Gujarat High Court
Dhirubhai Mohanbhai Bhanderi vs State Of Gujarat on 17 March, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION
R/CR.MA/1333/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 17/03/2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR QUASHING & SET ASIDE
FIR/ORDER) NO. 1333 of 2020
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M. K. THAKKER
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
✔
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DHIRUBHAI MOHANBHAI BHANDERI & ANR.
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.
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Appearance:
MR MITESH AMIN, LEARNED SENIOR ADVOCATE WITH MR
PRATIK Y JASANI(5325) for the applicant(s) no. 1,2
MS GAYATRIBA B JADEJA(5152) for the Respondent(s) No. 2
VRUNDA SHAH APP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M. K. THAKKER
Date : 17/03/2026
JUDGMENT
1. The present application is filed for quashing of the F.I.R.
being C. R. No.11191015200043 of 2020 registered at Nikol Police Station, Ahmedabad for the offences punishable under Sections 406, 420 and 114 of the IPC and Sections 5, 33(3) and 42 of the Money Laundering Act.
2. As per the allegations made in the F.I.R., which was registered on 11.01.2022, 3 accused, who are named in the F.I.R., Page 1 of 18 Uploaded by Vikramsinh Amarsinh(HCW0055) on Tue Mar 24 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 27 23:07:23 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/1333/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 17/03/2026 undefined out of which accused No.1 - Dhirubhai died on 02.08.2023.
Therefore, the proceedings qua accused No.1 stands abated.
3. So far as accused No.2, who is the applicant before this Court, is concerned, he is the son of accused No.1 and on referring to the recitals of the F.I.R., it emerges that the transaction which was carried out with Dhirubhai was regarding lending of money, against which cheques were issued and as per the allegations, despite payment of the amount borrowed is made, the cheques were not returned by Dhirubhai and one cheque was deposited in the account, which was dishonoured and a complaint under the Negotiable Instruments Act was filed.
Another cheque was handed over to one Savjibhai - accused No. 3, who also deposited in the account and on being dishonoured, a complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act was filed.
4. Heard the learned Senior Advocate Mr. Mitesh Amin with the learned advocate Mr. Pratik Y Jasani for the applicants, learned advocate Ms. Gayatriba B. Jadeja for the respondent No.2 and learned APP Ms. Varunda Shah for the State.
5. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Amin has submitted that previously, a suit under the Specific Relief Act was filed by the Page 2 of 18 Uploaded by Vikramsinh Amarsinh(HCW0055) on Tue Mar 24 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 27 23:07:23 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/1333/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 17/03/2026 undefined family of accused No.1 against the complainant on 24.06.2019, where an application under Order 7 Rule 11 came to be filed by the complainant herein, which came to be rejected on 20.10.2019. It is further submitted by learned advocate Mr. Amin that an injunction application below Exh.5 came to be filed by the family of accused No.1, which came to be allowed.
5.1 It is submitted by learned Senior advocate Mr. Amin that after all these proceedings, the F.I.R. which was lodged on 11.01.2020 without referring to any of the above aspects, the complainant has alleged that cheques which were handed over as security at the time of borrowing the amount were misused by accused Nos.1 and 2 in connivance with accused No.3. It is further submitted by the learned Senior Advocate Mr. Amin that the reply to the notice which was given by the complainant to the accused No.3, suggesting that there is some account dispute with accused No.1 - Dhirubhai, who died during the pendency of the investigation and there was no allegation against accused No.2, who is the son of Dhirubhai. It is submitted by the learned Senior Advocate Mr. Amin that even if the allegations made in the F.I.R.
would be considered on their face value, it does not disclose any Page 3 of 18 Uploaded by Vikramsinh Amarsinh(HCW0055) on Tue Mar 24 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 27 23:07:23 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/1333/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 17/03/2026 undefined cognizable offence and with a view to create a defence in the proceedings which are filed under the N.I. Act, the impugned F.I.R. is filed.
5.2 It is submitted by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Amin that as accused No.1 has died and no role assigned in the F.I.R. disclosing the cognizable offence, the continuation of the F.I.R. would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law and in that background, it is prayed to quash and set aside the F.I.R. It is further submitted by the learned Senior Advocate Mr. Amin that, as per the settled position of law, the offences under Sections 406 and 420 cannot co-exist simultaneously and in that background also, the continuation of the F.I.R. is nothing but harassment.
6. Per contra, learned advocate Ms. Jadeja for the complainant submits that accused No.2, who is the applicant herein, was taking care of the management of the business of accused No.1 -
Dhirubhai and in that background, the investigation is required to be concluded. At this stage, the application for quashing filed by the applicant would be premature.
7. Learned APP Ms. Shah for the State has supported the Page 4 of 18 Uploaded by Vikramsinh Amarsinh(HCW0055) on Tue Mar 24 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 27 23:07:23 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/1333/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 17/03/2026 undefined arguments of the learned advocate Ms. Jadeja for the complainant and submitted that as the investigation is not yet concluded, no interference is called for and the application is required to be dismissed.
8. Having considered the submissions made by the learned advocates for the respective parties and on referring to the allegations made in the F.I.R. Brief of stated in para 12 is reproduced hereinbelow:
"Dhirubhai Mohanbhai Bhanderi and his son Sunilbhai Mohanbhai Bhanderi, both residents of House No. 16, Vikram Park Plotting, Opposite Bajrang Ashram, Krishnanagar, Ahmedabad City; by taking undue advantage of the complainant's financial distress, advanced a total credit of ₹35,00,000 to the complainant at a high interest rate of 2.25%, which exceeds the prevailing market rates. Despite this entire amount including interest being repaid by the complainant, with the intent to commit fraud and breach of trust against the complainant, the cheques provided by the complainant as security for the funds borrowed on interest were misused. The said Dhirubhai deposited one cheque into his own account and another cheque into the account of his accomplice Savjibhai Popatbhai Dhodhari, a resident of F-604, Silver Palace, Surat City. In this matter, by committing fraud and breach of trust, by misappropriating the cheques provided as security by the Page 5 of 18 Uploaded by Vikramsinh Amarsinh(HCW0055) on Tue Mar 24 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 27 23:07:23 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/1333/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 17/03/2026 undefined complainant, by filing false cases against the complainant and, committed the offence in collusion with each other, etc."
8.1 It emerges that there is a dispute between the complainant and Dhirubhai regarding monetary transactions. It also emerges that against the loan which was given by accused Nos.1 and 2 to the complainant, cheques were issued towards the security of the said loan. It is contended by the complainant that despite payment of the loan amount, the cheques were not returned and the same were misused by the accused No.1. On referring to the complaint which is filed under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, it emerges that it was filed by Dhirubhai i.e. accused No.1, who is the father of the applicant No.2.
8.2 At this stage, the reference to the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited and Others V/s. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another reported in 2024 (10) SCC 690, is required to be made, wherein it is held that offences under Sections 406 and 420 both cannot co-exist simultaneously. Relevant observations are as under:
"35. This Court in its decision in S.W. Palanitkar & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Anr. reported in (2002) 1 SCC 241 expounded the difference in the ingredients required for Page 6 of 18 Uploaded by Vikramsinh Amarsinh(HCW0055) on Tue Mar 24 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 27 23:07:23 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/1333/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 17/03/2026 undefined constituting an of offence of criminal breach of trust (Section 406 IPC) viz-a-viz the offence of cheating (Section 420). The relevant observations read as under: -
"9. The ingredients in order to constitute a criminal breach of trust are: (i) entrusting a person with property or with any dominion over property, (ii) that person entrusted (a) dishonestly misappropriating or converting that property to his own use; or (b) dishonestly using or disposing of that property or wilfully suffering any other person so to do in violation (i) of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, (ii) of any legal contract made, touching the discharge of such trust.
10. The ingredients of an offence of cheating are: (i) there should be fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a person by deceiving him, (ii)(a) the person so deceived should be induced to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property; or (b) the person so deceived should be intentionally induced to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived; and (iii) in cases covered by (ii)(b), the act of omission should be one which causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to the person induced in body, mind, reputation or property."
36. What can be discerned from the above is that the offences of criminal breach of trust (Section 406 IPC) and cheating (Section 420 IPC) have specific ingredients. In order to constitute a criminal breach of trust (Section 406 IPC): -
1) There must be entrustment with person for property or Page 7 of 18 Uploaded by Vikramsinh Amarsinh(HCW0055) on Tue Mar 24 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 27 23:07:23 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/1333/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 17/03/2026 undefined dominion over the property, and
2) The person entrusted: -
a) dishonestly misappropriated or converted property to his own use, or
b) dishonestly used or disposed of the property or willfully suffers any other person so to do in violation of:
i. any direction of law prescribing the method in which the trust is discharged; or ii. legal contract touching the discharge of trust (see: S.W.P. Palanitkar (supra).
Similarly, in respect of an offence under Section 420 IPC, the essential ingredients are: -
1) deception of any person, either by making a false or misleading representation or by other action or by omission;
2) fraudulently or dishonestly inducing any person to deliver any property, or
3) the consent that any persons shall retain any property and finally intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit (see: Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab, (2009) 7 SCC 712 : (2009) Cr.L.J. 3462 (SC))
37. Further, in both the aforesaid sections, mens rea i.e. intention to defraud or the dishonest intention must be present, and in the case of cheating it must be there from the very beginning or inception.
38. In our view, the plain reading of the complaint fails to spell out any of the aforesaid ingredients noted above. We may only say, with a view to clear a serious misconception of law in the mind of the police as well as the courts below, Page 8 of 18 Uploaded by Vikramsinh Amarsinh(HCW0055) on Tue Mar 24 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 27 23:07:23 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/1333/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 17/03/2026 undefined that if it is a case of the complainant that offence of criminal breach of trust as defined under Section 405 of IPC, punishable under Section 406 of IPC, is committed by the accused, then in the same breath it cannot be said that the accused has also committed the offence of cheating as defined and explained in Section 415 of the IPC, punishable under Section 420 of the IPC.
39. Every act of breach of trust may not result in a penal offence of criminal breach of trust unless there is evidence of manipulating act of fraudulent misappropriation. An act of breach of trust involves a civil wrong in respect of which the person may seek his remedy for damages in civil courts but, any breach of trust with a mens rea, gives rise to a criminal prosecution as well. It has been held in Hari Prasad Chamaria v. Bishun Kumar Surekha & Ors., reported in (1973) 2 SCC 823 as under:
"4. We have heard Mr. Maheshwari on behalf of the appellant and are of the opinion that no case has been made out against the respondents under Section 420 Penal Code, 1860. For the purpose of the present appeal, we would assume that the various allegations of fact which have been made in the complaint by the appellant are correct. Even after making that allowance, we find that the complaint does not disclose the commission of any offence on the part of the respondents under Section 420 Penal Code, 1860. There is nothing in the complaint to show that the respondents had dishonest or fraudulent intention at the time the appellant parted with Rs. 35.000/- There is also nothing to indicate that the respondents induced the Page 9 of 18 Uploaded by Vikramsinh Amarsinh(HCW0055) on Tue Mar 24 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 27 23:07:23 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/1333/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 17/03/2026 undefined appellant to pay them Rs. 35,000/- by deceiving him. It is further not the case of the appellant that a representation was made, the respondents knew the same to be false. The fact that the respondents subsequently did not abide by their commitment that they would show the appellant to be the proprietor of Drang Transport Corporation and would also render accounts to him in the month of December might create civil liability on the respondents for the offence of cheating."
40. To put it in other words, the case of cheating and dishonest intention starts with the very inception of the transaction. But in the case of criminal breach of trust, a person who comes into possession of the movable property and receives it legally, but illegally retains it or converts it to his own use against the terms of the contract, then the question is, in a case like this, whether the retention is with dishonest intention or not, whether the retention involves criminal breach of trust or only a civil liability would depend upon the facts of each case.
41. The distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of criminal breach of trust and cheating is a fine one. In case of cheating, the intention of the accused at the time of inducement should be looked into which may be judged by a subsequent conduct, but for this, the subsequent conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to a criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right from the beginning of the transaction i.e. the time when the offence is said to have been committed. Therefore, it is this intention, which is the Page 10 of 18 Uploaded by Vikramsinh Amarsinh(HCW0055) on Tue Mar 24 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 27 23:07:23 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/1333/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 17/03/2026 undefined gist of the offence.
42. Whereas, for the criminal breach of trust, the property must have been entrusted to the accused or he must have dominion over it. The property in respect of which the offence of breach of trust has been committed must be either the property of some person other than the accused or the beneficial interest in or ownership' of it must be of some other person. The accused must hold that property on trust of such other person. Although the offence, i.e. the offence of breach of trust and cheating involve dishonest intention, yet they are mutually exclusive and different in basic concept.
43. There is a distinction between criminal breach of trust and cheating. For cheating, criminal intention is necessary at the time of making a false or misleading representation i.e., since inception. In criminal breach of trust, mere proof of entrustment is sufficient. Thus, in case of criminal breach of trust, the offender is lawfully entrusted with the property, and he dishonestly misappropriated the same. Whereas, in case of cheating, the offender fraudulently or dishonestly induces a person by deceiving him to deliver any property. In such a situation, both the offences cannot co-exist simultaneously.
44. At the most, the court of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate could have issued process for the offence punishable under Section 420 of the IPC i.e. cheating but in any circumstances no case of criminal breach of trust is made out. The reason being that indisputably there is no entrustment of any property in the case at hand. It is not Page 11 of 18 Uploaded by Vikramsinh Amarsinh(HCW0055) on Tue Mar 24 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 27 23:07:23 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/1333/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 17/03/2026 undefined even the case of the complainant that any property was lawfully entrusted to the appellants and that the same has been dishonestly misappropriated. The case of the complainant is plain and simple. He says that the price of the goods sold by him has not been paid. Once there is a sale, Section 406 of the IPC goes out of picture. According to the complainant, the invoices raised by him were not cleared. No case worth the name of cheating is also made out.
45. Even if the Magistrate would have issued process for the offence punishable under Section 420 of the IPC, i.e., cheating the same would have been liable to be quashed and set aside, as none of the ingredients to constitute the offence of cheating are disclosed from the materials on record.
46. It has been held in State of Gujarat v. Jaswantlal Nathalal reported in (1968) 2 SCR 408, "The term "entrusted" found in Section 405 IPC governs not only the words "with the property" immediately following it but also the words "or with any dominion over the property"
occurring thereafter--see Velji Raghvaji Patel v. State of Maharashtra [(1965) 2 SCR 429]. Before there can be any entrustment there must be a trust meaning thereby an obligation annexed to the ownership of property and a confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner or declared and accepted by him for the benefit of another or of another and the owner. But that does not mean that such an entrustment need conform to all the technicalities of the law of trust -- see Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v. State of Bombay [1956 SCR 483]. The expression "entrustment"
carries with it the implication that the person handing over Page 12 of 18 Uploaded by Vikramsinh Amarsinh(HCW0055) on Tue Mar 24 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 27 23:07:23 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/1333/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 17/03/2026 undefined any property or on whose behalf that property is handed over to another, continues to be its owner. Further the person handing over the property must have confidence in the person taking the property so as to create a fiduciary relationship between them. A mere transaction of sale cannot amount to an "entrustment"".
47. Similarly, in Central Bureau of Investigation, SPE, SIU(X), New Delhi v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd., Calcutta reported in (1996) 5 SCC 591 this Court held that the expression "entrusted with property" used in Section 405 of the IPC connotes that the property in respect of which criminal breach of trust can be committed must necessarily be the property of some person other than the accused or that the beneficial interest in or ownership thereof must be in the other person and the offender must hold such property in trust for such other person or for his benefit. The relevant observations read as under: -
"27. In the instant case, a serious dispute has been raised by the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties as to whether on the face of the allegations, an offence of criminal breach of trust is constituted or not. In our view, the expression "entrusted with property" or "with any dominion over property" has been used in a wide sense in Section 405 IPC. Such expression includes all cases in which goods are entrusted, that is, voluntarily handed over for a specific purpose and dishonestly disposed of in violation of law or in violation of contract. The expression 'entrusted' appearing in Section 405 IPC is not necessarily a term of law. It has wide and different implications in different contexts. It is, Page 13 of 18 Uploaded by Vikramsinh Amarsinh(HCW0055) on Tue Mar 24 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 27 23:07:23 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/1333/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 17/03/2026 undefined however, necessary that the ownership or beneficial interest in the ownership of the property entrusted in respect of which offence is alleged to have been committed must be in some person other than the accused and the latter must hold it on account of some person or in some way for his benefit. The expression 'trust' in Section 405 IPC is a comprehensive expression and has been used to denote various kinds of relationships like the relationship of trustee and beneficiary, bailor and bailee, master and servant, pledger and pledgee. When some goods are hypothecated by a person to another person, the ownership of the goods still remains with the person who has hypothecated such goods. The property in respect of which criminal breach of trust can be committed must necessarily be the property of some person other than the accused or the beneficial interest in or ownership of it must be in the other person and the offender must hold such property in trust for such other person or for his benefit. In a case of pledge, the pledged article belongs to some other person but the same is kept in trust by the pledgee. [...]"
(Emphasis supplied)
48. The aforesaid exposition of law makes it clear that there should be some entrustment of property to the accused wherein the ownership is not transferred to the accused. In case of sale of movable property, although the payment may be deferred yet the property in the goods passes on delivery as per Sections 20 and 24 respectively of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930.
"20. Specific goods in a deliverable state. -- Where there is an unconditional contract for the sale of specific goods in a Page 14 of 18 Uploaded by Vikramsinh Amarsinh(HCW0055) on Tue Mar 24 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 27 23:07:23 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/1333/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 17/03/2026 undefined deliverable state, the property in the goods passes to the buyer when the contract is made and it is immaterial whether the time of payment of the price or the time of delivery of goods, or both, is postponed.
Xxx xxx xxx
24. Goods sent on approval or "on sale or return". -- When goods are delivered to the buyer on approval or "on sale or return" or other similar terms, the property therein passes to the buyer--
(a) when he signifies his approval or acceptance to the seller or does any other act adopting the transaction;
(b) if he does not signify his approval or acceptance to the seller but retains the goods without giving notice of rejection, then, if a time has been fixed for the return of the goods on the expiration of such time, and, if no time has been fixed, on the expiration of a reasonable time."
49. From the aforesaid, there is no manner of any doubt whatsoever that in case of sale of goods, the property passes to the purchaser from the seller when the goods are delivered. Once the property in the goods passes to the purchaser, it cannot be said that the purchaser was entrusted with the property of the seller. Without entrustment of property, there cannot be any criminal breach of trust. Thus, prosecution of cases on charge of criminal breach of trust, for failure to pay the consideration amount in case of sale of goods is flawed to the core. There can be civil remedy for the non-payment of the consideration amount, but no criminal case will be maintainable for it. [See : Lalit Chaturvedi and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Page 15 of 18 Uploaded by Vikramsinh Amarsinh(HCW0055) on Tue Mar 24 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 27 23:07:23 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/1333/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 17/03/2026 undefined Another : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 171 & Mideast Integrated Steels Ltd. (MESCO Steel Ltd.) and Others v. State of Jharkhand and Another : 2023 SCC OnLine Jhar 301]
50. The case at hand falls in category No. 1 as laid in Smt. Nagawwa (supra) referred to in para 7 of this judgment.
51. If it is the case of the complainant that a particular amount is due and payable to him then he should have filed a civil suit for recovery of the amount against the appellants herein. But he could not have gone to the court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate by filing a complaint of cheating and criminal breach of trust. It appears that till this date, the complainant has not filed any civil suit for recovery of the amount which according to him is due and payable to him by the appellants. He seems to have prima facie lost the period of limitation for filing such a civil suit.
52. In such circumstances referred to above, the continuation of the criminal proceeding would be nothing but abuse of the process of law."
8.3 Considering the above decision, as well as in the background of the facts of the case on hand, it emerges that to implicate the present applicant, allegations are made by the complainant that money was borrowed by him from accused Nos.1 and 2 and it was repaid. However, subsequently, the cheques which are stated to have been deposited towards the security of the loan were misused by accused No.1, who is the father of the present applicant. As the complaint, which was filed Page 16 of 18 Uploaded by Vikramsinh Amarsinh(HCW0055) on Tue Mar 24 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 27 23:07:23 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/1333/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 17/03/2026 undefined on the basis of the cheque which was dishonoured against the complainant, was abated due to the death of the original accused No.1. After availing the loan facility from the present applicant as well as accused No.1, as per the recital of the FIR, no attribution in the offence was alleged and in that background, continuation of the proceedings against the present applicant would be nothing but harassment. It emerges from the record that the applicant was arraigned only to exert pressure on accused No.1, who died during the pendency of the proceedings; that is also one more reason to quash the impugned FIR.
8.4 Considering the above aspects, this Court is of the view that the case squarely falls under category Nos.1 and 5 of the State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; wherein category Nos.1 and 5 are reproduced hereinunder:
"(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the Page 17 of 18 Uploaded by Vikramsinh Amarsinh(HCW0055) on Tue Mar 24 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 27 23:07:23 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION R/CR.MA/1333/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 17/03/2026 undefined accused."
9. Resultantly, the present application is allowed. F.I.R. being C. R. No.11191015200043 of 2020 registered at Nikol Police Station, Ahmedabad is hereby quashed and set aside.
(M. K. THAKKER,J) Vikramsinh Amarsinh Page 18 of 18 Uploaded by Vikramsinh Amarsinh(HCW0055) on Tue Mar 24 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 27 23:07:23 IST 2026