anti-crime operations in the district of Purnea and Bhagalpur in the year 1952. Rs. 2.000 had been drawn by Sri Saran in connection with operation called 'Chase' and Rs. 550-8-0 in connection with operation called 'Bank'".
The finding of the learned enquiring officer is that though the latter portion of the charge dealing with a sum of Rs. 550-8-0 drawn in connection with the operation called 'Bank' was not proved, the first portion of the charge dealing with a sum of Rs. 2,000 drawn in connection with the operation called 'Chase' is substantially proved. He held that though it was possible that some of the subordinates of the petitioner, namely, the sector leaders may have taken some share in the amount misappropriated, the petitioner's responsibility for and complicity in the misappropriation has been proved, though it was difficult to say what was the exact amount misappropriated and who actually misappropriated the money. He further observed: There is no doubt that Sri Saran was a party to this misappropriation".
This finding is based on the evidence of several witnesses and documents which were in the handwriting of the petitioner himself. It was urged that the evidence of Balmiki Choubey and Shamlal Singh, which was relied on by the learned enquiring officer, should not have been accepted because they were in the position of an accomplice. But as pointed out in U. R. Bhatt v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 1314, the enquiring officer is not bound by the strict rules of the law of evidence in a departmental enquiry. Hence Illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act cannot be literally applied and it is open to the enquiring officer to hold a public servant guilty even on the basis of the evidence of an accomplice. The other points urged by Mr. Prasad in respect of this charge are all based on facts which this Court is precluded from entering into in this application. There was undoubtedly some evidence, especially documents signed by the petitioner himself, and the evidence of some of his subordinates which, if believed, would justify the conclusion that he was equally guilty with his subordinates in misappropriating this sum.
18. The other charges proved against the petitioner, namely, charge No. 1, items 1, 2 and 6 of charge No. 3 and item 7 of charge No. 4 are of a somewhat minor nature. Though he was charged with bribery, the learned enquiring officer has exonerated him but held him guilty of negligence, gross carelessness, lack of supervision and other minor breaches of departmental rules. It was urged that these findings were based on no evidence. But in my opinion, the findings were based on reasonable conclusions from the materials on record. It is however, unnecessary to discuss this point at great length because once it is held that the main charges, namely, charges Nos. 5 and 7, which show that he was guilty of misappropriation of Government money and of accumulating pecuniary resources disproportionate to his known sources of income have been proved, it will be academic to consider whether the minor charges of negligence of duty or lack of supervision were fully established or not. In this connection I may refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Bidyabhu-shan Mohapatra, AIR 1963 SC 779. There it was pointed out that if a public servant is held guilty of several charges in a departmental enquiry and if it is found subsequently that in respect of some of the charges the rules of natural justice were not complied with, or else that the finding was based on no evidence, nevertheless if the order of dismissal may be supported on any finding as to substantial misdemeanour for which the punishment can be lawfully imposed, it will not be proper for the Court to set aside the order of dismissal and send back the case to the punishing authority to consider afresh whether on the basis of the residuary charges which were said to have been proved, such an order of dismissal could be passed.
Here, the accumulation of more than rupees two and half lacs in a period of five years by a public servant is an act of serious misconduct and the finding that he misappropriated Government money is also an equally serious act of misconduct. The punishment of dismissal passed by the Government could be lawfully imposed for these two acts of misconduct alone. It is, therefore, academic to consider whether there was any reliable evidence in support of the other minor charges, namely, negligence, lack of supervision, etc. Mr. Basudeva Prasad urged that the principle laid down in the aforesaid decision by the Supreme Court is contrary to the principle laid down by their Lordships in several previous decisions. This argument, however, cannot be taken up here, because we are bound by the said judgment which directly deals with the case of a departmental enquiry against a public servant and will apply fully to the facts of the present case.
19. For these reasons, the application is dismissed with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 200.
Anwar Ahmad, J.
20. I agree.